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THE BEGINNING OF EARLY CHRISTIAN ARCHITECTURE*

By Richard Krautheimer
Professor of Art, Vassar College

When we think of the origins of Early Christian architecture, the first thing that comes to mind is the normal Early Christian basilica. Indeed, it is this form which appears in some of the most important churches, and which, in the course of centuries, has grown more and more important in Christian architecture: an edifice consisting of a nave, and two or four aisles separated from one another by rows of columns, a transept and an apse. It is this form which dominates the imagination of the historian when he thinks back to the Early Christian period, and the assumption is that it is this form which, from the very beginning dominated Early Christian architecture.

There remain, however, several questions. First, was this highly developed form really the beginning of Christian church architecture, or did there exist any earlier edifices belonging to Christian congregations? Second, if any did exist—what did they look like? Was the developed basilica the only type, in either the Roman Empire or in Rome itself, or did there exist other variations? Was it, at least, the dominating one? And third, since the Early Christian basilica form has become so important in the course of history, how did it originate?

The question of whether Christian edifices existed before the recognition of Christianity under Constantine is answered for the first period, the decades that followed the death of Christ and the foundation of Christianity as a religion under Paul, in the Acts of the Apostles,[1] and in the Epistles of St. Paul. From them it appears that the small communities of this earliest period, communities of friends, based on personal relationships as well as on a common creed, assembled in the house or apartment of some more well-to-do member of

* This article represents a paper read at a meeting of the New York Chapter of the American Archeological Institute on March 14, 1938. Despite its preliminary character, I am publishing it without alterations, adding footnotes only, in order to provoke discussion on some of the more important problems involved. I am planning two more detailed studies on "The Pre-Constantinian Churches in Rome," and "The Imperial Character of the Early Christian Basilica."

1. See, for instance, Acts 1:13; 16:15; 20:7 ff.; 21:18 ff.

the group—in any room large enough to shelter them.[2] This situation seems still to have prevailed in the second century; again the community probably assembled in some privately owned house. The Elder presided, he or a wandering preacher (such as Paul had been) gave a sermon, prayers were offered, the memoirs of the apostles or the writings of the prophets were read, a common meal was eaten, and a discussion on religious or administrative matters may have ensued.[3]

But this situation could no longer be maintained after the communities had grown, and had been consolidated, as was the case during the late second and third centuries. The Christian community of Rome apparently consisted, by the middle of the third century, of about 50,000 members, or five per cent of the population of Rome.[4] In the Eastern provinces sometimes a majority of the population was Christian.[5] Larger assembly rooms were needed for regular meetings, and an administration had to be created; a regular clergy (no longer a lay clergy) had to be installed, and an organization for the administration of charities had to be set up, as well as archives, a legal office, etc. Such a set-up was created in Rome between 230 and 250.[6] But where were the assembly-rooms, the "churches" of this growing community? Private homes had certainly become too small for such a purpose. The earlier assumption was that, in Rome at least, the communities assembled in the catacombs, the vast subterranean cemeteries outside the city, because of the continuous persecutions. But this theory has been disproved. Catacombs seem to have existed only in a few places, in Rome, in Lower Italy and Sicily, and in North Africa (Cyrene). Furthermore, the Christian communities did not suffer from continuous persecutions: during the third century there took place in Rome only

2. The synagogues of the Jewish communities seem to have become unavailable for the newly developing Christian sects as early as the period of St. Paul. See Acts 9: 20 ff.; 14:1 ff.

3. *C. Plinii Secundi Epistularum libri decem.* Ed., E. T. Merrill. (Leipzig, 1922), X, 9; Justin Martyr, *First Apology*, chaps. 65-67; *Didache* 8-14; for these see J. C. Ayer, *A Sourcebook for Ancient Church History* (New York, 1913); Tertullian, Apologeticus adversus gentes XXXIX (J. P. Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, I, 538; *The Ante-Nicene Fathers*, III, 47): "de solo triclinio Christianorum refractatur . . .," the interpolation "modest supper-room" in the translation of the A.N.F. seems not to be justified.

4. Letter of Pope Cornelius to Bishop Fabius, in Eusebius, *Hist. Eccles.*, VI, 43 (*The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, Second Series, I, 286 ff.).

5. A. Harnack, *The Expansion of Christianity*, trans., J. Moffat (New York, 1904-05), II, pp. 240 ff.

6. E. Caspar, *Geschichte des Papsttums* (Tübingen, 1930-33), I, p. 50 ff.

two persecutions which lasted two years each. It was during these persecutions that small groups of Christians were arrested in the catacombs, and thus the legend of the use of the catacombs as hiding and worshipping places has grown up. Under normal conditions the catacombs were not at all a suitable place for divine services. The network of the galleries was much too complicated, and the "chapels" in the catacombs (which are really tomb chambers) were far too small for the large Christian communities of the third century. The largest of these chambers, the so-called Chapel of the Popes, offers room for fifty people at the most. And the catacombs themselves were too far from the city. For the same reasons the small trefoiled chapels which sometimes are situated above the catacombs could not serve for regular meetings. There must have existed within the city regular assembly-rooms for the community; there remains the problem of determining what they looked like.

About twenty years ago, Monsignor J. P. Kirsch, Director of the Pontifical Institute for Christian Archeology, pointed out that below numerous Roman churches there were preserved remains of Roman houses. Since some of these houses were decorated with murals showing Christian symbols, it was a splendid hypothesis to assume that these very houses represented the ecclesiastical centers, the so-called *tituli*, of the third century Christian communities.[7] As the result of a campaign of research undertaken two years ago, I think I can establish more definitely in at least one case,—namely SS. Giovanni e Paolo—the appearance of such a community house.[8]

The church which now exists on this site shows in the interior a remodelling of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while the basic structure, which is visible from the outside, shows fifth century features. It is clear that below the church, and in its side walls, are preserved the remains of at least four private houses, three of them erected about the middle of the second century and later remodelled several times, while the fourth one may have been entirely a construction of the third century. This last house, under the front part of the church, as well as the one situated under the present apse, can be disregarded, since they did not form part of the community house, which

7. J. P. Kirsch, *Die römischen Titelkirchen im Altertum* (Paderborn, 1918).

8. Earlier attempts were made by Germano di S. Stanislao, *La casa celimontana dei SS. martiri Giovani e Paolo* (Rome, 1894); E. Junyent, *Il Titolo di S. Clemente* (Rome 1932), pp. 107 ff.

made use of only the two houses situated under the eastern half of the present nave and aisles. One of these houses, situated in the rear, was a private residence; the larger one, situated along the street, the Clivus Scauri, showed the normal plan of a Roman apartment house with a



Fig. 1. ROME—House of Titulus at SS. Giovanni e Paolo. Reconstruction (*drawing—C. Ulrich*)

row of shops on the ground floor (Figure 1). Both houses were certainly not originally Christian. But about the middle of the third century, as can be seen from the masonry of the new parts (the masonry can be clearly characterized as to period, since it changes continually, both as to the materials used, and as to the thickness and consistency of the mortar beds) the houses were joined by covering the narrow, oblique by-lane between them, and remodelled by erecting some new walls in the interior and a common façade towards the street; as mentioned above, a third house with shops was erected on the right at about the same period. The façade of the main building shows that it belonged to a large three-storied edifice: on the ground floor level are arcades with a portico behind, which opened onto the former shop rooms, while on the second and third floor levels are windows. From the exterior it seems to be a normal Roman apartment house, but while the windows on the second and third floor of the left half of the façade fall very clearly into groups which represent an interior division into two rooms

on the left and a single room, possibly a hallway, in the middle of the building, the seven windows on the right show quite a different pattern. The distances between these windows are too small to allow for partition walls dividing the width of the floor on this side into smaller rooms. Only a large hall could have existed in this part of the house, and the existence of such a vast room seems to be confirmed by the existence of a wall on the ground floor, which was erected during this remodelling, and which runs through the whole width of the house up to the façade. This wall must have been erected in order to support a strong upper wall, namely, the west wall of the large room on the second floor, while an even stronger wall under its middle axis may have supported its floor, and perhaps a row of piers along its axis.[9] So large a room, however, would have been of no use in an apartment house; it was suitable only for a large meeting room. It was fifty feet wide and forty to sixty feet long, and may have been two storeys high.

It cannot, of course, be definitely proved that at the time of the remodelling, about the middle of the third century, this strange house, with its large hall suitable for assemblies on the right, and a number of smaller rooms which would be suitable for administrative and similar purposes on the left, was already in the possession of a Christian community. It is certain, however, that the building was in Christian hands by the beginning of the fourth century, when the older rooms on the ground floor of the house were decorated in fresco with Christian symbols, and a staircase and a Confessio (a small room for preserving relics) were constructed on a mezzanine above the former by-lane, immediately under the floor of the hall on the second storey.[10] Above this Confessio stood an altar, the place of which is still marked in the middle of the nave of the present church at a place where normally no altar would be found. This must be the place where, in the community house, the altar was erected, and this place would have been situated exactly in the middle of the hall at a short distance from its east wall. Thus the early fourth century plan of the house is quite clear; the rooms on the ground floor were accessible from the street and evidently served as a vestibule, offices, etc. On the second (and

9. See also Junyent, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

10. Although the paintings on the walls of the staircase and the Confessio are hardly earlier in date than the middle of the fourth century, the masonry of these walls points definitely to the first half of the century.

probably also on the third floor) there were more small rooms, possibly offices, on the left, while the large hall on the right contained an altar set not far from the wall. This seems to have been the typical arrangement of a Christian community house of the period immediately before Constantine: a house of normal aspect, the interior of which was adapted to the needs of the Christian community.

I think this arrangement indicates also the position of the Christian communities in Rome at that time. The periods of persecution were rare and short, and in most cases of a more or less local character, and the intermediary periods were peaceful. Christianity was certainly not a *religio licita*—i.e., a religion officially recognized by the State; but it was a *religio tolerata* with which the state did not interfere.[11] It maintained a semi-legal status, and was thus enabled to own property[12] (perhaps through an intermediary in whose name the property was purchased); it was enabled to own a house, and to remodel this house so as to adapt it to religious needs, and its members were able to meet regularly for service. As long as the meeting place preserved the façade of a private house (and the meeting therefore preserved the character of a private meeting) the State evidently saw no reason to interfere.

These conclusions can, of course, not be based on SS. Giovanni e Paolo alone. They rest on documentary evidence as well,[13] and also on the existence of a number of similar pre-Constantinian *tituli* in Rome, the remains of which would lead to similar conclusions if they were reconstructed.[14] These semi-private community houses existed also during the third century outside Rome, in the provinces of the Empire. One of them was excavated by the Yale Expedition a few years ago in the small town of Dura, not far from the Persian border,[15] this one dated 231. On the other hand, this type of house was in no way limited to the Christian communities; Jewish communities constructed a certain type of synagogue in about the same way,[16] and so frequently

11. The persecutions seem to have been directed more against individuals who refused to bring the due sacrifices, than against the communities qua communities. See Ayer, *op. cit.*, and R. Knopf, *Ausgewählte Märtyrerakten* (Leipzig, 1901).

12. See A. Lampridius, *Vita Alexandri Severi (Scriptores historiae Augustae)*, chap. 49.

13. Kirsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 175 ff.

14. Junyent, *op. cit.*, pp. 86 ff.

15. *Excavations at Dura-Europos. Preliminary Report of Fifth Season of the Excavations (1931-32) Conducted by Yale University. The Christian Church at Dura-Europos*, by C. Hopkins and P. V. C. Baur (New Haven, Conn., 1934).

16. E. Renan, "La synagogue de Hammam-Lif," *Revue Archéologique* (1883), I, pp. 157 ff.; (1884) II, pp. 273 ff.; *Excavations at Dura-Europos, Report of Sixth*

did the Mithraic communities.[17] It is a type in perfect conformity with the position of tolerated, semi-legal, but not officially recognized communities.

It will thus be readily comprehended that the Recognition Act of 313 A.D. immediately affected the arrangement of the churches, since it changed the status of the Christian communities. The history of this Recognition Act, and the reasons for it, cannot be discussed here; nor is the rather controversial question of Constantine's "conversion" of any importance in this study. To us the important factor is that, through the various decrees issued at this time, the Christian creed was officially recognized, and the status of the Christian communities legalized. Thus, they were entitled to erect public places of worship which were impressive enough to emphasize the importance of the newly recognized community. It is understandable that, besides the new public places of worship, the tradition of the older semi-public and semi-private "house of the community" still continued; its diffusion declined gradually, of course, while the number and importance of places of public worship grew in the Christian communities of the Empire. But it would be a mistake, I think, to assume that all the newly erected churches followed one type only—that of the Early Christian basilica. On the contrary, there exist quite a number of variations, and for an understanding of the development of the new Early Christian architecture, these secondary types are extremely important.

The previous tradition of Early Christian architecture had created during the third century a very definite type of assembly hall within the houses of the community, the *tituli:* plain large rooms with an altar to one side. The natural first step for the Christian communities, after their recognition, was to isolate these halls as separate buildings, to make them more conspicuous, and (because of the increasing number of the faithful) to enlarge them. A typical example of such a simple large assembly hall is the church excavated at S. Crisogono in Rome about twenty-five years ago.[18]

The excavated church is a relatively late structure, of the fifth cen-

Season, 1932-33 (New Haven, 1936); E. L. Sukenik, "The Ancient Synagogue of *El-Hammeh*, *Journal of the Palestine Archeological Society* (1935).

17. For instance, in the house with the mithraeum below the apse of S. Clemente in Rome, Junyent, *op. cit.*, pp. 66 ff.

18. M. Mesnard, *La basilique de St. Chrysogone à Rome* (Città del Vaticano, 1935); R. Krautheimer, *Corpus basilicarum Christianarum Romae* (Città del Vaticano, 1937) Vol. I.

tury, single-naved with an apse and side rooms, and with a narthex (an entrance hall) in the front part of the nave. Within this building, however, the remains of an older building are preserved, still discernible because of the difference in the masonry. This older construction was a simple hall, with three arched openings in its façade and with doorways probably leading into open porticoes, or side rooms, along the



Fig. 2. Rome—S. Crisogono—Exterior. Reconstruction (*drawing—W. Frankl*)

flanks of the church (Figure 2). That this simple hall was a church is proved by the tradition of the site, by the existence of choir screens which separate a "nave" for the faithful from a "choir" for the clergy, and by the openings in the side walls, which would also fit the ecclesiastical character; the porticoes (or courtyards or side rooms) along the church could serve for the catechumens who had to attend part of the service outside the church. This arrangement recalls two passages in Eusebius' description of the basilica of Tyre:

> . . . Then he considered the rest and the parts outside the church, artfully equipping it with lateral rooms (*exedrai*), and with vast halls on each side which were linked to the flanks of the royal hall and united with the entrances to the central edifice. . . .
>
> . . . Others he arranged under the first outside columns around the quadrangular hall initiating them into the first elements of the letter of the four gospels. Those, however, he joins on both sides to the royal house;

catechumens who are still growing and progressing, yet not far away, nor a long way separated from the sight of the divinity which possess the faithful innermost.[19]

But this type of hall itself is in no way distinguished as an ecclesiastical edifice. It is a common Roman type of assembly hall used in administrative and other buildings, such as the single-naved halls at Urspring and Wiesbaden,[20] and the Curia of Diocletian in Rome. It is this type of plan which is found in quite a number of early churches, mostly of the fourth and early fifth centuries, in the more distant provinces of the Christian world such as Dalmatia,[21] Istria,[22] Carinthia,[23] Germany,[24] and Syria.[25]

The diffusion of this type makes it quite evident that in the first decades after the recognition of Christianity by Constantine, when the Christians first appeared in public and erected public edifices, they used for their churches the usual type of secular public building without transforming it in any considerable way. To them a meeting was first of all a meeting, and evidently it made no great difference to their architects whether its purpose was ecclesiastical or secular. Were it not for the choir screens, and for the priests' bench which sometimes appears, the special function of the edifice would not be evident. These features, however, are important, for they show the separation of a more and

19. Eusebius, *op. cit.*, X, chap. IV, 45, 63 (J. P. Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, XX, 868, 873 ff.; *The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, Second Series, I, pp. 375 ff.).

20. F. Koepp, ed., *Germania Romana*, I, (2nd ed.) *Die Bauten des römischen Heeres* (Bamberg, 1924), Pl. XII, 1; XIV.

21. W. Gerber and R. Egger, *Forschungen in Salona*, I (Vienna, 1917): Oratory in the North Thermae.

22. W. Gerber, *Altchristliche Kultbauten Istriens und Dalmatiens* (Dresden, 1912); R. Egger, *Frühchristliche Kirchenbauten im südlichen Norikum*, Sonderschriften des Österreichischen Archäologischen Instituts, IX (Vienna, 1916); K. Lanckoroński-Brzezie and G. Niemann, *Der Dom von Aquileia* (Vienna, 1906); C. Cecchelli and others, *La basilica di Aquileia* (Bologna, 1933); A. Gnirs, *Forschungsergebnisse aus dem südlichen Istrien*, Jahresbericht des Österreichschen Archäologischen Instituts, XII (Vienna, 1910), XIV (1911); Nesactium, north church; Parenzo, south buildings. Sometimes the roof is carried by interior rows of supports: Aquileia; Parenzo; Nesactium, south church; Brioni; Pola.

23. R. Egger, *op. cit.*, Hemmaberg before middle of fifth century; Gratzkogel near Virunum (Zollfeld); Aguntum near Linz, Tyrol (with side entrance).

24. E. J. R. Schmidt, *Kirchliche Bauten des frühen Mittelalters in Südwestdeutschland* (Mainz, 1932); H. Lehner and W. Bader, "Baugeschichtliche Untersuchungen am Bonner Münster," *Bonner Jahrbücher* (1932); W. Bader, "Ausgrabungen unter dem Xantener Dom," *Germania* (1934); Mainz, St. Alban; Bonn, Cathedral; Xanten, Cathedral.

25. H. C. Butler, *Early Churches in Syria* (Princeton, 1929); Chapels at Kasril Muddakhkhin; 'Anz; Dâr Kitâ; Banâkfur; Il-Ubêr.

a less important part within the assembly room, and thus a hierarchic separation quite different from the design of a common lay-brotherly congregation room as it existed in SS. Giovanni e Paolo. A step in the same direction was the adoption of the longitudinal (instead of the older transverse) plan, by which the altar became the dominating feature of the edifice, instead of a simple piece of furniture. The assembly hall was subordinated to the altar; the place set apart for the clergy became more important than the place for the congregation; the first signs of the transformation from the assembly hall into what a developed Catholicism would call a true church now became evident.

How earlier types of assembly halls were taken over by the church, and transformed in varied ways, is shown also in the church of S. Croce in Rome, founded about 350 A.D. Under the Baroque decoration numerous older structures are hidden.[26] The interior walls of the nave are clearly twelfth century, according to their masonry, and this is confirmed by the fact that Lucius II remodelled the church between 1144 and 1146. But the exterior walls of the building are much earlier, even older than the foundation here of a church of the fourth century. Their masonry shows that they are early third century, and we know that the edifice originally formed a part of the Sessorian palace. In this original state it presented itself as a large oblong transverse hall with five large archways opening onto a courtyard, and above them a series of five large windows (Plate I). A similar row of arches in the rear opened into a back room, also with five windows in the upper wall. On the shorter sides were two rows of windows, one above the other, and some secondary rooms. This older palace hall was given to the church, and was transformed, in the second half of the fourth century, for its new ecclesiastical purpose, by adding an apse to one of the short side walls. This, of course, involved the shifting of the axis from a transverse to a longitudinal direction. While those facts are generally known,[27] a new and rather surprising feature was discovered during our recent investigations: simultaneously with the addition of the apse, the interior of the edifice had been altered by the addition of two series of transverse arches which crossed the width of the nave. Remains of

26. H. Hübsch, *Die altchristlichen Kirchen* (Carlsruhe, 1862-63); A. Stegenšak, "Architektonische Untersuchung von S. Croce," *Römische Quartalschrift* (1900); G. Biasiotti e S. Pesarini, "Pitture del XII secolo . . . nella basilica di S. Croce," *Studi Romani*, I (1913); Krautheimer, *op. cit.*

27. Hübsch, *loc. cit.*; Stegenšak, *loc. cit.*; Biasiotti e S. Pesarini, *loc. cit.*

PLATE I

Rome—S. Croce—Flank

Rome. Old St. Peter's. Interior—(*Cod. Barb. lat. 4410*)

PLATE II

these arches are still preserved, and although their traces are very small they are sufficient for a reconstruction of the arrangement. Three pieces of walls, later than the original walls of the building and contemporaneous with the apse, show the places where the transverse walls had been inserted in the flanks of the older building, and the remnant of an arch, visible under and within the twelfth century interior wall of the nave, shows that each of these transverse walls was supported by three arches. Even the columns on which these arches rested are still preserved in the present building. Thus the Early Christian transformation of S. Croce appears as a hall with an apse and with two series of arches, arranged in a rythmical pattern, with two wider bays flanking a narrow one. It is a design unique in Roman churches, which finds its only parallels in a quite distant province of Early Christian architecture, in the Djebel Hauran in Southern Syria,[28] in the pagan (?) basilica of Shakka, and in a few churches, e.g., at Tafha, at Nimreh, and in the church at Kanawat which was attached to the south flank of the atrium of an older pagan (?) basilica. This last was also remodelled at the same time by constructing transverse arches across its nave and aisles, and in this remodelling a rhythmical pattern was created similar to the one used at S. Croce in Rome.

Aside from the importance of this discovery from the point of view of the history of architecture, the interesting fact about S. Croce is that the audience hall of a palace was used in the middle of the fourth century to fit the needs of the Church. Apparently, even by 350 A.D. the Church had not yet developed any one type of Christian edifice which exclusively dominated ecclesiastical architecture. A secular type at hand could be used, with the addition of only a few features which were evidently considered indispensable for the conception of a Christian church,—the apse, and the shifting of the edifice from a transverse to a longitudinal axis. While the latter element had appeared before, e.g., at S. Crisogono, and in the group of related churches, the apse is certainly a feature which stresses even more the subordination of the part of the building reserved for the congregation to that reserved for the clergy. But even this element of subordination, the apse, is taken from Roman pagan architecture, where it appears frequently from the first century on in public buildings, and in the audience halls of the imperial palaces, such as the audience hall of Domitian on the

28. Butler, *op. cit., passim.*

Palatine, two halls of the Domus Aurea, and any other audience hall where a dominating man or a dominating group—a law court, for example—received a crowd of common people, as in the three halls at the Forum of Pompeii, or in the "auditorium" of Maecenas in Rome. That it is taken up in ecclesiastical architecture shows quite clearly that God is conceived more and more as an earthly ruler, similar to the Emperor, and that the clergy is conceived as a body representative of God, just as the high officials of the State represent the Emperor. It is during the second quarter of the fourth century, shortly before the death of Constantine, that Christ, surrounded by the Apostles, is depicted like an Emperor surrounded by his Senate; it is about this time, that he is addressed as Basileus, as King of Kings, and is represented with a halo, an imperial attribute, and in imperial dress.[29] This assimilation of the image of God to that of the Emperor makes it understandable that his house also should no longer be conceived of as a simple meeting place, but as an audience hall. Indeed, the development of state philosophy had led more and more to the conception of the audience hall of the Imperial palace as a sacred place, a temple, the idol of which was the Emperor's person.[30] This idea is carried over into the Church, and it is quite characteristic that in some edifices of the period, for instance in the church of S. Balbina, it is still uncertain whether the edifice was built as a church, or whether it was an audience hall and only later taken over by the church.

There are other unusual types to be found in Roman architecture of the fourth century. The first church at S. Anastasia had, in all likelihood, a single nave, a wide transept and a semi-circular apse, thus forming a cross-shaped edifice of a type which seems to be unique in Rome. Its apse and transept are still preserved today,[31] although they have been remodelled in the eighth, fifteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

While these different types of congregational and audience halls dominated the ecclesiastical architecture of the city of Rome, other church buildings, again different from the Early Christian basilica,

29. See particularly J. Kollwitz, "Christus als Lehrer und die Gesetzesübergabe an Petrus," *Römische Quartalschrift* (1936); W. Weisbach, *Geschichtliche Voraussetzungen der Entstehung einer christlichen Kunst* (Basel, 1937).

30. A. Alföldi, "Die Ausgestaltung des monarchischen Zeremoniells am römischen Kaiserhof," *Römische Mitteilungen* (1934); *Idem.*, "Insignien und Tracht der römischen Kaiser" (*Ibid.*, 1935).

31. Krautheimer, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 42 ff.

were evolved in the catacombs. There also, in the vast burial grounds of the Christian communities, with their network of galleries at different levels underneath the ground, structures had to be erected in the first half of the fourth century in order to single out the tomb of some martyr buried in the catacombs, and to provide a room for the prayers of the faithful, for occasional services, and also for the agape, all of which, up to the end of the fourth century, took place over the tomb.[32] It is obvious that these catacomb churches were normally relatively small buildings, since they did not have to shelter either very large congregations or regular meetings; indeed the buildings are often mere chapels (as is the one at SS. Nereo ed Achilleo in Domitilla, datable 366-84, which we excavated a year ago, and which is only twenty feet square). They seem to have developed, not from congregational or audience halls, but from larger tomb chambers in the catacombs, such as the "Chapel of the Popes," and like these, they were originally built immediately over the tomb of the saint in the catacomb proper, i.e., underground.

As soon, however, as they grew larger (and that was the case from the second quarter of the fourth century on) a new problem arose. On the one hand, the floor level had to reach the tomb of the saint which was situated deep in the ground, on the first, second, or third level of the catacombs. On the other hand, they had to be provided with light and air, and to be made accessible to larger crowds, who could no longer be led through the dark, narrow labyrinths of the catacomb. This technical problem was solved by the "invention" of the cemeterial basilica, a structure whose floor was kept underground, at the catacomb level, while its upper parts emerged from the ground. The remains of a very early catacomb church of the period immediately after Constantine, datable 335-51, are preserved under the present seventh century church of S. Agnese. It was a rather long and narrow single-naved edifice, about thirty by ninety Roman feet, with an apse, and surrounded by chapels,[33] similar to the somewhat later catacomb church of S. Ermete, and to cemeterial basilicas outside Rome.[34] Again

32. Augustinus, *Epistles*, XX, chap. I, 34; XXIX, *passim* (Migne, Patr. Lat., XXXIII, 91, 114 ff.); St. Augustine, *Select Letters*, ed. J. H. Baxter (Loeb Classical Library, 1930), p. 44, where other references from Cyprian and Ambrosius are quoted, and p. 84.

33. Krautheimer, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 14 ff.

34. Salona, Monastirine, second phase 313-360. See R. Egger and F. Bulic, *Forschungen in Salona*, II (Vienna, 1926); Damus el Karita. See J. Vaultrin, "Les basiliques chretiennes de Carthage," *Revue Africaine* (1932).

it is a solution quite different from the normal Early Christian basilica, and so is the even more unusual cemeterial church of S. Sebastiano, where the aisles not only accompany the nave, but also encircle the apse, forming an ambulatory through which the congregation might pass to see the sacred place, the *memoria Apostolorum*.[35]

Thus, numerous types of ecclesiastical buildings appeared in Early Christian architecture under Constantine. Among these ecclesiastical edifices which are so different in type, there originated in the early fourth century the Early Christian basilica. Strangely enough, it is this type which is best known, although the earliest examples (those dating from the period of Constantine) are no longer extant, either in the West or in the East of the Empire. In Rome, both St. Peter's and the basilica of the Lateran were destroyed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries respectively, when the modern constructions of Michelangelo and Borromini were substituted for them. The ancient drawings and descriptions are, however, quite sufficient to give a clear idea of their original appearance, especially when they are combined with the results of the excavations undertaken by Professor E. Josi at the Lateran,[36] and the results of a thorough investigation of the extant remains of the basilica. Both edifices were enormous basilicas (about 500 Roman feet long), consisting of a nave and four aisles, separated from each other by columns; the columns at St. Peter's carried an architrave, at the Lateran arcades, and above them there were wall paintings and a clerestory with wide windows. The whole interior was magnificently decorated. An atrium extended in front of the nave, and at the opposite end was a transept with a semicircular apse; the transept contained the main altar, the apse, the seats of the bishop and of his presbyters.

Numerous explanations have been proffered to explain the origin of this new type in Early Christian architecture: the Roman house with its atrium;[37] the *oikos*, the large dining room of the Roman house; the private basilica;[38] the Greek peristyle;[39] the *schola*;[40] the

35. F. Fornari, "Il rilievo . . . di San Sebastiano . . . ?" Atti III. *Congresso Archeologia Cristiana* (1934); P. Styger, *Märtyrergrüfte* (Berlin, 1935); A. Prandi, *La memoria Apostolorum* (Città del Vaticano, 1936).

36. E. Josi, "Scoperte nella basilica Constantiniana al Laterano," *Rivista di archeologia cristiana* (1934).

37. G. Dehio and C. Bezold, Die kirchliche Baukunst des Abendlandes, I (Stuttgart, 1887-1901).

38. P. Crostarosa, "Le basiliche Cristiane," *Dissertationi della Pontificia Accademia* (1892).

Roman secular basilica;[41] the Jewish temple;[42] the *cella trichora*[43]—in brief, practically every building of antiquity. It seems to me that none of these explanations can rest on safe ground unless a few facts are kept in mind. First, that *all* the different types of Christian edifices, after Christianity had become a recognized religion and its constructions had received a public character, are definitely connected, not only with Roman architecture in general, but with Roman assembly halls in particular. Second, that throughout the Roman empire during the first half of the fourth century, the basilica as represented by St. Peter's and the Lateran (or by the corresponding basilicas in the East,—the Holy Sepulchre or the Church of the Nativity, or the Eleona) is only one, and almost an exceptional form among numerous Christian edifices of different pattern. Third, that it appears in different parts of the *Orbis Christianus*, at Jerusalem, Rome, Mambre, Bethlehem, Orléansville, Naples, Capua,—and that wherever it appears (except for a few cases where the fact cannot be proved)[44] its foundation is related to Constantine's personal influence. Fourth, that Constantine wanted to make the churches which he erected as lavish and beautiful as possible, with the express intention of having them surpass in splendor all other public edifices,[45] and thus emphasize the importance of the new state religion. And fifth, that while single features, such as the transept and the atrium in Rome, or the circular *memoria* and the precinct wall in the East, are evidently local features and can thus be disregarded as far as the question of the origin of the type proper is concerned, the general arrangement is surprisingly uniform.

Seen from this angle, the problem acquires a different aspect. The basic similarity of the first real Early Christian basilicas, whether they stood in the east or in the west of the Empire, combined with

39. V. Schultze, *Archäologie der altchristlichen Kunst* (Munich, 1895).

40. G. B. Brown, *From Schola to Cathedral* (Edinburgh, 1886).

41. K. Lange, *Haus und Halle* (Leipzig, 1885).

42. O. Puchstein, "Die Säule in der assyrischen Architektur," *Archäologisches Jahrbuch* (1892), pp. 11 ff., n. 32.

43. E. H. Freshfield, *Cellae Trichorae* (Privately printed, 1913); J. P. Richter, *Der Ursprung der abendländischen Kirchengebäude* (Vienna, 1878); G. B. de Rossi, *Roma sotterranea*, III (Rome, 1864-77), *passim*.

44. Such as Orléansville and Tyrus; I am, however, not quite sure whether Tyrus was a basilica proper.

45. See his letter to Makarius, in Eusebius, *Life of Constantine*, III, 31 (Migne, *op. cit.*, XX, 1091; *The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, Second Series, I, 528). (*Patrologia Graeca.*)

the fact that nearly all of them were personal foundations of Constantine; the contrast, on the other hand, in which these imperial churches stand to the numerous other ecclesiastical edifices erected by the Christian communities at the very same time; all this lends itself to the conclusion that the first basilicas were modelled according to definite directions, issued by the imperial office of works for the erection of imperial ecclesiastical buildings, directions within the limits of which the local executive architect enjoyed a certain liberty of action. On the other hand, it is also likely that these imperial churches were modelled after the pattern of some secular assembly hall, transformed for the new ecclesiastical purpose, assembly halls of a pretentious kind, however, so that the transformation would reflect the greatness of the imperial founder and offer room for the largest possible public gatherings.

In any town of the Roman Empire there existed secular basilicas, the official halls for large public gatherings.[46] They were meeting places which might be used as law courts, stock exchanges, bazaars, or for hundreds of similar purposes. Whoever knows Italy knows the last descendent of these basilicas;—the gallerias, which are to be found in any fairly large city of Italy, and which still serve the foremost of the purposes of the Roman secular basilica,—everyone knows that between noon and one o'clock he can meet his friends somewhere in the galleria. But a basilica was something more than a simple meeting-place: first, it was in most cases an imperial foundation, and very often named after the reigning Emperor, a highly official edifice (incidentally the modern *galleria* resembles the ancient basilica even on this point: it is always called after the king reigning during its construction). From the early imperial period on, the basilica was used for all kinds of state functions. To give just one instance: Augustus' dead body, when carried from Nola to Rome, lay in state in the basilica of the town where the funeral procession spent the night.[47]

For our problem, however, it seems even more important that the basilica was not merely a public official edifice, but that at least one religious, or semi-religious, function was connected with it. For it usually contained in an adjoining room, in an apse, or in the building

46. A. Zestermann, *Die antiken und die christlichen Basiliken* (Leipzig, 1847); R. Schultze, *Basilika* (Berlin, 1928).

47. Suetonius, "Divus Augustus," chap. 100, ed. E. S. Shuckburgh (Cambridge, 1896), p. 172; ". . . in basilica cuiusque oppidi vel in aedium sacrarum maxima . . ."; see A. Mau, "Basilica," in Pauly-Wissowa, *Real Enzyklopädie*, III, 84.

itself, the tribunal where the praetor administered the law.[48] Now it is sufficiently known how the essence of Roman state religion is focussed more and more in the Emperor's person, and in his genius, from Augustus' time on.[49] Temples were erected to him throughout the Empire, and the official oath had to be sworn by invoking his genius.[50] In the sanctuaries of military camps, where the military oath was sworn and where the eagles were kept, the presence of an image of the emperor was even obligatory.[51] On the other hand, these military sanctuaries were quite frequently connected with the military basilicas of the camps[52] in the same way in which the tribunal was connected with the forensic basilicas of the cities. Thus the connection of the Emperor's divine personality with the tribunal of a civic basilica becomes rather likely. Indeed, as early as the time of Christ the tribunal in Vitruvius' basilica of Fano was situated within a niche which linked the basilica to a temple of Augustus, thus placing the court immediately under the protection of the Emperor's genius.[53] It is also well known how, in the trials against Christians, the defendants are always asked to swear by the Emperor's genius,[54] and to sacrifice to the Emperor's statue. Since, however, the trials took place in the tribunal, is it not likely that a statue of the Emperor was present at the very spot, so that the sacrifice could be made to it then and there, before the eyes of the investigating official?[55] One might even say that, because of this fact, the connection between the tribunal in the basilica and the image of the Emperor must have been particularly strong in the minds of the Christians.

48. Mau, *loc. cit.*; R. Schultze, *op. cit.*

49. L. R. Taylor, *The Divinity of the Roman Emperor* (Middletown, Conn., 1931); Alföldi, *op. cit.*

50. Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 241; Th. Mommsen, *Römisches Staatsrecht*, II, 2 (Leipzig, 1887), pp. 809 f.

51. Mommsen, *op. cit.*, pp. 814 f.; Alföldi, *op. cit.*, pp. 67 f.

52. R. Schultze, *op. cit*, *passim.*

53. Vitruvius, *De architectura libri decem*, Lib. V, chap. 1; the question of how to reconstruct this niche does not concern this study. See, however, Alföldi, *loc. cit.*; Mau, *loc. cit.*; Prestel, *Des Markus Vitruvius Pollio zehn Bücher über Architektur* (Strassburg, 1912); R. Schultze, *op. cit.*, pp. 39 ff.

54. "Passio Martyrum Scilitanorum," in Ayer, *op. cit.*, pp. 67 ff.

55. Pliny's statement (Ep. 96) that he had an image of the Emperor brought in to have the Christians swear the oath of allegiance to it would be contrary to this assumption, if it could be proved that the inquiry took place at a regular court-session; but the interpolation "brought into the court" which is given by Ayer, *loc. cit.*, is not in any way justifiable: Pliny says simply: ". . . cum imagini tua quam propter hoc iusseram cum simulacris deorum adferri, . . . ture ac vino supplicarent. . . ." The whole tenor of the report seems to indicate rather a semi-private, not a highly official inquiry.

To sum up:—the secular basilica was not merely a secular building, an element of governmental power; the tribunal was connected with it, and the conceptions of emperor and basilica were closely linked up with each other. Thus, a religious or semi-religious element was connected with the conception of the civic basilica. The emperor represented to late antiquity, pagan and Christian, a divine power; with the rise of Christianity to the rank of state religion, an assimilation of the Christian cult and of Christian conceptions to the cult of the Emperor's genius took place.[56]

On the other hand, it must be remembered that, to the early Christian mind, the ecclesiastical assembly hall did not represent a sacred edifice in the sense which later became dominant. In the third century it is stated several times that the hall where the congregation meets is not at all a "temple,"[57] and although this attitude changes under Constantine through the formation of the new conception of Christ,[58] the differentiation between the more sacred memorial buildings erected on the venerated spots proper, and the less sacred congregational hall, the basilica, is still clear in many of the ecclesiastical edifices of his period.[59] Only in the later years of Constantine's reign is this conception gradually replaced by a more sacred idea of the congregational hall proper. The formation of the early Christian basilica belongs to this transitional period. Thus it must have seemed natural to the architects of Constantine, when they were called on to create the new Christian churches, to refer to the secular basilicas of the Roman tradition, which had been pretentious public meeting places, very often imperial foundations, and, at the same time closely connected with the idea of State religion. When Constantine founded the first monumental edifices of the new state religion, Christianity,

56. A. Alföldi, *op. cit.*, pp. 73 ff.; J. Kollwitz, *op. cit.*, *passim*; to quote some problems: proskynesis and adoration; Christ with the imperial insignia, etc.

57. Minucius Felix, "Octavius," chaps. X, XXXII: ". . . cur nullas aras habent, templa nulla . . .; . . . delubra et aras non habemus. . . ."(Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, III, 274, 353 ff.; *The Ante-Nicene Fathers*, IV, pp. 178, 193); Tertullian, "Apologeticus," XXXIX (see above n. 3).

58. See above.

59. Architecturally the distinction between the congregational hall and the memorial building is obvious in almost all the ecclesiastical edifices of the Near East (Jerusalem, Holy Sepulchre; Bethlehem), and in some of the West (Rome, S. Croce). Philologically it is confirmed, *e.g.*, in Eusebius, *Life of Constantine*, III, 43 (Migne, *Patr. Gr.*, XX, 1105): ". . . ἱερόν οἶκον ἐκκλησίας . . . νεών τε . . .": the "Congregational hall" (namely the basilica of the Eleona) and the "temple" (namely the Rotunda of the Ascension) are obviously contrasted with each other.

he not only turned to a well-known monumental type of public building, but to public buildings which were intimately linked up with the conception of the identity of religion and state. That this religion was now Christianity instead of paganism did not influence the basic conception, and one ought not to forget that the older identification of the Emperor with the divinity was an idea which in Constantine's philosophy was still a decisive issue; his self-stylization as Sol Invictus, the invincible sun, is a definite proof of this.

Proofs of the connection between the secular and the ecclesiastical basilica are frequently offered in the way the word basilica is used. Constantine, in ordering the Bishop of Jerusalem to erect a church at the Holy Sepulchre, writes that he wants this basilica to be "more beautiful than any of the others anywhere."[60] The Pilgrim from Bordeaux who, in 333, visited the Holy Land, in speaking about the Constantinian church at the Holy Sepulchre, qualifies the word "basilica" by saying "basilica id est dominicum," a basilica, that is to say, a house of the Lord.[61] Everyone knew what a basilica was. If the Pilgrim had to add the explanation "dominicum," it can only mean that he wanted to make it clear that the new edifice was not just any basilica, but a basilica for Christian worship.

Of course, it would be entirely fallacious to assume that the architects of Constantine simply took over the type of the secular basilica. That type was only a working basis on which something new had to be created, and the early Christian basilica, instead of being a derivative from the secular basilica, had better be considered as a free variant on the old theme. Even so, however, the new Christian type is but the transformation of a Roman basic pattern; again Christian architecture reveals itself as an outgrowth of the architecture of the late Roman Empire.[62] As to the form of the Roman secular basilicas,[63]

60. Eusebius, "Life of Constantine," III, 31 (Migne. *op. cit.*, XX, 1091; *The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, I, p. 528). The passage has been interpreted controversially either to imply that there existed other Christian basilicas which Constantine wanted to excel by his own building, or that he compared the "ecclesiastical basilica" to the existing "secular basilicas" throughout the Empire. The context seems to favor this latter interpretation. See also L. v. Sybel, *Christliche Antike* (Marburg, 1906-09), pp. 281 ff.

61. *Anonymi Itinerarium a Burdigala Hierusalem usque* (Migne, *Patr. Lat.* VIII, 791).

62. Sybel, *loc. cit.*; G. Leroux, *Les origines de l'edifice hypostyle* (Paris, 1913).

63. R. Schultze, *loc. cit.*; V. Müller, "The Roman Basilica," *American Journal of Archaeology*, XLI (1937), pp. 250 ff.

there existed certain conventions which were broken only in exceptional cases; it was always an oblong building, normally with one of its long sides along the market place, the forum. Its entrance was generally from the forum; only in a few groups of basilicas, in Italy,[64] in Africa[65] and in the Near East,[66] does the small side contain the entrance, while other basilicas, such as the Aemilia in Rome and the Basilica at Ostia, had two entrances, one from the Forum on the long side, and one from the street on the small side. The interior of the basilica consisted of a nave, which was normally accompanied by two aisles, or surrounded on all four sides by aisles. The aisles sometimes had galleries above them. The whole design of the building was centered on the nave, the aisles playing only a subordinate role. If apses were included in the construction, there were frequently two or three, attached to the two small sides, or to the two small sides and one long side of the edifice; usually they were separated from the nave by the aisles or by a series of columns. Variations occur, but never in the basic design, and it seems that the type was maintained relatively intact from the earliest instances in the first half of the first, or in the second century B.C.,[67] until the end of the third century A.D.

It will be obvious that some of these features are likewise essential to the Early Christian basilica: the nave and the aisles exist in both structures, the apse is present, and sometimes the galleries also make their appearance. But, of course, the type had to be transformed. First of all, the centralization of the secular basilica was eventually changed. The entrance, which frequently had been on one of the long sides, was now mostly transferred to one of the short sides. The forum itself, which in most cases had been on the long side, migrated to the small side and became the atrium. The aisles, instead of surrounding the nave on its four sides, as had been usual in most Roman basilicas, accompanied it only on its long sides; the apse, instead of being cut off from the nave, was made to open directly onto it, or onto the transept. The clerestory became much higher. Thus the Early Christian basilica is certainly not a copy of the secular, nor is it directly

64. Pompeii, Saepinum, Egnacia: R. Schultze, *op. cit.*, pp. 1 ff.; Lange, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

65. Tipasa, Sigus, Djemila: Gsell, *Monuments antiques de l'Algérie* (Paris, 1901).

66. Pergamon, Kremna, Perge: C. Texier, *Description de l'Asie Mineure* (Paris, 1839-49), pp. 1839 ff.; Lanckoroński-Brzezie, *Städte Pamphiliens und Pisidiens* (Vienna, 1890-92).

67. Basilica of Ardea: E. Wikén, *Bolletino dell' Associazione per gli Studi Mediterranei* (1934), pp. 7 ff.

derived from it. It is a new creation based on a traditional type, and adapted to a new function. In the process of this transformation, different variants were created in the different provinces of the empire, employing the galleries in the Near East, the double apses in North Africa, or arranging in one instance four aisles, in another two, along the nave.

The process of this transformation is still visible in quite a number of Constantinian Christian basilicas. In Old St. Peter's, for example, there seem still to have been preserved some traces of the centralizing conception of the Roman secular basilica (Plate II). The large cornice was protected by a railing so that one could walk on it,[68] and it surrounded the nave even on its entrance side, thus showing a certain similarity to the galleries which, in the secular basilicas, were frequently arranged above the aisles, and which together with the aisles surrounded the nave on all four sides.[69] At St. Clemente, it was the aisles which continued on the entrance side of the basilica,[70] as though it were a secular one, and as the aisles had opened with a series of wide entrances onto the forum in a secular basilica, the aisles on the short side of S. Clemente opened directly onto the atrium, and created an immediate connection between the exterior and the interior of the edifice. A similar arrangement of an aisle on the entrance side of the nave is found at S. Sabina, as late as the second quarter of the fifth century.

Some other rudiments in a number of Early Christian basilicas point in the same direction: the windows are often arranged in such a way as to surround the nave like a continuous band on all its sides, at the entrance side as well as above the triumphal arch; the entrances, instead of being limited to the short flank, are often also located on the long flanks, at times even exclusively.[71] Only gradually, during the fourth and fifth centuries, does the longitudinal tendency definitely replace the older centralizing arrangement of the Roman secular basilica.

68. Drawings. Grimaldi Ciampini, *Cod. Barb. Lat.*, 4410; Ciampini, *De sacris aedificiis* (Rome, 1693), Pl. VIII.

69. Basilica Julia, Basilica Ulpia.

70. Rome: S. Clemente, S. S. Giovanni e Paolo, S. Vitale, S. Sabina; Constantinople: St. John of the Studion; Salonica: H. Paraskevi, H. Demetrius.

71. North Africa: Orléansville; Matifou; Menas City; Apollonia. Syria: Basufân; Serdjibleh; Kasr Iblisu; Dâr Kitâ, St. Paul and Moses; Burdj-ed-Derun, chapel; and many others. Transjordania: Geraš, chapels flanking St. John. See H. Glück, "Der Breit-und-Langhausbau in Syrien," *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Architektur*, Beiheft 14 (1916).

The question of the causes and purposes of these transformations still remains. It is obvious that quite a number of them may be accounted for by the new function of the buildings; the apse had to open directly into the nave instead of being cut off, since it normally held the altar, and was therefore the center of the service; and one might say that, consequently, the side opposite had to become the entrance wall, and the centralized character had to be replaced by a longitudinal arrangement. I wonder sometimes whether this is not too much of a rationalization, and whether everything can really be explained in this way. There may be other trends which might account for the decisive transformation through which the secular basilica became an ecclesiastical edifice.

It is perfectly possible that other types of late antique architecture which were common in religious and secular buildings exercised a considerable influence in this transformation. The *Oikos Corinthios*, with its nave and two aisles, and a rectangular or semicircular apse,[72] played evidently an ever growing role in late antique architecture, influencing other secular types such as *nymphaea*,[73] audience halls,[74] private basilicas,[75] and sacred edifices such as the mystery temples of certain sects.[76] Simultaneously the *Oikos Corinthios* became more and more assimilated to the plan of the secular basilica. But to go into the details of these questions would lead too far. My problem has been to show how in pre-Constantinian times the Christian communities adapted their religious edifices from a non-public type of building; how later under Constantine, when Christianity had been recognized as an official religion, numerous forms of public places of worship arose side by side; and how, among all these varied types, the Early Christian basilica developed probably under the direct initiative of Constantine, as a monument to both the imperial conception of God and the divine conception of the Emperor.

72. Herculaneum, Casa dell' atrio a mosaico.

73. Unknown nymphaeum, reproduced in eighteenth century drawing, Windsor Royal Library. Vol. 176, no. 9751.

74. Flavian palace on the Palatine: Ch. Hülsen, *Forum und Palatin* (Munich, 1926), p. 79. Palace of Diocletian, Spalato: E. Hébrard and J. Zeiller, *Spalato* (Paris, 1912), pp. 120 ff.

75. Villa Adriana.

76. "Basilica" at Porta Maggiore: J. Carcopino, *La basilique pythagorienne de la porte majeure* (Paris, 1926); Pesch: R. Schultze, *op. cit.*, "Basilica of Matronae Vacallinehae," pp. 61 ff.

WHITEHEAD'S NATURALISM AND GOD

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There are two very general points of view, each essentially incompatible with the other, that are to be found in the history of human thought. They are naturalism and supernaturalism. The significance of these categories lies in their incompatibility. Many of the categories of our thinking appear incompatible with one another, but really are not. Much of philosophy seems to consist of sham battles between people who do not understand each other. Half-truths will oppose each other until someone brings them together into some higher synthesis. The conflict of idealism and realism may be cited. It is now generally recognized that, in some sense or other, the truth of the one is compatible with the truth of the other.

But it is no sham battle that naturalism and supernaturalism have fought—and are fighting. This is due to the fact that the proponents of each point of view, instead of misunderstanding, actually do understand each other. There is no possibility of harmonizing the two philosophies through a higher synthesis. If the one is essentially true, then the other is essentially false.

For the sake of clarity it may be well to define our terms. All philosophical dictionaries are agreed that the term "naturalism" is difficult to define. The term has been variously understood as referring to a system of thought which holds nature to be self-sufficient, asserts that nothing transcends nature, rules out whatever is called "God" or the "supernatural," denies the "spiritual," or anything transcendent of experience, has an exaggerated appreciation of science and is uncritical of its presuppositions, reduces the complex to the simple without residue, denies all final causes, is non-teleological, and makes consciousness epiphenomenal.

It seems to me that no one of these defining characteristics is sufficient. A distinction must be made between what naturalism is, on the one hand, and how various naturalists have attempted to state their thesis, on the other hand. Only too often naturalism has been defined by some one particular method of defending it. For our purpose the essence of naturalism may be stated negatively. Its positive definition

will be implied. Any system of thought is naturalistic, we may say, that denies what has been called an axiom—the principle *ex nihilo nihil*. This principle has been stated in various ways: "There cannot be more in the effect than in the cause"; "the stream of being cannot rise higher than its source"; "there cannot be in the consequent anything more than, or different in nature from, that which was in the antecedent"; "the 'lower' can come from the 'higher,' but not the 'higher' from the 'lower.' " Any system of thought may be said to be supernaturalistic if it holds, either implicitly or explicitly, to the aforementioned principle. It is to be noted that according to this meaning of supernaturalism a philosophy cannot be said to be supernaturalistic merely because it admits of something that transcends existence.

There is not time to defend the significance of these two categories. Their significance is an assumption. One might refer the skeptic to the whole history of philosophy. However, it might also be pointed out that the two categories are not of academic concern only. From the ethereal realm of philosophical speculation the conflict of naturalism and supernaturalism is brought down to earth, for instance, with the call to arms of the Catholic Church against communism. Supernaturalism, in some form or other, has dominated western culture for over two thousand years. It is a relevant question to ask: Will the culture of the next historical epoch be defined by naturalism?

Only history can answer the question, and the outcome will depend, not only on machine guns, but also on the power exerted by great systems of thought. I wish to consider rather briefly one philosophical system—Professor Whitehead's philosophy of organism. The question which we ask, and will attempt to answer, is this: Is the philosophy of organism a type of naturalism? This question professes to be significant for three reasons. In the first place, if naturalism and supernaturalism constitute the great divide in philosophy, it is well worth knowing which point of view the insight of Whitehead seems to substantiate. Secondly, while Whitehead for the most part has constructed a new vocabulary for metaphysical purposes, nevertheless many, if not most, of the traditional religious terms are retained. This is, perhaps, responsible in part for some of the confusion attending the interpretation of his philosophy by those who would see in the philosophy of organism something of value for a Christian theism. The answer to our question may eliminate some of the confusion. And

thirdly, the question is significant if it will lead to the determining of whether the philosophy of organism has a closer relation to dialectical materialism, or to traditional Christian philosophy. This is of practical, as well as of theoretical, importance.

The first of the four sets of categories in the philosophy of organism is the category of the Ultimate. " 'Creativity,' 'many,' 'one' are the ultimate notions involved in the meaning of the synonymous terms 'things,' 'being,' 'entity.' These three notions complete the Category of the Ultimate and are presupposed in all the more special categories" (p. 31).[1] "Creativity" is the principle of novelty, the universal of universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact (p. 31). It is responsible for the production of novel togetherness, which is the ultimate notion embodied in the term "concrescence" (p. 32). Whitehead says that this Category of the Ultimate replaces Aristotle's category of "primary substance."

In his *Metaphysics* Aristotle defines primary substance as that which cannot be predicated of anything else, but of which anything else may be predicated (namely, as its accident). That "creativity" takes the place of this category of Aristotle's in the philosophy of organism is made clear in the following passage: " 'Creativity' is another rendering of the Arstotelian 'matter,' and of the modern 'neutral stuff.' But it is divested of the notion of passive receptivity, either of 'form,' or of external relations; it is the pure notion of the activity conditioned by the objective immortality of the actual world—a world which is never the same twice, though always with the stable element of divine ordering. Creativity is without a character of its own in exactly the same sense in which the Aristotelian 'matter' is without a character of its own. It is that ultimate notion of the highest generality at the base of actuality. It cannot be characterized, because all characters are more special than itself" (pp. 46 and 47). In another place Whitehead says, "In all philosophic theory there is an ultimate which is actual in virtue of its accidents. It is only then capable of characterization through its accidental embodiments, and apart from these accidents is devoid of actuality. In the philosophy of organism this ultimate is termed 'creativity'; and God is its primordial, non-temporal accident. In monistic philosophies, Spinoza's or absolute idealism, this

1. All references, unless otherwise indicated, are to Whitehead's *Process and Reality* (Cambridge and New York, 1929).

ultimate is God, who is also equivalently termed 'The Absolute.' In such monistic schemes, the ultimate is illegitimately allowed a final, 'eminent' reality, beyond that ascribed to any of its accidents. . . . One side makes process ultimate; the other side makes fact ultimate" (pp. 10-11).

With the proper qualifications implied, then, one may think of the primordial nature of God as something akin to the primary substance of Aristotle. Aristotle found the category necessary in order to take account of potentiality. And so does Whitehead, for he says, "Viewed as primordial, he [God] is the unlimited conceptual realization of the absolute wealth of potentiality" (p. 521). One might also point out that creativity—and hence God's primordial nature—occupies a somewhat similar position in Whitehead's metaphysics to the category of Pure Being in the metaphysics of Hegel. Pure being has no differentiation; "it is pure indeterminateness and vacuity."[2] Hegel calls attention to the fact that "in oriental systems, and essentially in Buddhism, Nothing, or the void, is the absolute principle."[3] This specific comparison of Whitehead and Hegel becomes more significant when we recall that Pure Being, the most abstract of the categories, was identified with Nothing, and also that Whitehead in denying eminent reality to his category of creativity says that "in this general position the philosophy of organism seems to approximate more to some strains of Indian, or Chinese, thought, than to western Asiatic, or European, thought" (p. 11).

Are we then to think of the primordial nature of God as nothing but the barest abstraction? In a sense, yes, and in a sense, no. For our purpose the "sense in which" is important. As a non-temporal accident of creativity God is an entity. An entity exists; hence it is concrete. God shares the three-fold character of any actual entity, viz.: (1) "the 'primordial nature' of God is the concrescence of an unity of conceptual feelings, including among their data all eternal objects" (p. 134); (2) he has the subjective character aimed at in his process of concrescence; (3) he has the superjective character which is the pragmatic value of its specific satisfaction qualifying the transcendent creativity. In other words God exists, even as primordial, and as such is concrete.

2. Hegel: *Science of Logic,* translated by W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers (New York, 1929), p. 94.
3. *Ibid.,* p. 95.

For eternal objects considered merely in themselves are only possibilities, and hence abstract. But the "realm" of abstract possibilities cannot itself be abstract. It is for this reason that some actual entity is necessary that will include both actuality and possibility. And because the primordial nature of God is the unconditioned conceptual valuation of the entire multiplicity of eternal objects, possibility has a real relevance to the creative advance of the world (p. 46). God's immanence in the world in respect to his primordial nature is "an urge towards the future based upon an appetite in the present" (p. 47). He is the principle of concretion. In this sense the primordial nature of God is concrete.

But there is a sense in which God's primordial nature is the barest abstraction. And that is, when it is considered relative to God's consequent nature. As in historical Christianity, Whitehead's God is both Alpha and Omega (p. 523). But there is a difference. For Christianity God is eternally the same, and his essential nature is not affected by any temporal process. It is not so for the God of Whitehead. There is no unmoved mover. By reason of the relativity of all things there is a reaction of the world on God (p. 523). God's derivative nature is consequent upon the creative advance of the world (p. 524). This means that God as Omega is a function of time. In brief, it means that the God, which for Christianity is ultimate fact, is always becoming, but never is, in the philosophy of organism. Hence, if by a "concrete" God is meant a God in full eminent reality, the God of Whitehead only approximates concreteness in the consequent phase. It follows by the same criterion of concreteness that God as primordial is the barest of abstractions. Whitehead's God is always striving to be the complete, eminently real God of Christian theism, but which, by its very nature, it can never be, for God is in the grip of that ultimate metaphysical ground, Creativity, of which it is a non-temporal accident (p. 529).

The principle *ex nihilo nihil*, then, is certainly denied in the philosophy of organism. If we mean by a higher level of reality that of which purpose, will, and self-consciousness can be predicated, then the primordial nature of God must be said to be on a rather low level. The terminology of Whitehead may mislead one at times, but I think his meaning is clear. It is true that, because the primordial nature of God is the unconditioned conceptual valuation of the entire multi-

plicity of eternal objects, the objectification of God in each derivate actual entity results in a graduation of the relevance of eternal objects to the concrescent phases of that derivate occasion (p. 46). But the relevance of God to other actual entities is not to be conceived as conscious purposiveness.

Whitehead says, "God's purpose in the creative advance, is the evocation of intensities" (p. 161). But this "purpose" is a primordial appetition (p. 160). And relative to consciousness as we know it, God's appetition is blind and unconsciousness. In fact, Whitehead uses the term "appetition" instead of "vision" because the latter term suggests consciousness (p. 50). "Appetition" is also equivalent in meaning to the term "conceptual prehension" (p. 49). But a conceptual prehension can only be the act of "pure" mentality. And this is devoid of all suggestion of consciousness, for consciousness arises as a result of "impure" prehensions, i.e., the integration of "pure" mental prehensions with "pure" physical prehensions (pp. 49, 407). So while the consequent nature of God, which is a function of time, may be said to be conscious because the creative advance of the world provides the primordial nature of God with a body, nevertheless God as non-temporal, and as the ultimate ground of the world, is not conscious—and hence is not purposeful in the ordinary sense of the word.

It is true that Whitehead speaks of "final causes" as well as of efficient causes. "Final cause" is identified with "subjective aim," and this latter God has in common with all actual entities. But it seems clear that all teleology is limited to particular actual entities. There is no conscious cosmic teleology. In his primordial nature God's relation to the world is impersonal. "He . . . is unmoved by love for this particular, or that particular" (p. 160. See also p. 522).

In light of the foregoing, then, this much at least may be said of Whitehead's conception of God. Primordially considered, God is the non-temporal accident of Creativity, and Creativity is to be thought of as similar to Aristotelian matter, or the modern "neutral stuff." Since all possibilities cannot become actual, some principle of limitation is necessary. God fulfills that function by introducing *some* order into the world (p. 522). But this order is introduced unconsciously, for God as primordial has only pure conceptual feelings. God as a conscious creature depends upon the objectification of the world in himself, thus producing that integration of conceptual and physical feelings

that defines consciousness. This is the consequent nature of God. And as consequent God is no longer merely an urge toward the future based upon an appetite in the present, a lure for feeling, a principle of concretion. Due to the evolution of the world his nature has changed. Of him now can be predicated love, wisdom, infinite patience, and tenderness.

Whether or not these terms historically associated with, and derived from, quite a different conception of God can legitimately be predicated of Whitehead's God is not now our chief concern. Nor am I now concerned with the problem as to whether or not all of Whitehead's categories, principles, and explanations are consistent one with the other. What is of importance for the present is the fact that the principle *ex nihilo nihil* is not only implicitly denied, but is refuted by the whole philosophy of organism. For according to it the "higher" does come from the "lower," the stream of being does rise higher than its source, etc. The denial of the principle is not an accident; it is fundamental in the philosophy of organism.

All of Western philosophy that has not been naturalistic has been based on the principle *ex nihilo nihil*. This principle was certainly fundamental in the philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, and the medieval schoolmen. All of modern idealism has rested upon it. And today it is still asserted. Idealists have held the principle to be the presupposition of philosophical intelligibility. A. E. Taylor says that it is "fundamental to all explanation."[4] Professor J. E. Boodin insists that "causality from behind cannot account for more than there is in the antecedents."[5] However much the philosophy of Whitehead resembles the philosophy of Plato, I think it is safe to say that Whitehead rejects that in Plato which most Christian theologians have found most valuable. It is for this reason that Whitehead can reject all past theism as essentially false (p. 520), and assert as essentially true Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (p. 521).

Our thesis, then, is that Whitehead's philosophy is essentially naturalistic. If this be true, then at least two important implications may be drawn. (1) There is no significant sense in which the phi-

4. *Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge*, a collective work (London, 1925), p. 460.

5. Quoted from an article by A. O. Lovejoy, "The Meaning of 'Emergence' and Its Modes," in *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy* (New York, 1927).

losophy of organism can be of service to those who are attempting to reconstruct *Christian* philosophy. (2) The philosophy of organism, in essentials, has much in common with other types of naturalism, both historical and contemporary—and especially with dialectical materialism.

These conclusions are contrary to those drawn by many, if not most, of Whitehead's interpreters. Many Christian philosophers and theologians seem to think that in Whitehead's philosophy there is something of value for historical religion. While perhaps the evidence put forward in this paper would not support a blank denial of this, nevertheless I feel certain that any additional evidence would substantiate such a denial.

Three illustrations may be given of what seems to me to be false optimism on the part of present theological interpretation of Whitehead. Mr. E. E. Aubrey, in his *Present Theological Tendencies*,[6] calls the philosophy of organism a "theistic naturalism," and thinks that the phrase "God's conceptual realization" connotes "preëstablished harmony." Now, throughout the history of thought theism and naturalism have opposed each other. Certainly Whitehead's philosophy is essentially one or the other. Classifying his philosophy under a category composed of incompatible terms is too easy a way of making his genius favor the Christian tradition. Furthermore, the phrase "God's conceptual realization" only *appears* to connote a preëstablished harmony compatible with theism, for it must be remembered that it is devoid of all suggestion of consciousness or purposiveness. Only by disregarding the warning of Whitehead as to the use of the term could "conceptual realization" imply a preëstablished harmony that has anything more than a verbal similarity with past meanings of the term.

It might be objected that there may be a cosmic teleology without its being also a conscious teleology. I have no doubt but that it is possible to defend the notion of a *blind* cosmic teleology. In fact, from our analysis it appears to be the position of Whitehead. However, two comments may be made on this point. In the first place, from the standpoint of the history of philosophy and theology, it is highly questionable whether a blind teleology should be called teleology at all. In the second place, even so it still remains true that the difference between a conscious and a blind teleology is more significant than

6. (New York, 1936), pp. 185 ff.

anything they may have in common. After all, what is the difference (at least, for religion) between blind teleology and no teleology at all? If one uses the phrase "preëstablished harmony" in connection with a blind teleology, it seems to me, considering the past history of the term "theism," that the term ought not to be applied to *that* kind of teleology. Although Whitehead does use the term "preëstablished harmony," he explicitly rejects theism (p. 520) because it is incompatible with his meaning of "preëstablished" (see p. 41).

The Editor of *Christendom* also seems to be convinced that the philosophy of organism is not essentially naturalistic. In the Winter (1936-1937) number of the quarterly Mr. Morrison says, " . . . when we examine the philosophical system of Professor Whitehead we find a world view which could almost be said to be St. Thomas's world view come to life . . . that is to say, it is Thomism with dynamic and vital concepts substituted for the bare formal logic of Scholasticism" (p. 123). The following passage from Whitehead is significant at this point: "The vicious separation of the flux from the permanence leads to the concept of an entirely static God, with eminent reality, in relation to an entirely fluent world, with deficient reality. But if the opposites, static and fluent, have once been so explained as separately to characterize diverse actualities, the interplay between the thing which is static and the things which are fluent involves contradiction at every step in its explanation" (p. 526). Whitehead then goes on to say that the systems of Greek, Hebrew, and Christian thought have embodied these notions which he rejects, finally adding that "such systems have the common character of starting with a fundamental intuition which we do mean to express, and of entangling themselves in verbal expressions" (p. 526). In short, as he has said before, the one point of view makes process ultimate; the other makes fact ultimate (p. 11). Whitehead chooses process. When Thomistic philosophy is made dynamic it ceases to be Thomistic philosophy.

This tendency to see in the philosophy of organism a kind of neo-Thomism is found in the thought of Walter M. Horton. He says, " . . . perhaps under his [Whitehead's] leadership, there is coming to be something like a revival of Platonic and even scholastic realism."[7] Now it is true that Whitehead goes back to Greek philosophy for inspiration and help. And so did St. Thomas. But I wish to suggest again

7. *Realistic Theology* (New York, 1934), p. 11.

that what Whitehead finds of value in Greek philosophy is quite other than what St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and other church Fathers found.

In Whitehead's philosophy the new naturalism has risen to a new height. By no reasonable stretch of the imagination, it seems to me, can he be claimed for the Christian tradition. On the other hand, were the dialectical materialists not so hypnotized by the founders of their movement, they might well draw Whitehead into their camp. Karl Marx said that he turned the Hegelian philosophy upside down. In at least three places in *Process and Reality* Whitehead says practically the same thing (pp. viii, 11, 135, 254). One quotation may be given. In the Preface he says, "Indeed, if this cosmology be deemed successful, it becomes natural at this point to ask whether the type of thought involved be not a transformation of some main doctrines of Absolute Idealism onto a realistic basis" (p. vii). Whitehead speaks mildly and gently, but his meaning is no less clear.

The philosophy of organism and dialectical materialism, in common with all naturalisms, deny the principle of *ex nihilo nihil*. And while they differ in many respects, as any two philosophies will, nevertheless fundamentally as regards historical religion they take the same stand. Both reject a God that is eminently real. Dialectical materialism is not as materialistic as it appears, and the philosophy of organism is not the asset to religion many think it to be.

We cannot here make an analysis of the fundamental identities between the philosophy of organism and dialectical materialism. But it may be well to note another significant point that they have in common. They share together what might be called "the strategy" of the new naturalism—that of self-criticism. Until relatively recently naturalism and materialism were practically equivalent terms. The critique of materialism was embodied in a supernaturalism of some kind or other. And likewise the critique of supernaturalism was embodied in some type of mechanistic materialism. But the strategy of the modern naturalist marks a new line of attack on supernaturalism. Briefly it is this. Past materialism was always unsuccessful in refuting supernaturalism because it was unaware of the fact that supernaturalism presupposes it. Mechanistic materialism is simply inadequate. Once you grant its premises you will be forced into supernaturalism in order to avoid its conclusions. The history of philosophy is a witness to this truth. Hence, to avoid supernaturalism the correct method is

to attack that which provokes it, namely, mechanistic materialism. It is by this strategy that both dialectical materialism and the philosophy of organism come to essentially the same conclusion, so far as the conception of God is concerned.

One might object to all I have been saying by suggesting that I am using an old logical trick. I am identifying God with some particular notion, namely, eminent reality, and then arguing that if that particular notion is given up, God and all supernaturalism vanishes—as though the meaning of God were exhausted by one or more historical conceptions of him. That is a fallacy of presumption—one which has characterized all dogmatic religion.

But the matter is not quite so simple. In the first place, my argument is not concerned with the merits or demerits of any religion, or any particular conception of God. Rather it is concerned with interpreting Whitehead, showing that he falls in the naturalistic tradition, and, by implication, suggesting that, contrary to what many of his interpreters would admit, his philosophy is incompatible with, and contradicts, the Christian philosophical tradition in many of its essential phases. In the second place, I have assumed that eminent reality, at least in Christian doctrine, is an historical fact, and from the theological point of view, is a necessary, although not sufficient, characteristic of God. In the third place, to those Christian philosophers who perhaps are not in agreement, I would call attention to the fact that no great religion could or would have long existed had its conception of God not implied eminent reality. Religions in their prime have been defined by the presence of the latter; in their decay, by its absence. The God that built the churches and temples in all nations, that inspired men to endure hardships and privations to carry his Word into diverse parts of the world, that caused men to imprison and torture—*that* God was one who had power commensurate with the demands made upon him, who knew when a sparrow fell from a limb, who could reward the faithful with immortality. That God was not one whose essential nature is dependent upon the evolution of the world.

We are witnessing today a great effort on the part of those individuals who are alive to present issues, and are concerned with the fate of Christianity, to reconstruct Christian philosophy and theology. There are some who tell us that Christianity, confronted as it is by

new forces in the world, may have to change until it is something almost unrecognizable compared to what we know it as today. But there is a limit to which anything can change and still retain its self-identity. And Christianity is no exception. Even on the point of view which assumes that there is an "essence of Christianity," which in its temporal expression takes on various phenomenal forms, if the "essence" changes into its opposite, then it is simply no longer Christianity. Now the opposite of Christianity, *whatever else it may be*, is any *Weltanschauung* in which, explicitly or implicitly, there is the denial of a God that is eminently real. I submit that throughout history, whenever the existence of God was denied, what *essentially* was denied was simply the existence of a God that is eminently real. One can argue that Christianity is a falsification of the intuitions of Jesus, that the religion *of* Jesus is not Christianity, and that it is compatible with naturalism;[8] or one can argue that Christianity is essentially true, and that it *necessarily* implies the notion of a God eminently real. What I do not understand is how one can have it both ways. Whitehead doesn't try to, if I interpret him correctly. Have not some of his readers seen in his philosophy things that are not there?

All of which brings us around to the statement made at the beginning—that naturalism and supernaturalism are incompatible in a sense in which there is no possibility of their being resolved in a higher synthesis. Whitehead's philosophy, it seems to me, is naturalistic. Whether the new naturalism, and the philosophy of organism in particular, is essentially true or false I leave for others more bold to state. Fortunately the question of consistency in interpretation is independent of that of the truth-value of the system. And it is in respect to the former that we find no reason to believe that the philosophy of organism falls within the Christian tradition. So far as religion is concerned, this philosophy has more in common with dialectical materialism.

8. See page 520 in *Process and Reality* for a hint at this interpretation.

NIETZSCHE'S CRITIQUE OF JUDAISM

By Arno Carl Coutinho

The philosophical achievement which forms the nucleus of Nietzsche's doctrine, and which has hitherto been most influential, is his analysis and critique of accepted moral judgments. This critique is not confined to the present state of society, but also discloses the reasons for its historical development, and inquires whether the latter has contributed toward the realization of the kind of life demanded by Nietzsche. The most noble style of life Nietzsche finds established among the Greeks during the early flowering of their culture before Socrates, when its developed sense of the tragic affirmed the painful life of daring for daring's sake.[1]

To this early Hellenism, which perceived the meaning of action exclusively in earthly life, the Judaism of the Old Testament presents a contrast. As compared to these early Greeks, who lived naïvely and ingenuously, the Jews are people of the mind, people of the soul,—a priestly people.[2] They are the antithesis of the Greeks, whose culture is dominated above all by care and cultivation of the body. The struggle between Judaism and Hellenism became aggravated with the birth of Christianity, and the outcome of that historical conflict was in favor of Judaism and Christianity. The occidental morality attacked by Nietzsche rests mainly on late Hebrew and Christian-Hellenistic foundations. But even though Christianity originated in Judaism, its victory was possible only through the decline of the ancient Greco-Roman world. Nietzsche, therefore, does not confine himself to a critique of Jewish development, but amplifies it by an analysis of late Greek culture, and corrects his judgment of the Hebrews by an inquiry into their earliest history, in so far as the Old Testament permits such a procedure.

Though Nietzsche in no sense arrives at an apology for Judaism, he nevertheless, observes personalities among the Jews of the early period that are on a par with the pre-Socratic Greeks, if not, indeed, their superiors. Both the weakness and the greatness of the Jews he ascribes to the peculiarities of their history.[3] According to Nietzsche,

1. *The Birth of Tragedy.*
2. *Beyond Good and Evil.*
3. *Ibid.*

the Jews were originally tributary to the Hindus.[4] He arrives at this conjecture on the ground that the Code of Manu permits only evil-smelling plants, such as garlic and onions, to the Chandalas, their lowest caste, and demands circumcision of them,—similar customs to those found among the Jews. It was after the exodus from Egypt that the Jews developed warlike virtues in the course of conquest, and freed themselves from servility. Only with their victories and the possession of territory does the history of the Jews begin, and only then does there develop the Hebrew image of God. And, like the gods of all healthy peoples, according to Nietzsche, the God of the Jews is a warrior king, and a just judge. He has all the great virtues which the Jews cherish among themselves. But they did not enjoy political liberty for long; their leaders, mainly priests, in order to secure their own leadership, demanded only faith, not inner freedom. To be sure, this faith is deeply grounded; it does not rest on priestly authority alone,—it is the heritage of heroic personalities who possess something of that "most rare thing on earth: the incomparable simplicity of the strong heart."[5] A taste for discipline, a yea-saying to strict demands, reverence for the Highest, contempt for the human as all-too-human, the conviction that there are differences of rank in the world, and sacred possessions which the mass of mankind may not touch, an unconditional confidence in a just world-order, is what the people of the Old Testament taught, and what governed their deeds.

With the political decline of the Jewish people, which might easily have led to their complete destruction, not only was the authority of their religious leaders strengthened, but their real priestly talent came to its full development. It preserved their existence and procured for them, not political power, but dominion over the minds and morals of other peoples. Since the rabbis proclaimed every attack on theism an attack on morals, and forbade the substitution of free inquiry for faith, they made sure their authority over the Jews. Victorious Rome was conquered by them through Christianity, an act of supreme hate and revenge.[6] The good qualities of the ancient gods were repu-

4. *Nachgelassene Werke*, "Unveröffentlichtes aus der Umwertungszeit," *Werke*, Edition Naumann-Kröner, vol. v, 14 (Leipzig, 1904), p. 120.

5. *Genealogy of Morals*, Third Essay: "What is the meaning of ascetic ideals?" § 22.

6. *The Will to Power*, Book II, "A criticism of the highest values that have prevailed hitherto."

diated; all actions and events were tested for their fredom from sin; history was seen as but a judgment of guilt and atonement; nothing was left unmoralized. The God of the Jews lost all his frightfulness, and as a reflection of the depressed circumstances of his people, became a tame and gentle God, and humility became the noblest Christian virtue.

Though the Jews generally did not become Christians, wherein Nietzsche saw proof of their greatness, tenacity, and cunning, nevertheless, in exploiting the decadence of the ancient world, they corrupted the natural values of life until the foundations of classical culture were undermined. Their talent for histrionics was evinced, for the Jews reached their goal precisely in withstanding Christianity, despite the fact that, through their long history of suffering and oppression, they had adopted more and more Christian traits, regarding God alone as Spirit, while they themselves, like all sick and sorely tried old people, became rich in ideas, and full of *esprit*.[7]

The fact that Christianity represents an act of vengeance on the part of the Jews has been overlooked, Nietzsche thinks, mainly because Christianity teaches universal love of mankind, and because a spiteful people in a state of well-being is not in the habit of seeking revenge through love.[8] But since the Jews had no country of their own, and therefore could not direct their love toward a national life on their own soil, this doctrine of universal love was on their part, an act of self-defence which sapped the decadent humanity of the ancient world of confidence in its old proud culture.

Since the life of man, as taught by Christianity, consists only of guilt and suffering for sins, men, therefore, desired release from their misery. That God had chosen his son to atone for all sins committed by mankind appeared to them to be the most divine act. Their despondency, however, was not alleviated by this promise of salvation. It destroyed, as Nietzsche states, dignity, and incentive for further effort.[9] And as dignity and nobility were taken away from human beings in this age of decadence, so were they also lacking in their God. He does not, like the gods of the Greeks, take upon himself the responsibility for sin, nor does he act through power, as they do, but out of pity

7. *Ibid.*
8. *Genealogy of Morals*, *loc. cit.*
9. *Beyond Good and Evil*, Third Essay: "The religious mood."

for his creatures. Because he becomes a weak and kind God, a God of the feeble, the miserable, and the heavy-laden, humanity loses all sense of distance, becomes importunate, and burdens him with each and every small personal need.[10] In all their neediness the Jews who remained loyal to their priest-code, in contrast to their brothers who became converts, preserved a greater distance, and a stronger reverence toward their God. Thus the Christian has all the ignoble habits of the conquered Jewish race in a heightened degree.[11] He is a more obliging tool in the hands of the priests; he is much more bound to them because Christianity consists solely in the consciousness of man's iniquity, and his deliverance through God. The conceit of the Christian, that he is elected to be God's child, is proportionate to his subservience, and his conviction of utter impotence in worldly affairs. He lacks assurance in the conduct of life, and only clerical solace can comfort him.[12] But the priest desires this state of affairs for maintaining his power, and because he is also a sufferer, though to be sure, with a will toward supremacy. He has neither desire nor ability genuinely to cure mankind; his solace is, in Nietzsche's opinion, a cure only for isolated symptoms of human misery. The asceticism and renunciation demanded by Christianity only makes a virtue of necessity and shortcomings;[13] for, in Nietzsche's belief, mankind can recover only by a full development of its strength, not by humility before God, or repentance for evil deeds. But illness is sometimes necessary, even for the healthy, in order to test his fitness. Even if Judaism, and more especially Christianity, carry many seeds of disease, not alone for the decadent, who become still more ill by infection, but also for the healthy, nevertheless Jewish and Christian ethics gave to the younger peoples of the west a tension productive of cultural and spiritual development. Modern man, compared with ancient, has a more richly varied soul, while, at the same time, he is also more torn by conflicts originating in the adoption of Jewish-Christian principles by heathen nations, once primitive and barbarous, but gradually refined by the traditions of antiquity.[14]

But is the role of the Jews in Universal History exhausted with

10. *Ibid.*
11. *The Anti-Christ.*
12. *Genealogy of Morals, loc. cit.*
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Beyond Good and Evil,* "Peoples and countries," § 242.

this moral influence upon the occidental world? Besides their contribution to the development of Christianity, the Jews who have not yet been assimilated in the countries in which they live, Nietzsche maintains, are significant for their acumen, their tenacity, their patient endurance under the most impossible conditions, and for the ability with which they devote themselves to despised occupations, above all, that of money-changers.[15] Their depressed status as social pariahs has, however, prejudiced the capacities they have acquired in the span of centuries. They lack confidence in personal address, chivalry, and *noblesse*, in spite of the fact that an aristocratic bearing must have been natural to them as Orientals. Under Portuguese and Moorish rule, also, the Jews did enjoy dignity. When change of climate and servile neighbors increase their insecurity and oppression, the necessity of adapting themselves does not always favor spiritual discipline. Often superficial knowledge takes the place of thoroughness; learning serves money-making, or cultural vanity; everything is regarded as a means of advancement in society. The tendency to keep distance from others is given up when the goal can be reached by obtrusiveness. But in spite of every desire to break through, and an excessive will to adaptation, there remains a lack of easy self-confidence. Because they own no land of their own, the Jews lead the life of nomads, and easily adopt the ways of parasites. The moral strength, inherited from their ancestors, to educate themselves and others, degenerates into histrionics.[16]

Though the necessity of adaptation has estranged the Jews from chivalric manners, nevertheless, this same compulsion has sharpened their sense for realities. Their talent for economy, trade, and especially finance, receives high praise from Nietzsche. Indeed, he hopes to see the intelligence so developed become a factor in the future conduct of world affairs. Nietzsche is strengthened in this desire because he observes in the Jews a conservative element which preserves the middle class as the backbone of culture, and is against all violent changes.[17] Because of their constancy and persistence, their sacrifices in the interest of survival, and the many distressing experiences through which their minds have matured, Nietzsche discovers in the Jews, in spite of all their weaknesses, a most useful element for occidental culture. He ad-

15. *The Will to Power*, Book IV, "The order of rank: Discipline and breeding," § 864.
16. *Beyond Good and Evil*, "Peoples and countries," § 251.
17. *The Will to Power, loc. cit.*

vocates their gradual assimilation, even if the Eastern Jews must remain temporarily excluded because they still live too much in the milieu of the Ghetto.[18] He expects that much good will come from a mixture of the Prussian military nobility, which knows how to obey and how to give orders, with the best examples of the patient, intellectual, and realistic type of Jew.[19] Although Nietzsche never favored an unrestricted assimilation, on account of racial differences, he did not participate in efforts to eliminate the Jews. To be sure, he paid attention to the anti-Semites, and the investigation into the Jewish extraction of artists and scientists working in Germany was an undertaking that interested him.[20] But the objectives pursued by Nietzsche and those of the anti-Semites were entirely different. Nietzsche viewed anti-Semitism as a sign to the Jews to prepare themselves for a higher objective than to follow nationalism; the anti-Semites, on the other hand, fought the Jews because they were too little capable of assimilation.

Conscious of these opposing estimates of the Jews, Nietzsche was not satisfied with a mere critique of nationalism, but attacked, not without malice, outstanding individuals among the anti-Semites. In the work of Richard Wagner he discovered specific Jewish traits, and ascribed them on occasion to Wagner's alleged Jewish extraction. To Dühring's complaint about present-day corruption through Jewish influence Nietzsche answers ironically that his contemporaries are entirely too good-natured for any real corruption. He was afraid that if Stöcker was put in control his *Will to Power* would be confiscated.[21] He "congratulated" his brother-in-law, Bernhard Förster, because his party was not responsible for a ritual-murder trial, as had been the Hungarian anti-Semites.[22] He withdrew for a period from association with Ferdinand Avenarius, who had asked him to contribute to the *Kunstwart,* and had permitted a polemic against Heine as a Jew.[23] If Nietzsche, in spite of his vehement critique of Christianity as a Jewish accomplishment, takes sides with the Jews, he does so, not only in conformity with his cherished Nordic principles of chivalry, but also because of his super-national tendencies as an "independent spirit" transcending all boundaries.

18. *Beyond Good and Evil, loc. cit.*
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Briefe an Mutter und Schwester* (Leipzig, 1909), p. 718.
21. *Briefe an Peter Gast* (Leipzig, 1908), p. 389.
22. *Briefe an Mutter und Schwester* (Leipzig, 1909), p. 522.
23. *Briefwechsel mit Overbeck* (Leipzig, 1916), p. 427.

COMMUNICATIONS

REPORT ON THE THIRTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON RELIGION IN HIGHER EDUCATION

By Martha H. Biehle

The national council on Religion in Higher Education met at Keuka College, Keuka Park, New York, September 5 to 11, for its thirteenth annual conference since the founding of the Council in 1923 by Dr. Charles Foster Kent. During these years the Council has elected to membership one hundred seventy-eight men and women, Protestants, Catholics and Jews, who believe in the importance of religious life and thought in institutions of higher education. The Council has aided them to finish their graduate study and to secure opportunities for service in a variety of fields in colleges and universities. As teachers and administrators they now represent the Council in more than eighty different institutions. Others are serving in the ministry and other fields of social, educational and governmental service. Through its members, and officially from its office, the Council occasionally gives assistance directly to colleges in planning their program of religious life.

At its conference this year, attended by one hundred men and women, members and their guests, the National Council on Religion in Higher Education gave its attention primarily to problems of the social aspects of religion, philosophy, and psychology. Although there was no single topic for the conference as a whole, the topics chosen independently by the three daily discussion groups reflect this general interest in the social significance of religious thought. These subjects, examined in formal papers and informal discussion, were "Conflicting Views of the Nature of Man," "The Nature and Function of Philosophy with Especial Reference to Its Role in Social Change," and "The Contribution of Group Experience to Individual Development."

The discussion of conflicting views of the nature of man centered chiefly about papers presented on naturalistic philosophy and on dialectical theology. Dr. Edwin E. Aubrey of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago, presenting the paper on naturalism, distinguished between three historic types,—mechanism, biological naturalism, and psychological naturalism. He then discussed the naturalist

view of man in respect to three essential religious problems, man's origin, his destiny, and the means of his realization. Questioned as to whether empirical description is adequate to the richer experiences of aesthetic, moral and especially religious life, Dr. Aubrey expressed his own interest in pushing the empirical method into areas of experience not usually found in the naturalist's universe, and recognized the validity of other forms of knowledge. Objection was raised that the naturalist method misses the essential nature of moral and religious realities, since it is the record of an observer rather than the findings of a living participant. Dr. Aubrey granted that faith determines the world one lives in, but held that the contrast of the two attitudes is not absolute. He wished to keep science and religious experience within similar categories in contrast to the dialectical opposition of them.

Dr. Paul J. Tillich of Union Theological Seminary, consultant for this group, discussed the concept of man in dialectical theology. Referring to the question of method raised in Dr. Aubrey's paper, he distinguished three levels on which man can be understood, each with a peculiar method, and each dependent on the higher: the experimental method viewing man entirely from the outside and in artificial situations; phenomenological description, which is primarily the method of history, understanding man's nature as it expresses itself naturally and freely in the situations in which it is found; responsible understanding which interprets man with reference to his norms, ends and values, the contents of his freedom. Beyond these three is the self-commitment to ultimate values which conditions the three lower levels. The whole of life is involved in the commitment; therefore, at this level there is no method, no testing. Proceeding from the discussion of method to the doctrine of man, Dr. Tillich related the Christian doctrines of original sin, freedom, salvation, and creaturehood to the whole view of man given in modern scientific and philosophic discussion. He placed special stress on freedom as the outstanding characteristic of man, claiming that by using his freedom man may participate in the creativity of God, shaping a rational universe. Man's potentialities for creativity are limited, however, as he most markedly experiences in the fact of death. Comment on this statement questioned Dr. Tillich's primary emphasis upon man's freedom as exclusively man's characteristic. There was also question about the basis of evil in this system of thought.

The Marxian concept of man was discussed by Dr. Paul H. Douglas of the University of Chicago, a guest speaker, who stressed Marxian insight into the universal play of self-interest and freedom of decision. It was observed that this Marxian view is akin to traditional Christian thought of original sin, and is a reinterpretation of it in terms of modern life. Reference was made to statements where Marx foresaw the possibility of chaos. These were taken as indications of the fact that Marx knew that no historical change can come without human freedom, decision, and commitment.

Eastern philosophies, Buddhism and Hinduism, also contributed to this discussion of man. Dr. Teresina Rowell, of Adelphi College, pointed out that the supposed denial of the self in Buddhism was really a pragmatic psychology or therapeutic designed to get rid of that attachment to selfish grasping which the Buddha discovered to be the cause of human suffering. Buddhism's contribution to the method of social change lies in its belief that the new society must begin in our own lives. We must overcome the grasping which prevents us from seeing reality, and begin to embody in our own immediate social relationships the kind of harmony we are trying to achieve in the social system.

Dr. Mahanam Brahmachari, Hindu monk, and a guest at the sessions, pointed out that in Hindu philosophies "man" is not a philosophical category. The term *jiva*, which means "the life," or "living Beings," is used without sharp distinction between man and so-called lower animals; they are all jivas. The underlying essense of every jiva or psycho-physical organism is called *atman* or consciousness. Two antagonistic views of the nature of individual *atman* or consciousness are found in the doctrines of Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja. The former maintains that the individual consciousness is identical with a universal absolute consciousness; the latter holds that the ultimate Being is himself an individual, and the infinite number of individual jivas constitute one of his two modes. According to Śaṁkara the realization of identity with the ultimate Being constitutes liberation of man which is the goal of his life. According to Rāmānuja, in the highest stage the individuals do not merge in the absolute, but find their liberation in becoming distinctive and conscious participants in the life of the Lord.

The difficulty of generalizing about the Hindu philosophy of man was indicated by Mr. Kenneth Morgan, of the University of Michigan. Not only is modern Hindu thought based on the philosophy of

one of the two leading schools, Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja, but it is influenced by Mohammedanism, Christianity, and western culture. Generalization is further complicated by the tendency of Hinduism to attempt a synthesis of all religions.

A second group spent the week discussing the nature and function of philosophy with especial reference to its role in social change. The question was opened by Dr. Gregory Vlastos, of Queen's University, with a paper on historical aspects of philosophy, in which he stated that philosophy has been and still is man's sustained effort to think rationally and comprehensively about the whole of his experience. This is an individual creative process, but the social nature of the philosopher's self must not be overlooked. Dogmatism in philosophy reflects divisions within society; philosophy is thus a creature of history. In its efforts toward rationality, it is also, however, a creative force in history. Philosophy, to function as a liberating human force, must be aware of its past bondage to social inequalities, and therefore it cannot avoid social partisanship. Comment called attention to the importance of recognizing inner coherence in philosophy, and asked that too much emphasis should not be given to the genetic development of philosophy. The element of spontaneity must not be overlooked.

The group then examined the contributions of personal idealism, instrumentalism, and speculative philosophy to this question. Speaking for personal idealism, Dr. Jannette Newhall observed that as a social philosophy personalism emphasizes the value of persons as individuals, and stresses the obligation of persons as members of society. Social values are believed to be sought, both by man and by God, in a co-operative process. Question was raised as to whether personalism gives sufficient recognition to the degree to which the self is constituted by social responsibility.

On the other hand, pragmatism, according to Mr. George H. Griffiths, views all philosophies as being relative to historical and cultural contexts. Pragmatism sees the relevance of philosophy and the enduring value of the philosophic enterprise in its relativity—performing critical, evaluative, synthesizing, reconstructive, and prophetic functions—to social and individual desires and aims. Thus pragmatism urges a critical approach to all existing institutions, evaluating them in terms of their consequences for individual and social fulfilment. In

clarifying the present situation, in elucidating the ideal it generates, and in aiding the discovery of methods that shall secure that ideal, pragmatism sees the supreme function of contemporary philosophy. The question then raised was whether pragmatism has an adequate standard for judging whether a theory should be accepted or rejected; that fascism, for example, claims justification in pragmatism. The reply was that pragmatism takes its stand on the method of intelligence, seeking those situations in which there is the greatest mutual support among values.

Dr. Arthur E. Murphy, of Brown University, participated in this group as consultant and gave an informal summary of the problem of philosophy's position in the present world. He agreed with the analysts who say that there is no longer meaning in the ancient search for "ultimate reality." Rather the philosopher's service to society, he felt, is found in his criticism of the meaning of words and ideas, and the uses to which they are put. Philosophy must also have a speculative function purposely extending the meaning of terms.

Another approach to the question of philosophy's present function was considered in a paper by Dr. Howard B. Jefferson, of Colgate University, on the place of philosophy in the curriculum. He described the low estate to which the teaching of philosophy has fallen in many places, since being dethroned from the central position about which all other faculties revolved. He emphasized the importance of philosophy today as criticism, as an historical study, and in changing the social attitudes of students. Questions raised by the discussion called attention also to the role of philosophy as "prophet," helping to guide the development of blueprints for civilization, and giving the student positive assurance to aid him in determining his own basis for personal and social living.

A third group meeting for discussion considered the effect of group experience upon the individual. It studied the special contributions made by the family to the growth of the individual, and analyzed some of the problems of group experience in education. It also considered questions of group religious experience, bringing into this discussion the problem of criteria for determining which groups are religious. It was suggested that such criteria must include activity for social change, and the equation of economic power to free human beings to develop as whole personalities.

Evening sessions included a variety of speakers. At one of these, Dr. Paul J. Tillich presented a paper on the historical background and significance of dialectical theology. At another, Mr. Harry Price, secretary of the American Committee on Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression, and on leave from the Department of Economics at Yenching University, China, discussed "The International Aspect of the Far Eastern Crisis."

One evening was given to a consideration of "The Development of the Labor Movement in the South," with a paper by Dr. James Dombrowski, secretary of the Highlander Folk School of Monteagle, Tennessee, and a showing of the motion picture, "People of the Cumberland," depicting the work of the School, present conditions of life in the Cumberland mountains, and some of the problems of labor organization in the South. A panel discussion, on another evening, considered ways of meeting the religious needs of students through the college, the church, and personal counseling. At the final evening session, Dr. Paul H. Douglas presented a paper discussing three areas of major fear in the lives of American people today: (1) the fear of continuing and increasing large-scale unemployment, (2) the fear of inability to bring about social change without violence, (3) the fear of war growing out of the present European crisis.

THE FOUR HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ENGLISH BIBLE

This important anniversary was celebrated at Columbia University by a Special Convocation, on October 18, at which the degree of Doctor of Sacred Theology was conferred by the President of the University upon the Very Reverend Walter Robert Matthews, Dean of St. Paul's Cathedral, London. The ceremony was opened by the Chaplain of the University with the prayer of President Johnson at the laying of the cornerstone of King's College, on August 23, 1756. This was followed by the Nunc Dimittis, in the translation by Myles Coverdale (c. 1539), rendered by the choir of St. Paul's Chapel. After this the eminent candidate was presented by President Henry Sloane Coffin, of Union Theological Seminary, and received the degree from

President Butler. In his address, Dean Matthews stressed the very great importance of this anniversary for all the English speaking peoples. He traced the influence of the English Bible on the religious, social, political, and literary development of England, showing how all her institutions, as well as her intellectual and moral life, have been colored by it. He showed that the English have been, in the past, a Bible-reading people, but that today this is no longer true; modern life, with its great wealth of literary production, and its manifold distractions, has displaced the Bible from its former pre-eminence. It is greatly to be feared that this will result inevitably in a weakening of the moral fibre of the nation, unless the Bible is restored to its legitimate place in education. The Bible will regain its place and influence as the results of constructive modern scholarship are fully known and utilized.

La Vie de Marpa, le "Traducteur," suivie d'un chapitre de l'Avadāna de l'Oiseau Nīlakaṇṭha. By Jacques Bacot. (*Buddhica*, documents et travaux pour l'étude du Bouddhisme, publiés sous la direction de Jean Przyluski. Première serie: Mémoires, vii) Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1937. 115 pp. Fr. 48.

By publishing this French translation and transcription into Latin letters of an evidently very old biography of Marpa the Translator (A.D. 993-1081), the *Buddhica* series makes an important new contribution to the knowledge of later Buddhism, which has been helped so much by its previous publication of the travel-diary of the pilgrim Hiuan-Tsang.

Only in recent years have we become acquainted with the great Tibetan teachers of the "direct path," the Kargyütpa School; especially through Grünwedel's German translation of *The Legends of Nā-Ro-Pa*,[1] and Evans-Wentz's English edition of the poetical biography of Milarepa. Now, Jacques Bacot closes the ranks by adding this book of reports about Marpa, who stands between Naropa and Milarepa, as pupil of the first and teacher of the second.

The main content of this biography is a report of Marpa's three journeys to India on a search for gold, for a good teacher, and for books. On his second trip he received the decisive initiation from Naropa. The third journey seems to be much more on the spiritual plane: it is a typical account of the arduous search of the pupil for a *guru*. Naropa, being already dead at this time, reveals himself to his pupil only by symbolical means, through which he transmits to Marpa his knowledge of the magic transmigration. Back in Tibet Marpa demonstrates this practice to his disciples by transfering his soul into the dead bodies of a pigeon, a lamb, and a deer, leaving his own body lifeless during the experiment. When he returns to his body he laughs at his worried disciples. At last, he goes so far as to make use of this power to transport the heavy body of a dead yak upstairs in an easier way!

The last part of the book deals with the death of Marpa's son, Darmadode, to whom alone he had entrusted the secret of transmigra-

1. Reviewed in *The Review of Religion*, I (1937), pp. 392-95.

tion. After Darmadode has fallen off his horse and broken his skull, Marpa orders his disciples to find another body for Darmadode's soul, the uninjured corpse of some other young man into which he could migrate. But there is no such body to be found anywhere, which means that the secret doctrine of how to attain Nirvana without meditation can no longer be spread in Tibet. Only the body of a pigeon is found intact. When the dying Darmadode refuses to migrate into that low animal, the people begin to doubt the possibility of transmigration, and the whole doctrine taught by Marpa. In order to convince them of its truth, Darmadode then performs the transmigration, after having entered a high state of perfection by means of meditation, which is necessary in order not to lose one's higher self during the process. Later Marpa directs the pigeon to fly over to India, where it finds the corpse of a young brahmin about to be cremated, Darmadode leaves the pigeon, which was nothing but a means of transportation, enters the brahmin's body and returns home to his parents, becoming a more obedient and agreeable son than the dead one had ever been.

To this Jacques Bacot adds the "Avadāna of the Bird Nīlakaṇṭha," another Tibetan text, which illustrates how the motive of transmigration was used later in love stories and fairy-tales.

The entire translation is very carefully done, and we can only regret that Bacot has not presented the full text, but only an excerpt, omitting all kinds of repetitions and scholarly doctrines, as well as certain longer portions of the travel stories themselves. He tries, however, to give us a more correct idea of Tibetan thought than the other translators, to whom he refers in his Introduction. He criticizes Evans-Wentz because his vocabulary, built up from spiritualistic sources, alienates us from the real atmosphere of Tibet,—for instance, his constant use of such terms as "illusory body," and his translation of *Sgyūma* (*Māyā*) as "Illusion." And he rightly criticizes Grünwedel's translation of *groṅ-jug* as "being penetrated with frost," while its real meaning here can only be "entering a dead body"! He also considers Grünwedel's comparisons between Tibetan Buddhism and Manichaeism to be rather subjective. He may be correct in this, but we would have been grateful for a little more comment from Bacot himself, even if they proved to be "subjective" here and there.

FRIEDRICH SPIEGELBERG

Columbia University

The Legacy of Asia and Western Man. By ALAN W. WATTS. London: John Murray, 1937. xviii + 187 pp. 3*s*.

In reviewing this latest book of Alan Watts, who is the editor of the soberly redacted periodical, *Buddhism in England*, it might be suitable to throw a flashlight on the young author himself, along with his writings. His personality is unforgettable to those who attended last year's Congress of Faiths in Oxford, England. It has often been said and experienced that the real value of a conference lies, not so much in the official presentations, as in the improvised discussions which garland the program. This was especially true for the Congress of Faiths, and a good deal of its vitality was due to Alan Watts, one of the youngest speakers, who again and again went to the platform, and each time provoked a movement of expectation in the audience. For he soon became known as a person who always succeeded in turning the disputed questions in a different direction, frequently by a humorous paradox, thus opening all minds for the other side of reality,—its miraculousness, its dialectics, or whatever else it may be called.

This could happen because everyone felt, and one can feel the same thing in his books, that here speaks a man who really behaves according to his ideals. The spirit of modesty and artless simplicity pervades his expositions of the Mahāyāna doctrine of śūnyatā,—emptiness. In *The Spirit of Zen*[1] he freely confesses his dependence upon the work of the great Japanese scholar, Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, and in *The Legacy of Asia* he acknowledges that the work owes its inspiration to C. G. Jung, "whether or no he will agree with the main conclusions of this book" (p. xiv). Alan Watts can well confess his dependence on the thought of others, for it is to his credit that he is conscious of the sources of his ideas, while others often pretend to be original because they are not aware of the inheritance of their doctrines. Though not a scholar in the usual sense, he is one of those exceptions worthy to be mentioned among scholars, who replaces philological investigations with a quite unusual degree of inner understanding, and vital participation in the problems.

Zen, in the treatment of Watts, becomes something of general application. He brings forth its quintessence, in so far as it is arresting for

1. (London, 1936.)

the Western mind. In its deeper sense, it is shown to be much more than a special, historical phase of Far Eastern Buddhism, much more than just one religious practice among others, but rather, a universal and eternally valuable attitude of mind, "just as applicable to washing clothes as to performing religious offices."[2] The same spirit of what may be called a Religion of Non-Religion can be found in his pamphlet, *Seven Symbols of Life*,[3] in which he talks about the "eternal verities as expressed in the images of the lotus, of water, wind, fire, man, woman and child," and comes to the conclusion that "such things will appear no longer ordinary, but miraculous and full of wonder" (p. 22).

Watts recognizes his own feelings in the humorous way in which "frequently the Zen masters used to refer to each other as 'old rice-bags' and with other uncomplimentary terms, not out of any professional jealousy, but because it amused them to think that they and their wise and venerated brothers were supposed by ordinary standards to be so especially holy, whereas they had all realized that everything was holy, even cooking-pots and odd leaves blown about by the wind, and that there was nothing particularly venerable about themselves at all."[4] Thus, we are told, our attitude must at last be that of *Muga*, "that is, an absence of the feeling that 'I am doing it.' . . . The consciousness of 'self' must be subordinated to concentration on the task in hand."[5] (We are here reminded of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger.) Watts has identified his own deepest tendencies with what he calls "the spirit of Zen," and claims that "Zen will go further than Japan. Already a hostel for Western students has been attached to a monastery at Kyoto, and whether under the name of Zen or not, something of its spirit must enter wherever religions and philosophies are to be roused from the grave of theories and words."[6]

It is the main purpose of this latest book, *The Legacy of Asia*, to disseminate this expectation. Through Zen Chinese culture is expected to reinform our own with a new meaning. "This book," he writes, "is concerned with the possible child of Eastern and Western wisdom" (p. xiii). He feels definitely, and stresses again and again, "that the

2. *The Spirit of Zen*, p. 17.
3. (London, 1936.)
4. *The Spirit of Zen*, p. 33.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 129.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

time has come for fresh food to be given to the roots of Western civilization" (p. 1). "Christianity is left with three alternatives: to resurrect its own past by returning to Puritanism, Scholasticism or Gnosticism; to root itself in modern scientific thought; or to explore the entirely new field of the tradition of Asia" (p. 3). Of course Watts considers the last possibility the only adequate one. On the other hand, it is his conviction that Christianity must also learn from modern psychology, even though it is a very young science,—as Jung once said, "it was not even born yesterday; it was born this morning" (p. 6). The *tertium comparationis* between Zen and Jung's psychology could be expressed by a motto describing the principle of *Muga* which is called the basis of Bushido: "I have no principles; I make adaptability to all things my principles."[7]

The Legacy of Asia closes with a well-chosen Bibliography, and a Glossary which explains in a very thoughtful way some of the most important Chinese, Japanese, Sanscrit, and Pali expressions, for which every reader will feel especially grateful.

FRIEDRICH SPIEGELBERG

Columbia University

History of the Arabs. By PHILIP K. HITTI. London: Macmillan, 1937. xviii + 767 pp. $10.50.

There are a fair number of college textbooks on the history of medieval Europe and western culture, but this volume by Professor Hitti of Princeton appears to be the first of its kind on the history of the Arabs and Islam. As a pioneer work it deserves praise for the author's skilful apportionment of the material, his accuracy, learning and objectivity. It should prove a useful work for college reading because of its conciseness and comprehensiveness, and its admirable plates, maps and chronological and genealogical tables and references.

From a higher critical point of view it may be said that Hitti is peculiarly qualified for writing of this kind, by virtue of his intimate knowledge of the Arabic sources and of present-day life in the Near East, as well as by his training as editor of texts, translator and cataloguer of manuscripts.

Since this review is addressed primarily to students of religion, no general description of the book's contents need be given other than to

7. *Ibid.*, p. 130.

say that the author has managed to include in his account of Arabic and Muslim history and culture from antiquity to the end of the fifteenth century a good deal of information, not only about pre-Islamic religion and Islam, but also about political, social and economic history, education, science, art, literature, military matters, dress and amusements in the peninsular of Arabia, in Palestine, Syria, Egypt, North Africa, Spain, Mesopotamia, Persia and Asia Minor—a triumph of condensation.

The student of religion will find some interesting comments on pre-Muhammedan religious attitudes and cults, on the life and work of Muhammad, on the Koran, the sects, ritual, belief, law, tradition, organization and the like. While it is possible for a non-Arabist to obtain much valuable information about these matters from a number of handbooks, such as those of MacDonald, Wensinck, Goldziher and others, he will probably find that Hitti's book has the advantage of providing him with the necessary political, social and economic background much more fully than the handbooks mentioned. Nor, in spite of the fact that the author is a Christian Arab, will a critical reader find any obvious religious prejudices in the evaluation of Islamic ideas and practices, or in the consideration of their relation to those of Judaism and Christianity. In this respect Hitti has achieved praiseworthy objectivity. In many places he has shown, or has followed other scholars in saying, that the Arabs owe such and such an idea or practice to the Jews, Christian Syrians, Persians, Greeks or Hindus, but at the same time he possesses enough sympathy with native Arabic instincts and attitudes to be able to recognize originality or skilful adaptation on their side.

About one quarter of the book's forty-nine chapters are devoted to religion or culture, and of each of these chapters almost a half deals with religion or religious literature, so that, as indicated above, the student of religion will find it a convenient and interesting introduction to Islamic belief and practice.

The following details seem to call for comment. The etymologizing of the name Abram as *ab* and Arabic *ram* "desire" is probably wrong (p. 40). Parallelism in Hebrew poetry is probably not to be explained by Arabic influence, because it is found in Ras Shamra texts of the fifteenth century B.C. (p. 43, note 1). The table of alphabets omits the ninth consonant *ṭēt* (p. 52, plate). The equation of Akkadian Me-

lukkha with Amalek is hazardous (p. 52). Obedas is written as Obodas (p. 68). It is inaccurate to say that aleph represents the sound *a;* aleph is a consonant, as, of course, Hitti knows (p. 71). The aleph sign has been misplaced in the word *ma'* (p. 83; cf. similar slips on p. 556, note 1, and p. 614, note). The head on the coin reproduced is that of Trajan, not Hadrian as stated (p. 86). The textual accuracy of modern copies of the Koran is greatly exaggerated (p. 122); cf. A. Jeffrey in *Riv. degli studi orientali,* 1937, p. 249 ff. The Mishnah is referred to, when the Midrash is obviously meant (p. 125); incidentally Hitti deals rather inadequately with Jewish influence on Koran, *ḥadith,* and Muslim religious law. The battle-site Yarmuk in Transjordan is certainly not the Jarmuth of Joshua 10:3; the latter is to be identified with an entirely different Yarmuk in Judaea (p. 152, note 3). It seems very doubtful whether Ar. *kharāj* comes from Gr. *choregia* (p. 171), but, what is more important, Hitti has given an excellent survey of the system of taxation under the Khalifs. The *resh galutha* or exilarch of the Babylonian Jews is wrongly called "chief rabbi"; this title should be applied to his colleague the Gaon (p. 357). It is an exaggeration to say that Islam first reconciled monotheism with Greek philosophy (pp. 381-82); what about Philo, whom Hitti himself later mentions as the source of certain Muslim religious doctrines? The famous Alfonsine Tables were not compiled by the Castilian king Alfonso X the Wise, but by two Jews working under him (p. 570). No doubt there are other inaccurate or erroneous statements which have escaped the reviewer, but in view of the considerable amount of material presented, the book is conspicuously free from errors of detail.

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The Prophets and the Rise of Judaism. By Adolphe Lods. Translated by S. H. Hooke. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1937. xxiv + 378 pp. $5.00.

In this volume Professor Lods continues the admirable study of Hebrew history and religion which he began in his *Israel,* and brings the account down to the end of the Persian period. Thus the two volumes (which form part of the series on the history of civilization edited by Henri Beer) serve as an excellent presentation of biblical life

and belief. The treatment is eminently clear, reasonable and attractive. The conclusions are based on wide and accurate knowledge of literary and archeological sources. In short, the distinguished author has given us what is perhaps the most satisfactory brief and general account of this important period of civilization that has appeared within the last quarter of a century in any language. It is not meant, of course, to replace the many valuable monographs that have been written on special aspects of Old Testament history, religion, and literature, and does not, therefore, present detailed evidence in support of every theory advanced; it will, however, be of as great interest to the specialist as to the general reader because of the very helpful synthesis that it makes of the Hebrew contribution to western civilization, and because of the author's skill in selecting what is valuable and new in the vast specialized literature bearing on the subject. The reviewer regrets that the general excellence of the volume is not matched by its physical form; the paper is thick, and the book is heavy and hard to hold for any length of time. The illustrations, however, are good.

Lods' admirable common sense and balance of judgment are particularly noticeable in his treatment of the following controversial subjects: the psychopathology of prophetic inspiration (pp. 57 ff.); the "nomadic ideals" of the prophets (pp. 60 ff.); the differences between prophetic eschatology and the ancient oriental view of the after-life (pp. 69 ff.); the defense of the generally accepted view that Deuteronomy was published in the reign of Josiah (though the reviewer favors a later date) as at least a program, if not a plan of action that could have been put into practice at that time (pp. 140 ff.); the characterization of Jeremiah (pp. 169 ff.); the list of returned exiles in Ezra 2, Neh. 7 (pp. 190 ff.); the differences between Palestinian and Diaspora Judaism in the Persian period, following the views of Causse (pp. 208 ff.); the influence of Ezekiel on later Judaism (pp. 211 ff.); the teaching and personality of Deutero-Isaiah (pp. 336 ff.); the redaction of the Priestly Code, and the relation of the Priestly narratives of the Pentateuch to the other sources (pp. 281 ff.); the chronology of Nehemiah and Ezra (pp. 298 ff.); the origin of the Jewish community at Elephantine (pp. 305 ff.); the Samaritan schism (pp. 320 ff.).

The following are the chief points about which the reviewer dis-

agrees with the learned author, or believes that the treatment might have been improved:

Lods' argument against a post-exilic date for the publication of Deuteronomy on the ground that it presupposes the existence of an independent state with a king, army, etc., might be met by the theory, which he himself advances, that it was perhaps a Utopian program; thus it might well have been composed in the Persian period by those leaders who looked forward to the restoration of the Davidic kingdom (pp. 147 f.).

Rather fanciful is the suggestion that the book of Habbakuk may have been the work of the prophet Uriah of Kirjath-jearim (p. 165). Also tenuous is the suggestion that Sheshbazzar was the son of Jechoniah, which is hardly supported by the late passage I Chron. 3:18 (pp. 178, 189).

In the section on the Holiness Code, Lev. 27-36, Lods underestimates the amount of ancient tradition incorporated, and goes too far in attributing the larger part of the legislation to the Babylonian and Persian periods (pp. 263 f.).

The argument for diverse authorship of Isaiah 56-66 is not very convincing; nor does Lods show his usual sensibleness in writing, "We have already mentioned two of these passages [Isa. 63:7-64:11 and 66:1-2], which must date from before 520; their most distinctive feature is their deep spirituality" (p. 273). Is it not rather naïve to assume that deep spirituality mysteriously disappears from Hebrew writing after 520 B.C.? What about many of the deeply spiritual psalms that are generally thought to have been written quite late in the Persian, or even in the Hellenistic period? And what of the evidence for assuming that Deutero-Isaiah himself wrote after the sixth century? Moreover the second of the two passages in question, which says that God does not need an earthly temple, would be most appropriate just in the period after 520 B.C. when the Second Temple was completed.

Again, in dealing with Malachi Lods permits himself to be influenced by the now obsolete view of Wellhausen and his followers that prophecy degenerated after the Exile; he also fails to make clear in what sense Malachi is a "preacher rather than a prophet"; his whole characterization of Malachi seems to the reviewer to need correction (pp. 275 ff.). While it is perfectly true that the *forms* of prophetic

teaching changed greatly toward the end of the Persian period, it is no less true that the *spirit* of prophetic teaching lived on abundantly in the writings of the Wisdom school and the early Pharisaic teachers. Up-to-date in almost everything else that relates to the history of Judaism, Lods is sadly behind the times in failing to recognize the prophetic element in Pharisaic Judaism, in spite of its legal forms.

The discussion of the meaning of Old Testament sacrifices is generally good, as noted above, but in one point Lods' imaginativeness seems to have deserted him, for he objects to the theory that the animal sacrifices were chiefly "substitutional deaths" on the ground that we should not thus be able to understand why only one victim was offered on behalf of the entire people (p. 295). But surely even ancient peoples had enough power of rationalization to regard such a sacrifice as a symbol of individual sacrifices. There are numerous examples of this kind of rationalization in ancient cults and legends. Of course there may have been divergent and even contradictory theories of sacrifice involved. Pareto's *Sociologie* is full of instructive examples of this fact.

In dealing with the causes of the Samaritan schism the author has neglected to consider the social and economic factors involved, which have been recently studied by Alt, Albright and others (pp. 300 f.).

Finally, the reviewer finds that the concluding chapters which summarize the religion of the Jews during the Persian period seem rather sketchy, even superficial at times, as though the author had tired of his task. It is true that they are a summary and not an independent treatment, but one misses in them that unusual power of synthesis that is so splendidly evident in the earlier parts of the book. However, if they seem deficient, it is only because they are judged by the high standard which the author himself has set, and even with their deficiencies they may be read with profit.

As for errors or inaccuracies in detail, which are very few indeed, the following may be noted. Murahu for Murashu (p. 5); Ipsambul for Abu-Simbel (p. 41); location of Harran in north-east Mesopotamia instead of north-west—possibly the transalator's slip (p. 44); Marduk Paliddin for Marduk-apal-iddin (p. 105); 590 (B.C.) for 190 (p. 319).

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Sacrifices in Ancient Israel: Their Origin, Purposes, and Development. By W. O. E. Oesterley. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938. 320 pp. $4.00.

Few subjects in the history of religion are more fascinating, important, and complicated than the subject of sacrifice. The recent contribution by Professor Oesterley is therefore a welcome addition to an already large and imposing literature. The difficulties involved in any adequate discussion of the sacrifices of ancient Israel are great. There are, first of all, the perplexing critical questions relating to the date of some of the most important materials, for example, the relevant portions of Deuteronomy, the ecclesiastical utopia of Ezekiel 40-48, and the individual regulations of the Priestly Code. A second difficulty is the obscurity of Semitic, especially of Arabian, origins. A more subtle problem is the one of appreciation of the psychology and social mentality of primitive men. Later rationalizations may provide us with valuable clues, but they are not to be taken too seriously, certainly not as satisfactory descriptions of the meaning, function, and essential purpose of sacrifice. Again, the numerous kinds of sacrifices to which the Old Testament and the Ras Shamra inscriptions bear eloquent witness make precise and intelligent statements hazardous. And finally, the great difference among scholars, even amid wide areas of agreement, bears testimony to the presence of numerous factors and forces which weave themselves intricately and intimately into the cultural patterns of primitive thinking.

Oesterley has succeeded in overcoming these difficulties in a marked degree. He has the happy faculty of clear and penetrating discussion; he keeps minor matters subordinate so that the chief issues in his investigation stand out sharply. He controls the literature of the subject, and is refreshingly critical throughout the whole course of his discussion. He chooses his illustrations discerningly, and uses them with telling effect. His treatment is chronological, but only in its general outline and development; thus he avoids the vexing problem of the date of many individual passages. While his own study is set in a firm framework, he sounds a repeated warning against oversimplification of the central problem. Even so, the reader runs the danger of losing sight of the fact that various motifs are frequently reflected in one and the same sacrificial offering. A useful feature of

the book is the explanation of technical terms for sacrifices in the Old Testament.

The chief object of *Sacrifices in Ancient Israel* is to show the three main purposes for which sacrifices are offered. These purposes are: (1) to present gifts to the supernatural powers; (2) to effect communion between the worshipper and his deity; and (3) to liberate life for the benefit of gods and men. After a succinct survey of the chief literature on the subject, the purposes of sacrifices among the uncultured peoples are examined. The field is narrowed by a brief sketch on sacrifices among the Semites, especially among the Arabs, the Babylonians and Assyrians, the Syrians and Canaanites. The discussion of the ritualistic acts accompanying the sacrifices, such as purificatory rites, gestures, postures, and shouts, emphasizes the priority of what men do over what men think in matters of this sort. The body of the book concerns the purpose and development of sacrifices among the Hebrews. One chapter is devoted to the nomadic period, five chapters to the agricultural period, two to the period after the exile, two more to the attitudes of the prophets, both pre-exilic and post-exilic, toward sacrifices. An especially welcome discussion covers the post-biblical and pre-Christian field, in which Oesterley has done so much for us. The last two chapters of the book on the teaching of Jesus regarding sacrifices, and on the atonement, are full of interest and reflect the independence and originality of the writer's mind.

The conception of sacrifice as primarily a gift was stated by G. B. Gray in his *Sacrifice in the Old Testament* (1925). This book was written as a corrective, or at least as a supplement, to the classic work of Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*. Oesterley recognizes the large place of the gift element in sacrifice. The offering of gifts has many motives behind it: to secure the god's favor, to avert his wrath, to propitiate him, to show him gratitude, to manifest the worshipper's affection, and to dedicate oneself to him. In one way or another the attitudes represented in these interests reflect themselves throughout the course of Semitic religion. Diversity of motivation is further revealed in the variety of situations which prompt the sacrifice, whether it be the need for fertility, initiation, "cutting" of covenants, entrance into or return from battle, or any one of a hundred occasions. In Arabia, for example, gifts vary all the way from blood, water, milk, and gold, to the worshipper's "soul and mind, his chil-

dren, his possessions, the light of his eyes, and the thoughts of his heart" (p. 50). Among the Babylonians all offerings are fire offerings and are dominated by the conception of the gods as possessors of the land. In Israel the diversity of motive for the bestowal of gifts is exceedingly great. Oesterley certainly does insufficient justice to the remarkable offerings described in Judges 6 and 13, and the cup marks in the Gezer sanctuary are not even mentioned. These instances are peculiarly important because of the simplicity and relative purity of their form.

Robertson Smith's great book on *The Religion of the Semites* has had a great influence upon British scholarship, and its complete and admirable revision by S. A. Cook (1922) testifies to its continued influence. It was in this book that the idea of *communion* as the basic force in sacrifice received classic expression. The importance of totemism was greatly exaggerated by Robertson Smith, and while this has been almost universally recognized, English scholarship has been slow to break away from some of the implications of this theory. One fears that Oesterley has not avoided this pitfall. His emphasis is more upon *union* than upon communion; indeed he sometimes seems to exceed the position of Robertson Smith himself. This gives his discussion a freshness and vitality which is welcome, but raises grave questions in the mind of the reader. That sacrifice was a means of establishing contact between the worshipper and his god is established, and that convictions in the primitive Semitic community regarding the essential solidarity of animal, man, and deity frequently governed this relationship need not be denied. But to say that sacrifice brought about a union, "made the worshippers one with Yahweh" (p. 172), seems to be misstating the situation. Oesterley admits that such a statement is nowhere to be found in the Old Testament. In this connection one may refer to the discussion of the Passover. Here the communion character of the festival is not exaggerated, but later in the discussion (p. 109) we are asked to contemplate what such a *union* would mean to the early Semite, with its implications of participation in the life with Yahweh after death. Oesterley may be right; his arguments are certainly persuasive. But the problem is complicated and difficult, and involves, moreover, the whole character of Hebrew religious attitudes.

A third interpretation of the purpose of sacrifice was suggested by Dussaud in his book, *Les origines canaanéennes du sacrifice israélite*

(1921), and by E. O. James in his *Origins of Sacrifice* (1933). In both of these books emphasis was placed upon the element of the liberation of life. The real object of sacrifice, says Dussaud, is to possess the principle of life. "By the pouring out of the blood the life of the sacrificial victim is set free, and, by the previous laying of his hands upon the victim, the offerer identifies himself with it. The outpoured blood is received by the god, the flesh is eaten by the offerer; and thus, as both participate, a union is effected between the offerer and his god."[1] James' thesis is similar. It will be noted that in both the communion element is prominent. One can only be grateful to Oesterley for his very orderly and intelligible treatment of a difficult subject, and one which is indissolubly bound with the conceptions of *gift* and *communion*. More might have been made of the water libations in the ancient Near East, and their magical associations with the fructifying of the soil.[2] This would have given us access to the interest in *rain*, and the myth and ritual connected with it.

No part of the book will evoke more discussion than the author's view of the attitude of the prophets toward sacrifice. We must recognize that the customary cleavage between priest and prophet has frequently been carried too far; that the prophet was in a very real sense a functionary of the sanctuary has been repeatedly suggested in recent years, and the evidence of his connection with the sanctuary is strong. It is really striking how few passages in the prophetic books deal directly with sacrifice. Oesterley takes up the most important ones, and subjects each to brief examination. Amos 4:4-5 is not a condemnation of Canaanite worship, the objection is to the divorce of ceremonial and morality. Similarly the blazing denunciation of chapter 5 is not directed against all sacrifices, but against "*your* sacrifices, *your* feasts." Moreover, Oesterley queries, "What alternative form of worship would he have proposed?" If, indeed, such a question is relevant to the prophetic spirit of dynamic protest, then it would seem that the clear answer of Amos would be "a worship without sacrifice." Oesterley cannot accept that answer. To the *locus classicus* on this question, "Did ye bring unto me sacrifices and offerings in the wilderness forty years, O house of Israel?" he proposes an affirmative

1. Quoted by Oesterley, p. 19.

2. The stress upon *life*, and the relationship of sacrifice to the elemental interest in physical survival and preservation is an increasingly significant phase of Old Testament studies.

answer! "Did not your forefathers offer me sacrifices which were acceptable because they were offered in faithfulness and sincerity? Why, then, do you offer sacrifices which, on account of your sins and on account of false ideas about your God Yahweh, are worthless and unacceptable?" Oesterley might in certain instances have made an even stronger case for his position, as, for example, in the case of the prophet Isaiah, where strongly conservative forces are clearly at work. But his interpretations are not the most natural; they usually appear strained. Moreover (for this objection by itself might not outweigh his argument), the whole logic of the prophets and of prophecy is against the view of Oesterley. Jeremiah, far from being the exception which proves the rule, is the prophet whose lineal and close relationship to the other prophets confirms their testimony.

Many other matters in the book deserve extended study and comment. There are a number of references to magic, but they are never more than minor in character, and in no case is the subject brought out into the open or discussed at any length. Further, many of the pertinent illustrations adduced are explicable only by the mentality of magical coercion, yet these lie before us unexplained. The subject would have been illumined by some discussion of magical techniques. In this connection, the contributions of Professor W. C. Graham, *The Prophets and Israel's Culture*, and of Graham and May, *Culture and Conscience*, have given us a deeper insight into the nature and cause of the prophetic protest. Again, it must be asserted with force that primitive attitudes toward sacrifice, certainly Hebrew attitudes, were not at all definite and precise, but vague, diffuse, and undifferentiated. This very vagueness, the unremembered origins, the cult speech rich in connotation, the happy celebrations of feast days, the excitement attendant upon eating together, the sanctuary's immemorial past,—all this was part of the sacrificial occasion. In the true worshipper was aroused that numinous feeling of which Rudolf Otto has written in unforgettable language.

Finally, the chapter on the atonement, fresh and stimulating as it is, will deserve careful study. It faces squarely the difficult question as to the place of Isaiah 53 in the thought of Jesus regarding himself. "When it is a question of *suffering because of the sins of men*, then Isa. liii is referred to, but not when it is a question of *bearing their*

sins, or atoning for their sins." Oesterley is probably right that the latter interpretation was first applied to Jesus by the early Church. His examination of the word *ransom* in Mark 10:45 (a passage of central importance) is not quite so convincing, and many students will feel that the view of Professor B. W. Bacon in his *Jesus and Paul* comes to closer grips with the problem and shows more penetrating insight into the meaning of the Gospel.

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Geschichte der talmudischen Zeit. By NAHUM N. GLATZER. Berlin: Schocken Verlag, 1937. 178 pp. R.M. 2.50.

The book under review is a treatment of the era in Jewish history beginning with A.D. 70, the year of the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem, and ending with the completion of the Talmud around the year A.D. 500, rightly designated by our author the Talmudic era.

It should be said at once that it is not, and is not meant to be, a work which will meet the needs of the student of Jewish history. Many moot points are not even touched upon. The student will find no discussion of vital problems of the period. Facts that are questionable, to say the least, are taken for granted, and no literature is indicated to guide the student. It is hard to see on what principle certain sources are given while others which might substantiate very surprising assertions are omitted. What is more serious, perhaps, is the apparent ignoring of some very significant scholarship in the field, to cite only the work done by Hershberg and Zuri.

For the cultured layman, however, although at first blush it does not seem to be much more than an outline of the period in question, this is an important book—important in its approach, in the task it sets itself, which is to fit this period of Jewish history with its institutions, thought trends, and life pattern into the general framework of the age. It attempts to discover how the Jews after the Destruction judged of and evaluated the world around them, the Roman Empire with its ambitions and welter of cults and philosophies; how they regarded themselves in relation to this world; and what institutions and thought trends they developed to meet and clear a path through the tumultuous magnificence of the age which destroyed and dissolved every

entity independent of the Empire. God's rule as against Roman rule, what the former meant to the Jew of the period, and how he proposed to preserve it, is the theme of the book.

Now this is not history, strictly speaking. But, as our author points out, historical data, historical events are absent from, or but meagerly treated in, the vast literature created by the Jew of that period, who considered nothing significant and worthy of record that did not make for the establishment of the Kingdom of God. What we have in that compendium of law and lore called the Talmud, is the mind of the Jew and his palpable institutions, which to the Jew was a kind of adumbration of the future kingdom, or society, or humanity which will supersede forever the predatory empire of Rome.

In the light of this conviction or faith our author attempts to explain some of the remarkable phenomena of that age, such as Jewish separatism, which, as a matter of fact, was not much different from Christian separatism as evidenced in Tertullians' *De Idolatria.* The former, however, was not a total separation from or abnegation in respect to, this world. The Kingdom of God was not a turning from man. It was man at his best, the state at its best. Thus Halacha, the regulating of all our acts in this world, was asserted as against the gnostics, who considered this world and all human relations evil, and it was asserted against all salvationist cults and philosophies which, as stressing the individual in relation to himself or his soul, represented an escape from this life which was to be affirmed and hallowed as of God. Thus we arrive at the Jewish position relative to the great paradox of the Greco-Roman world: the tendency to deny this world, together with the adulation of the Empire and the idolisation of the Emperor.

Christianity, in spite of Tertullian, adjusted itself to, and overcame the paradox. Judaism, however, represented the great refusal. The age and its paradox it met with an everlasting nay. Whereas Christianity accepted Caeser while denying the world, Judaism accepted the world while denying Caeser, except as a temporary and necessary evil. Thus also, the Jew found his place in the world. He was here for the sake of the future humanity. For it he preserved his group life with its institutions.

The 'destruction,' therefore, was rather a construction. From being a nation accepting Caeser and all the conditions of present power, as it

was before A.D. 70, it became a different kind of nation, separating itself from force and violence, and dedicating itself to the future. This is the burden of the first part of Dr. Glatzer's book, in which he sketches events and conditions within Jewry with remarkable orderliness, and shows how the Jew gradually, by force of circumstances, gave up all belief in violence, or even statecraft, and arrived at his own peculiar ideal of the Kingdom of God. These circumstances are clearly and forcibly marshalled in the first five chapters.

The sixth chapter, however, which deals with the very important subjects of communal organisation and economic life is unfortunately very inadequately treated, the more to be regretted after asserting complete inner autonomy for Jewry, and seeing reflected in the communal organisation the ideals of the future. It remains unclear, for instance, just what were the economic occupations of the Jews. In one place our author even contradicts himself when he says that the Jews remained largely a peasantry, when he had already declared that, as a result of Roman depredations and tax burdens, they had become urban artisans.

In the final chapters, eight and nine, the author presents us with an admirable sketch of the outside thought world and of the relation of Judaism to it. As throughout the book the exposition of the different thought trends and cults is clear and rapid, the discussion of their reaction upon the Jewish world is enlightening and provoking. The present reviewer must, however, urge his viewpoint in this connection, that the actual practise of the pagan cults, and not merely the thought trends, are to be considered in the attempt to explain certain important institutions and elements of Halacha and Agada,—especialy to explain Jewish separatism and the relations between Jew and non-Jew. Here Michael Guttmann's excelent work *Das Judenthum und seine Umwelt* should have been consulted, and its discussions incorporated in such a book as this. Dr. Glatzer is following conventional procedure, but considering the purpose of his book, it would gain much in value if pagan practice in the ancient Near-East were animadverted upon. A Talmudic tractate—Aboda Zara—is devoted to problems arising out of it.

The author is guilty of certain technical inaccuracies which even in a popular book should be corrected. He applies the modern or Roman concepts, civil and criminal law, to the realm of Jewish law. The cor-

responding terms in the original are to be translated rather as capital and non-capital cases. He should also examine some of his references. A glaring one is that on page 59. It should be Mishnah Sota 9.15, and certainly all vague remarks should be cleared up, such as the one on page 55 with reference to R. Jacob. Furthermore, the author should not permit himself to make general statements without offering examples. Such an interesting statement as that "the human dignity and rights of the worker were thoroughly protected" deserves amplification and the support of some examples. The reader feels woefully let down when the author blithely, and without further remark, passes on to something else.

The author is interested in developing a certain line of thought. Such writing has the advantage of making the matter lively, pleasing and even inspirational, especially when the writer is endowed as Dr. Glatzer is with the gifts of orderliness and lucidity. It has, however, also the disadvantage of overlooking very important facts and, therefore, giving us a somewhat distorted picture. How, for instance, will our author explain the greed for and achievement of worldly power by rabbinical authorities in Babylonia during the period in question, when he tries to convince us that the Galut-Diaspora—meant the total giving up of all such power. Facts which have to be explained, or explained away, to support our author's thesis are legion.

In spite of these strictures the average reader will gain from a perusal of this book, in addition to real enjoyment, an intelligent grasp of the period and its diverse implications. He will gain a new understanding of the Greco-Roman world, and the Jew in it struggling against powerful forces, physical and spiritual, to preserve himself for the distant future.

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The Golden Chain: Jewish Literature through the Ages, Vol. 1, Part 1. By SOLOMON GOLDMAN. New York: Bloch Publishing Company, 1937. xi + 219 pp. $1.50.

This handy book is a welcome addition to the meager supply of easily read compilations of Jewish literature. It deals with the Old Testament from Genesis through Kings, and is the first of a series, further volumes of which will be concerned with the remaining books

of the Old Testament and the Apocrypha, the Talmud and Midrash, philosophy and mysticism, medieval and modern literature.

The great need for just such a series as this is evident in the large increase in the number of groups studying the history and literature of the Jews. Most of these are adult classes sponsored by synagogues, Zionist societies, college student clubs, Jewish centers, etc. This series seems to have been arranged chiefly for their use; however, it may also interest similar non-Jewish groups who wish to get a Jewish view of Jewish literature. The author explains in the preface that he prepared this material because of the requests and persistent interest of the thousands who attended the courses in Jewish History which he conducted in synagogues in Cleveland and Chicago. While other teachers may lack the dynamic personality and eloquence necessary to attract and hold such numbers, they will find the summaries and discussions in the present series helpful to themselves and to their classes.

The "humanizing," or popularizing, of the results of technical scholarship is a desideratum in an age when few are equipped with the knowledge and patience to follow the results of specialists published in learned journals. In literature and history, particularly, there is a dearth of scholars who translate the findings of painstaking research into a language understandable and interesting to laymen. This is what Rabbi Goldman accomplishes in *The Golden Chain.*

The present volume takes up each Biblical book under the following headings: contents, oft-quoted phrases and passages, authorship, style, philosophy, influence. In some instances an additional section is devoted to a summary of the historical data contained in the book. The author promises that in further volumes there will be introductory chapters surveying a whole class or branch of literature, as for example, the Talmud.

Though Rabbi Goldman's intent is not clear, the present reviewer finds this volume most valuable as introductory, or supplementary, to the reading of the actual text of Scripture. The author declares that books containing the Jewish literature under discussion are inaccessible to the average man or woman interested in the development of the Jews. This is due chiefly to the language difficulty, and to the great length of the writings. Many parts of this literature, however, are now available in translation, and the books of the Old Testament, at

least, are not so long but what, with judicious choice of suitable chapters, they would be not too great a burden even for the "tired business man." Rabbi Goldman does suggest the reading of certain chapters, but they are all too few (seven from Deuteronomy, for example). Perhaps one of the stimulating effects of this series will be to induce further reading of the texts themselves. In this connection it may be recalled that for observant Jews reading of the Bible is an important religious regulation and practice. They read prescribed portions of the Pentateuch and Prophets as part of each Sabbath service, and on festivals and fast days selections from the Hagiographa. For this reason, and because there already are a number of good introductions to Biblical literature, this first volume of the series is the least necessary. The very brief treatment of each of the Biblical books may be helpful, but is scarcely adequate. An average of twelve pages is devoted to each book, including the summary of contents, appraisal of influence, and citation of passages.

The central *motif* of the entire book is denunciation of higher criticism. True, the author in the preface disclaims partisanship in this controversial field: "I present both the traditional and critical points of view" (p. viii). Nevertheless, there is persistent pleading for tradition and insistent condemnation of the results of critical scholarship. No words are too harsh, no epithets too strong, in description of the "arrogant" critics. On page 17 the author quotes the following sentence with approval: "The whole system (Biblical criticism) has degenerated into a mass of far-fetched hypotheses and haphazard theories, which only fitted within a frame of preconceived ideas about the history, the development and the composition of the Scriptures." "Sheer folly," "beautifully spun theories," "wild conjectures," are typical of the author's polite depreciation of the work of scholars who claim to use scientific methods in their analysis of the Bible. The book contains some excellent summaries of higher criticism as it bears on certain problems, but the long discussions of critical theories regarding authorship and dating of Biblical books evoke the thought that the author's own interests, rather than the laymen's enlightenment, have called them forth. For the majority of readers for whom this book is designed a scientific attitude toward the Bible, and literature in general, is a new and untrodden path. One does not declaim furiously against relativity or the quantum theory to those who as yet are innocent of elementary physics.

To indicate how recent archeological findings have substantiated the historicity and contemporaneous writing of many Biblical passages and events would have been justified. Many higher critics are doing that these days. They go further, and (perhaps more significently), point out that the emphasis is shifting from the interests of literary and political-historical criticism to a full social-cultural approach to the Bible (cf. Prof. Barton, page 74, in *The Haverford Symposium on Archaeology and the Bible*).

A reaction against the cold, destructive, super-analytical treatment of the magnificent treasures of the Bible is understandable, but it should not necessitate a swing to the opposite extreme. A sober, or even an enthusiastic interpretation of a great literature does not need to mean flag-waving, name-calling, nor obscuring the deficiencies of the fundamentalist position. Does our author really intend to bring his readers nearer to the latter viewpoint? This would seem to be the intention of his words regarding miracles and revelation. On page 41 he states: "Certainly the account of the miracles has been both seriously questioned and hotly debated. The matter is too complicated to be settled either on the basis of blind belief or cynicism." And on page 43 the author seems to disparage any but a literal "one time for all time" revelation. "Many have resorted to the subterfuge of 'continued revelation' . . . God speaks to man in all ages." Does the author accept the traditional "Chosen People" idea when he declares without further explanation (page 66): "Here too the position of Israel as the chosen people of God finds ample and eloquent expression"?

The physical smallness of the volume hardly indicates the amount of material it contains. This is due to the abbreviated, outline style employed in various parts of the book especially in the chapters summarizing the contents of the Biblical books. Sometimes this brevity obscures the meaning, e.g. (page 5), "the Towers" and "the prohibition of blood," (page 6), "the wicked cities," (page 73), "Wear tassels." Accuracy is the rule throughout the book, but there are occasional slips of fact. On page 1 there is the statement that the Christian Bible contains the Apocrypha. In referring to the scholar Dr. Woolley, the author evidently thinks "she" is a "he." It would help the reader if the summaries of the contents were by chapters in the Torah books, as they are in those of the Earlier Prophets.

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The History of Primitive Christianity. By JOHANNES WEISS. Translated by Four Friends and Edited by FREDERICK C. GRANT. New York: Wilson-Erickson, 1937. 2 vols. xiv + 877 pp. $10.00.

The English translation of Johannes Weiss' *The History of Primitive Christianity* is an event of primary significance for the world of New Testament scholarship. That this major work of both erudition and insight has remained so long untranslated is understandable only in the light of political events which surrounded its publication. This work, the culmination of the brilliant and productive career of its author, then Professor of New Testament Criticism at the University of Heidelberg, was interrupted by Professor Weiss' death in August, 1914, just on the eve of the cataclysm which has never ceased to exert its sinister influence upon scholarly production and dissemination. Not only was this work left unfinished, but almost a quarter of a century passed before it was made available to English readers, brought to completion in the interval by Professor Rudolph Knopf, sometime Professor of Theology in the University of Bonn. It has now been translated by four members of the Faculty of the Seabury-Western Theological Seminary, Dean Frederick C. Grant, who also served as editor (now Professor of New Testament at Union Theological Seminary), and Professors Arthur H. Forster, Paul S. Kramer, and Sherman E. Johnson.

Professor Weiss' book was an epoch-making one for many reasons. Its author had already established himself as one of the ablest critical scholars of his day. Further, a new line of historical interpretation had been initiated by him in his earlier work *The Preaching of Jesus Concerning the Kingdom of God* (1890), which was based upon a fresh understanding of the apocalyptic hope cherished by Jesus and his contemporaries, and of the Messiahship of Jesus as seen in the light of that eagerly shared expectation. As a founder of the so-called "eschatalogical school" of New Testament criticism, Professor Weiss came to this monumental history of the first age of Christianity with a developed philosophy of criticism, as well as with a highly perfected scholarly technique. His skill as a critic, moreover, was matched by a deep spiritual insight, so that he wrote as one profoundly aware of the religious import of the movement which he chronicled, and with an underlying sympathy for the reader's faith as affected by the results of critical analysis. This combination of gifts produced a work

which deserves to be considered as one of the greatest treatments of this subject which the scholarly world has produced.

The period covered by the work is that of the New Testament, —from the death of Jesus to the middle of the second century. The themes of the book are the faith and experience of the early Christian community in Jerusalem, the missionary movement under Paul's leadership, Paul's contribution to Christian interpretation, the development of the church in its first hundred years, and the state of the Christian groups in given localities such as Asia Minor, Macedonia, and Rome. Thus, in scope and thoroughness it takes its place among the solid historical works of modern scholarship.

It is not only the substantial nature of the work, however, which makes it valuable today. The reader of this new English translation is struck by the fact that the book does not read like a work of a quarter of a century ago. In spirit and in method it has a surprisingly modern flavor. In a brief review one cannot adequately analyze this living quality in the work. But two causes for it may be hinted at. (1) In his interpretation of characters and events Professor Weiss made use of psychological techniques which were new to his day, but which have become the accepted tools of historical study today. A fine example of this is seen in Book I, when the appearances of Jesus to the disciples after his death are under discussion. Vol. I, pp. 28 ff. (2) He scrutinized the New Testament documents which were his source materials, not merely as isolated fragments of writing left to us from the age he was interpreting, but as expressions of a faith which preceded them. He saw that both chronicle and letters had taken shape in the light of a previously espoused cause. In this recognition, which was fundamental to his interpretation of the New Testament writings, he was the precursor of the Form-critical movement of today. With respect to this point, the best example to cite is his treatment of Paul's letters in Book III.

We are indebted to the translators for a clear and smoothly idiomatic English rendering of the German text. It is one of the happiest features of their plan of work that they have kept the reader aware of the developments of research since 1914 by a series of footnotes referring to both German and English works of scholarship.

Not only did this work of the great German scholar of the last generation initiate new lines of historical study, but it is still able to

fructify historical scholarship and is, moreover, an admirable means for the general reader to become acquainted with these important developments in their comprehensive significance.

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Philipp Nicolais Kristendomstolkning. By MARTIN LINDSTRÖM. Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bokförlag, 1937. 329 pp. Kr. 6:75.

"Philipp Nicolai's Interpretation of Christianity"—a scholarly study of a theologian whose life-span covered the half century between 1556 and 1608. Better known as a hymn writer, indeed, as the founder of a new lyrical and subjective school, Nicolai gave the Lutheran Church two of its favorites, "Sleepers wake, a voice is calling," and "O Morning Star, how fair and bright." His theology, like his hymns, was based on the mystical union between Christ and the human soul, and was conceived in the erotic terminology of the Song of Solomon. It is unfortunate that this valuable book in Swedish is unavailable to many readers, but perhaps a brief summary of its contents may be useful.

Chapter 1, "Biographical Orientation," is a useful account of Nicolai's life in relation to his work. Born in a village parsonage in Waldeck, he received a thorough education, including studies at Erfurt, and a theological degree from Wittenberg. A course in natural philosophy, which consisted of Aristotle "according to Melancthon" played a major role in his intellectual development. In 1586 he took up the cudgels against the Calvinists of Westphalia with his first published book, and for fourteen years pursued a career of the bitterest sort of polemical strife. During the plague of 1597-98, which claimed some 1300 victims in the city of Unna where he was pastor, Nicolai, grieved by the death of so many of his relatives and parishioners, withdrew into prayer and contemplation, and wrote the beautiful *Freudenspiegel* for the comfort of the bereaved. It is a work influenced by St. Augustine, St. Bernhard, and Christophorus Irenaeus, and in it appears Nicolai's basic concept of love as an organic principle binding together the whole creation,—the driving force of all life, a cosmic principle, and the very essence of immortality. This doctrine ressembles that of the Spanish humanist, Juan Luis Vives, with whose writings he was familiar.

Nicolai's attacks on Calvinism brought cruel reprisals in the shape of attacks on his sanity and his morals. In 1600 he gladly accepted a call

to Hamburg, where he passed the remainder of his life in peace and harmony, admired and beloved by all. It was in this latter period that he wrote his most important works, including his masterful exposition of the doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ's human nature, *Sacrosanctum omnipraesentiae Jesu Christi mysterium.*

In the second chapter, "The Legacy from Ancient Philosophy," the author traces the influence on Nicolai's thought of the philosophy of the Greeks. Aristotle came to him, as we have seen, mainly through Melancthon, in whose *Liber de anima* he found the concepts which formed the foundations of his psychology, especially in relation to free-will. Another link with Aristotelianism is found in the writings of Jakob Schegk, a scholar trained in pre-Reformation theology at Tübingen. Armed with the whole panoply of Scholasticism, Schegk had entered the lists of Lutheran theology in 1565 with his *De una persona et duabus naturis Christi,* an exposition of a strictly Aristotelian christology, founded on the classic concepts of "being," "substance and accidents," "form and matter." It was through the humanist, Vives (1492-1540), who had connections with the Platonic Academy at Florence, that he made his contact with Plato. It was, of course, Renaissance Neo-Platonism of an eclectic type, influenced by Cicero, and Augustine, and even the Hermetic literature. From Vives he derived his anthropocentric viewpoint, and his emphasis on the rational will as man's unique possession. It is the rational will which makes him truly man, and love is the will's noblest activity. Thus we find the sources of Nicolai's system in Hellenism, mediated through scholastic and humanistic thought-forms.

Chapter III, "God, the World, and Man," consists of an exposition of Nicolai's doctrine of love as developed in three of his later works, the *Mysterium* (1602), *Theoria vitae aeternae* (1606), and *Synopsis articuli controversi de omnipraesente Christo* (1607). The keystone of his philosophy is the text from St. John, "God is love," which he interprets as "*nothing but* . . . an omnipotent and eternal love." And it is from this "nothing but" that he derives the main points of his doctrine, by which he refutes the Calvinists' predestination. This supremacy of love is reinforced by citations from Augustine, "Mercurius (Hermes Trismegistus), Orpheus, Hesiodus, Parmenides, . . . Plato," a list of authorities taken bodily from Vives.[1] This love is the very *essentia* and *substantia* of God,—the eternal relationship between the

1. *De veritate fidei Christianae libri V* (Basileae 1544), p. 142.

three persons of the Trinity. It is a love which, from its very nature, must share itself. In developing his doctrine of the Creation from this premise, Nicolai draws on the *Artis cabbalisticae tomus unus* of Johannes Pistorius. The "wrath of God" is merely an expression of his outraged grief over the indifference, or infidelity, of the object of his fervent love, which, meeting opposition, becomes, in truth, a consuming fire. Nicolai's cosmology is also based on this central doctrine; the whole universe, as well as man, is the object of God's love, and responsive to it. He agrees that Plato is not at all unreasonable in thinking of the world as a living being,—a mighty organism governed by the universal law of love. Nicolai conceives of it as a being whose "vital spirits" consist of angels, and whose heart is the human race. The instrument through which God's love functions is the Logos, the eternal Reason, like an active soul in a living body. For his cosmology Nicolai goes, not only to the *Timaeus*, but also to Vergil.[2] In this creation man occupies the central point, midway between heaven and earth and partaking of the life of both realms. He was created especially as an object of love, that is, to be God's bride and respond to his love with an equally ardent passion. His soul is a temple, or palace, in which the Divine Lover dwells with his Beloved ("quo copulantur Deus et homo").[3]

In Chapter IV, "The Person and Work of Christ," the peculiar role of the Second Person of the Trinity in Nicolai's system is expounded. It is here that he reveals himself as an out-and-out Lutheran, especially in his doctrine of the omnipresence of Christ. The mystical union between God and man exists in its fulfillment only in Christ, in whom the Logos dwells. In Christ the Logos loves its human nature as a man's soul loves his body, and in Christ alone the human nature gives back the full and perfect response to the divine love. The union between the two natures in Christ is simply and solely the bond of reciprocal love. But here Nicolai is strongly influenced by Schegk in his use of the Aristotelian terms of form and matter, and entelechy.[4] There is a complete parallel between the christology and the anthropology of Nicolai. God's relation to the human nature in Christ is, in principle, exactly the same as his relation to any other man, the difference being merely in the degree of intensity of love. The Incarnation is some-

2. *Aeneid* VI, 724 ff.
3. *Mysterium* I, 204 b.
4. Jakob Schegk, *De una persona* (Frankfort, 1565), pp. 43, 97.

thing quite normal, because inherent in the love relationship between man and God. In this connection Nicolai cites Origen,[5] and is in agreement with him, although he himself places a higher value on the Incarnation as the instrument of man's salvation. For Nicolai "the spiritual union with God, which is man's meaning and goal, has its chief cause and foundation in the personal union between the two natures in Christ" (p. 173). The problem of Christ's omnipresence, Nicolai holds, is a false problems, created by the Calvinists, and based on a false conception of the nature of God's omnipresence. Since God is nothing but love, his infinitude and his omnipresence are both entirely spiritual, without any kind of geometrical dimensions. This love is like light, which pervades all, but is entirely immaterial. For this light, all time, past, present and future, is concentrated into one instant, and all space into one mathematical point. Just as any man can create in his mind a whole world, and be present in every part of it, so the Logos in Christ, creator of the actual world, is present in every part of it, entirely without extension. There is, therefore, no problem of how the Logos can be contained in the body of Jesus, and at the same time omnipresent in the universe. It is a mystery, but not a problem.

Nicolai's eschatology is also based on this conception of love as the very substance of the universe. Heaven and hell are not places, but states,—two aspects of God's love, manifested to man in accordance with the nature of his own response, as the joy of the lover in the beloved, or the burning wrath of the lover betrayed. Thus, heaven and hell are not localized in space or time, but omnipresent in the whole creation, in the souls of the living as well as of the dead. Man lives a double life, his spiritual nature being continually in either heaven or hell, according to the state of his response to God's love.[6] Or, to speak more accurately, heaven or hell is in man's soul according to the degree of his love. One method of contact with God, which is heaven, is the Lord's Supper, in which man is fed with the mystical body of Christ, just as the angels feed on God as manna. After the resurrection Christ's spiritual body is both localized in heaven, and unlocalized and omnipresent in the whole creation in varying degrees,—in the highest degree present in the communion bread and wine.

For the redemption of man the Incarnation was necessary, for what

5. *De principiis* II, cap. 1, 3, 5, 6.

6. An interesting parallel to Nicolai's doctrine can be found in the *Heaven and Hell* of Dr. Lindström's great compatriot, Emanuel Swedenborg.

the devil had accomplished in the Temptation and Fall, was the seducing of God's bride by making himself the object of her desire. This disarranged the whole purpose of creation, and produced a spiritual sickness in the very heart of it, the race of man. It also brought down God's wrath on his unfaithful bride, and because his justice must be satisfied, handed her over to Satan for eternal punishment. To save the erring spouse from this fate two things must be accomplished: God's justice must be satisfied, and Satan must be overcome. To suffer and make atonement for man the Logos must become man; and to conquer Satan he must match guile with guile. As Satan accomplished the Fall in the guise of a serpent, so must the Logos accomplish the Redemption also in disguise—hence the Incarnation.[7] Here Nicolai uses the analogy between microcosm and macrocosm. When a man's body is sick, his soul fights against the sickness, hates the infected part, will amputate it if necessary, and would give a drop of its heartblood to drive out the poison. Just so, God, who is the soul of the world, fights against the sin which has infected its heart (the human race), and gives the Logos (all his wisdom concentrated into one body) to drive out the disease. But the cure cannot be made by force. Coming in humility, as the servant of man, he puts to shame the pride of Adam, and wins back the love of the erring bride.

In his controversies with the Calvinists, Nicolai strongly upheld the true Lutheran doctrine of the omnipresence of Christ's human nature, especially in relation to the Lord's Supper. He held that human nature can be lifted up to participation in the divine majesty without ceasing to be fully human. And this applies to every Christian, as well as to Christ.[8] But the ordinary human soul is not united with God through its own strength, but solely through God's grace. The *communio mystica* of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper is achieved through the faith of the receiver plus the grace of the divine giver. Nicolai's bitterest opponent, J. Lampadius, described his theory as "Phantastica ubiquitas." Nevertheless, Nicolai's exposition of the ubiquity doctrine is, perhaps, the most elaborate and thoroughly rational of them all.

Strangely enough we find in his doctrine of the Atonement the Old Testament idea of God's honor. Like Anselm, Nicolai finds the Incarnation necessary to restore the broken order of the creation, but for

7. *Synopsis* I, 451 b.
8. *Mysterium* I, 411 ff.

Nicolai, this is not so much a matter of a broken *law*, as of a broken love. By the Fall God's mercy has been changed to justice, and Christ must satisfy outraged justice in order to restore mercy. There are two lines of thought apparent in Nicolai's thought, the orthodox one of "satisfaction for the sins of the world," and another line that is characteristically his own. For Nicolai the work of salvation was the winning back of man's love for God, and the healing of man's spiritual sickness. After the Fall man feared God's wrath, and ceased to love him, and Christ must prove himself worthy of love in order to make it possible for man to love God again (an idea reminiscent of Vives). Man's sin is conceived of as an actual sickness in the organism of creation which Christ takes upon himself, suffers it and overcomes it in his own human nature, thus restoring the heart of creation, the human race, to soundness.

The fifth chapter, "Salvation in the World of Faith and in the World of Sight," is an exposition of Nicolai's doctrine of regeneration, based on his theory of man's double life, the physical and the spiritual. With the Fall man's spiritual life suffered an actual death, and therefore must be born anew. Several times he quotes a line from Johannes Mathesius, "Vivimus in verbo velut embryo in alva"—a conception which fits in well with his own rather biological way of thinking. Earthly life is like the life of the child in the womb, narrow, dark, restricted, out of which he is to be born into a larger, fairer life. The Church, our spiritual mother, is in constant travail bringing forth the Sons of God. The baptismal font is the instrument of this new birth, but the sacrament of baptism is not actually the spiritual rebirth. Regeneration is a lifelong process—a painful process, like parturition itself. It is not achieved by any ritual, or magic practice, but by our own struggles, and aided by God's grace. In this process of regeneration the body itself, as well as the soul, is purified, healed, and rejuvenated. The worldly man who has been baptised, is like a dead foetus in the womb of the Church, and can never be brought to birth.

The reborn soul is nourished by her mother, the Church, through the Lord's Supper, and instructed by the scriptures and the sermons, as becomes a child of God. Reaching maturity she becomes the bride of Christ, and the temple in which the mystical marriage takes place. But the life of the regenerating soul is no bed of roses. She must strive continually against the Devil, who seeks to lure her into infidelity, and

she must accept the disciplines and the chastisements of life as part of God's loving care. So long as life lasts we must "be called, enlightened, punished, consoled and ruled by the Word, and beneath the Cross also be examined by God on what we have learned" (p. 267). This process of regeneration is completed only at death, when the newborn soul emerges from its prison into the spiritual life everlasting.

But the separation between the two worlds of faith and of sight is only a matter of degree, not a difference of kind. The soul which is responsive to God's love, experiences within herself the mystical marriage and the ecstacy of union with God. Here and now she partakes of the world where faith is dissolved in vision and certainty. The orthodox Lutheran "salvation by faith" is replaced by the mystical certainty of direct experience of salvation, by actual union with God. But we must remember that this mystical union can take place only because of Christ's work as Savior. The author quotes W. Koepp as follows: "We have in Nicolai the *only* true renewal of the *genuine Lutheran* unio in Lutheranism!"[9] But he himself feels that Nicolai's main conceptions came from other sources than Luther. For Nicolai faith plays only an instrumental role—it is not the center of his theological interest. For him the central idea is always God's overpowering love for man, and his power to win the human heart. His real break with orthodox Protestantism is in regard to the kind of life the renewed soul must live. For Nicolai it is still egocentric—he seeks his satisfactions in a higher realm of being, to be sure—but still it is his own happiness he seeks in the mystical union. For the orthodox Protestant, he is altogether freed from egocentric pursuits; he belongs to God as an instrument, and seeks, not his own, but his neighbor's happiness. For Nicolai man's desires are still his main driving force, though centered on a divine object, and no radical break with "the old man" is required. However, by his union with God, the regenerated man's will becomes one with God, and in consequence, he loves his neighbor as himself. With Nicolai God is the final cause of love, rather than its efficient cause. In the practical realm of ethics Nicolai's system may seem deficient in that it despises the things of earth, as is usual with mysticism, especially of the Platonic type. But, nevertheless, Nicolai's attitude toward the life of earth is less negative than might be expected, for

9. W. Koepp, "Wurzel und Ursprung der orthodoxen Lehre von der unio mystica" *Zeitschrift fur Theologie und Kirche* (1921), pp. 144 f.

he who truly responds to God's love enjoys the life of paradise even on earth.

Nicolai's importance for later Lutheran theology lies in his doctrine of the *unio mystica* which becomes the foundation-stone of Pietism. Albert Ritschl has said that the *unio* of orthodoxy also arose out of the teaching of Nicolai and his like concerning the mystical union, with its Neo-Platonic metaphysics, rather than from Luther's own doctrine of the spiritual marriage with Christ.[10] Likewise Werner Elert identifies Nicolai's *unio* doctrine with the later one, but also claims that it is identical with Luther's union with Christ through faith.[11] For him Luther, Nicolai, and orthodoxy are all in the same line. Dr. Lindström disagrees with this argument, and finds the closest correspondence to Nicolai's doctrine, not in the later orthodoxy, but in the doctrines of Johann Arndt. He finds Nicolai's influence in the development of the orthodox *unio* tradition negligible. However, there is a point in which he has been of considerable influence, that is, his teaching concerning *communicatio spiritualis*. Both Johann Gerhard and Balthasar Meisner have used Nicolai's terminology—*idiopoiia*, *metapoiia*, and *koinopoiia*, and have followed his line of thought.[12] Also, it should be noted that Nicolai seems to have been the first in the field of Lutheranism to use the expression *unio mystica* (in a letter dated 1590). Dr. Lindström ends his work with the words: "Nicolai seems to be unique in that, in the field of Lutheranism, he has built so synthetic a system with love as the consciously developed and asserted central conception. This guarantees him a place in the history of Christian thought."

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Complaint and Reform in England 1436-1714. Arranged with Introductions by William Huse Dunham, Jr., and Stanley Pargellis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1938. xxxv + 925 pp. $4.00.

These fifty tracts were selected to illustrate English culture in the Tudor and Stuart periods. The whole range of human interest is included,—adventure, exploration, country life, coinage, vagrancy and poor relief, architecture and medicine, schools, law, political theory

10. A. Ritschl, *Geschichte der Pietismus*, II (Bonn, 1884), pp. 20, 22 ff., 31 f.
11. W. Elert, *Morphologie des Luthertums*, I (München, 1931), p. 142.
12. Joh. Gerhard, *Loci theologici* (Berolini, 1863-1875), pp. 1863 ff.; Balthasar Meisner, *Summum mysterium . . . Christianus* (Amstelodami, 1676).

and practice, war, matrimony, luxury and the public peace. If any one theme recurs more than another it is religion, not because of any deliberate choice on the part of the editors, but because religion was a dominant concern of the age. Of the fifty tracts few fail to make some reference to the subject, and over a dozen deal directly with the ecclesiastical situation.

The pre-Reformation tracts, however, have little to the point, and the omission is not fortuitous. The Reformation was an arrest of secularism. The first tract of 1436 would base the peace on England's mastery of her sea wall. The next regulates the apparel of the diverse classes, and the third would limit royal absolutism.

But the first pamphlet of the sixteenth century, Simon Fish's "Supplication of Beggars," attributes the poverty of the land to the "sturdy, idle, holy thieves," namely the begging friars. Two tracts of Henry's reign, one never before published, give the arguments pro and con for the royal supremacy. The examination of Lady Jane Grey presents the stout arguments with which she rebuffed the attempts of Mary's agents to constrain her to the fold of Rome. The religious situation under Elizabeth is illustrated by a tract on witchcraft, a Puritan admonition to Parliament, the Queen's speeches to Parliament, in which she complains alike of the Romanists and of the "new-fangled fault finders," and Cardinal Allen's "Admonition to the Nobility" of England, in which he justifies Catholic rebellion against the excommunicated Queen. The tract on the "Office of a Councillor" is one of those which would naturally be classified under government and politics, yet the office of the councillor is not only to be acquainted with the number of strangers in London, to be versed in the affairs of Ireland, and to understand her Majesty's mint, but *imprimis* to have digested matters concerning religion.

In the reign of James the pamphlet of "Tom Tell-Troath" reveals the anti-Spanish and anti-Catholic feeling of England. For the period of Charles and the Commonwealth we have the speech of Laud in the Star Chamber, in which the persecutor of Prynne acquits himself well and makes himself almost appear the victim. The description of a Puritan is taken from the Mar-prelate controversy. Heresiography is illustrated by a tract of Pagitt. The Diggers and the Levellers receive a pamphlet each. The Fifth Monarchy Men and the Quakers do not appear. The Cavaliers contribute a bit of roisterous satire. A

Non-Conformist tract of 1667 blames the economic distress of England on the clergy as Simon Fish had done on the friars. The Popish plot figures in a tract of 1679, and the Deist movement in a sermon of Tillotson. The High Church Tory party had its comeback in a tract of Atterbury in 1711.

Many of the well known figures of the age do not appear: Jewell, Hooker, Cartwright, Jeremy Taylor, Chillingworth, Baxter, Milton, Fox and Bunyan. Probably they were excluded partly because their works are easily accessible, and partly because they were too prolix. The editors chose, wherever possible, materials which could be included unabridged. Hench the preference for the pamphlet, sermon, letter or poem. All in all this is an exceedingly interesting and useful collection, not the least for the history of the Church.

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Presbyterians in Colonial Pennsylvania. By GUY SOUILLARD KLETT. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1937. xi + 297 pp. $3.00.

The religious history of the United States is still largely unwritten, and every substantial contribution is a welcome addition. Our early historians wrote of politics with the Revolution large in their consciousness; then, in later decades, when we were puzzled over the industrial revolution, our historians wrote of economics. It seemed to them more vital. Indeed, so far reaching were the ramifications of the economic interest, that for not a few it seemed to be the sole causal factor in the historical process. But that was too easy; other factors in human experience are driving forces in the process. Religion is certainly one such, but the field of religious history has been too little entered by the professional historian. Mr. Klett is conscious of the shortage, noting, in the preface of the book here reviewed, that "the emphasis of numerous historical works on American colonial life has been placed upon the political and economic activities of the colonists." And he proceeds on the basis that religion is a causal factor in historical development: "The spirit of devotion to a divine purpose that has found expression in the lives of individuals has influenced the course of events to such a degree that it cannot be excluded from a consideration of human activity." He belabors no theory of causation,

and much data appears in his book which is grist for the economic historian.

Mr. Klett presents a straightforward narrative of the appearance of Presbyterians in Pennsylvania, their increase and spread, the development of church organization, and its role in the regulation of Presbyterian societies, and the activity of Presbyterians in missionary and charitable pursuits, education, and politics.

There is a natural logic in the limits of the author's field. Presbyterians were in other colonies than Pennsylvania, in fact, in substantially greater numbers at the opening of the eighteenth century, but from 1717 on came the Scotch-Irish immigrants, who in the main settled in Pennsylvania and were for the most part Presbyterians. The religious freedom granted by the Penns not only was an inducement to settle in their colony, but facilitated the development of one of the most significant religious bodies in American history.

And then it is that the Scotch-Irish are the people of the story. They are a breed of such fiber that one does not need the books of Ford and Hanna to set them forth. Survivals of the rigors of Scotland and Ulster, with little of earthly possession, they jostled their way into the back counties with an "insatiable hunger for land," and, grabbing lands as they could, merited, according to one commentator, the curse of Scripture against the stiff-necked and rebellious. Profoundly religious, with an unholy regard for the logical conclusions of their own minds, which they too easily identified with the will of God, they were to play no mean role in the shaping of American culture. At the end of the colonial era Benjamin Franklin, who computed the total population of Pennsylvania at 350,000, estimated the Scotch-Irish at one-third of this number, and the author, "allowing for the fact that not all Scotch-Irish were Presbyterians" conservatively estimates the number of Presbyterians in Pennsylvania to have been around 100,000.

In our day, when religion meets so many competitors, it is a little difficult to comprehend its significance in earlier days. In Pennsylvania of the eighteenth century the Bible and the Westminster Confession of Faith were regarded as the foundations of the spiritual and intellectual life of the family, while the family with the church made up the most significant institutional framework of that century. With such understanding. Mr. Klett has made his research and written his book. The problem of sources in religious history is always a stubborn one, and

in this study the author was faced with the loss of many session minutes. Presbyterial and synod minutes were more productive and of great value, as were collections of manuscript letters, especially the Logan Letter Books and those of Richard Peters. A bibliography of twenty pages indicates his indebtedness. Fortunately the Presbyterian church is historically minded, and the library of its historical society is a boon to all workers in Presbyterian history.

Mr. Klett's book is a chapter in elemental beginnings. The Pennsylvania frontier, Scotch-Irish dissenters of "the middle and meaner sort of people," insufficient civil authority, and Presbyterianism made up the raw materials. Much detail goes into the picture necessarily, for this is not a popular book but a contribution to scholarship.

Until 1718 the growth of Presbyterian congregations in Pennsylvania was dependent upon the assimilation of individuals of similar religious principles though of different nationalties. It is "quite likely" that there were some Presbyterians in the province in 1685. In 1695 a group of Baptists and Presbyterians met together in the warehouse of the Barbadoes Company in Philadelphia for worship, and with the coming of Jedidiah Andrews to Philadelphia in 1698 a distinct Presbyterian congregation was set up. In 1706, according to most authorities, the Presbytery of Philadelphia was set up, at which time Andrews was the only active Presbyterian minister in Pennsylvania. In 1710 there were three congregations in the province. In 1717 the Synod of Philadelphia was established, from which year, as it happened, dates the beginning of the Scotch-Irish migration.

Two chapters are given to the expansion and settlement of Scotch-Irish Presbyterian societies. Their spread is traced up the tributaries of the Delaware, Susquehanna, Juniata, and Allegheny rivers. One wearies a bit with the innumerable creeks that are traversed. Some aid is provided in six maps from data in the Pennsylvania Department of Forests and Waters, but these lose much in having no mileage scale, and should have been supplemented with a summary map of the state with some scheme of dating the Presbyterian movement.

Three quarters of the book is given to the Presbyterian institutional development—the formation of local religious societies, the growth of organized Presbyterianism, and the activities of local congregations and their regulation by presbyteries; and, secondly, to the part Presbyterians played in the larger social scene—in charitable and missionary

pursuits, in education, in enlarging Presbyterian integration, in maintenance of civic and moral standards, and finally in increasing concern with politics as the colonial period moved into its last decades.

It is in these chapters that one feels how significant were Presbyterians in the shaping of the history of Pennsylvania. Where is the line to be drawn between Scotch-Irishman and Presbyterian in this development the author does not say, nor does he pose the problem, but Presbyterianism in Pennsylvania took some of its shape from these dominant adherents. Their clannishness, no doubt, went far in sharpening their denominationalism. In any case, an early feature of life in their advancing settlement was religious fellowship which, in turn, prompted speedy establishment of preaching by ordained ministers and the formal organization of the congregations into sessions. Presbyteries and the synod followed in due time, and the Presbyterians of Pennsylvania were welded together to an extraordinary degree.

One of the most valuable sections of Mr. Klett's book is concerned with the regulatory functions of the Presbyterian church. The eldership had the power to inquire into the knowledge and spiritual estate of any member, to admonish and rebuke, and to exclude from the Lord's Table. Too few sessional records remain, but enough to indicate the multiplicity and varied character of the cases that came before the sessions. They would seem unusual today, but "it must be remembered that the control which sessions exercised had much to do in regulating the lives of church members within their respective communities at a time when civil authority was ineffective and impotent in the face of frontier conditions that gave freedom of expression to individuality." The cases handled by the sessions ran the whole gamut of social and religious offenses common to that day, such as "illegitimate relations, marital disagreements, false accusations, questionable business dealings, encroachments on property rights, discordant relations between children and parents as well as between indented servants and masters, lying, drunkenness, violation of the Lord's day, fights, swearing, etc."

The presbyteries in turn also acted as instruments of regulation. From the beginning decisions had to be reached affecting their own members because of some breach of Presbyterian law. Questions of doctrine, the character of preaching, moral delinquency, kept the presbyteries ever alert. Besides watching over their own members, they

handled many problems of moral turpitude on appeal from the sessions.

From the point of view of a civilization in transit this aptitude of the Pennsylvania Presbyterians, through their ecclesiastical structure, to perform this regulating function was very important. Though the author does not say so, his data permits the conclusion that the degradation of civilization, so characteristic of the American frontier, was held in check by this activity of the Scotch-Irish Presbyterians. This conserving tendency was still greater due to the constant struggle to maintain an educated clergy.

Not all the values of this book can be crowded into a review. Mr. Klett set himself an ambitious task and has executed it well. He reveals a sure grip upon his data and has kept his problem always clear and within logical limits. One would like to see some of the men who are named here, set forth in the flesh, but that would probably have overtaxed the limits of the book. The author has carried the political activities of the Presbyterians in Pennsylvania to the threshold of the American Revolution, indicating that the part they played in that conflict is of such scope as to require a separate study. It is to be hoped that Mr. Klett will undertake the study.

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Marcus Whitman, M.D., Pioneer and Martyr. By CLIFFORD M. DRURY. Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Press, 1937. 465 pp. $5.00.

In these days of casual and often careless biography it is refreshing to come upon a work which is intensive in its treatment of detail and, at the same time, is truly epic in its scope. Dr. Drury's book presents a thorough and scholarly examination of primary sources, well documented and illustrated, dealing with the life of Marcus Whitman (1802-1847), and includes some hitherto unstressed letters, but into this treatment is woven a multitude of cross references which make this study of the life of a famous and rather paradoxical individual also a history of the development of the Northwest throughout the first half of the last century.

The book shares with many other biographies of its type an inclination to heaviness in the opening chapters. Authentic material concerning the early years of Whitman's life is scanty, and the author

has resisted the impulse to draw on his own imagination in favor of introducing a wide variety of references from both within and without the Whitman family, which, directly or indirectly, bear on the central character. While somewhat tedious at times, this treatment sketches in vivid relief various phases of the history of the country about Rushville, New York, where Whitman lived for the first eight years of his life, and Hampshire County, Massachusetts, where the following ten years were spent. William Cullen Bryant, the school of Moses Hallock in Plainfield, and the "Haystack Monument" meeting in Williams College are flashes in these pages.

The chapter dealing with the years from 1820 to 1832 contains a careful reconstruction of Whitman's medical training, and it is helpful because of the light it throws on the tragic drama of the later years. Whitman's "riding" with Dr. Ira Bryant, who was not a "one horse doctor," reveals the childhood of American medicine. For at least two years previous to his matriculation in the Fairfield Medical School, and while he was debating within himself regarding study for the ministry, Marcus gained from his medical tutor knowledge concerning blood-letting, which was then in fashion, and the use of some fifty varieties of pills with which the saddle-bags were well stocked. This chapter shows how Whitman gained much of the rough and ready knowledge which was to prove such a decisive factor in his western experiences.

After receiving his medical degree in January, 1832 from the Fairfield School, then one of the outstanding institutions in the region, and one which granted the degree of the University of the State of New York, Whitman was ready to enter on his mature labors. Three years were now spent in the town of Wheeler, Steuben County, and these years from 1832-35, in which Asiatic cholera swept over Europe and America, were trying ones in which to begin medical practice. Whitman rose to the emergency, and Dr. Drury appears correct in his estimation that the self-reliance developed in this anxious period stood him in good stead in the Oregon field.

During 1834 Whitman, who for some years had felt a pull toward the Church, came under the influence of the Rev. Samuel Parker. Parker had volunteered to make a tour of exploration beyond the Rockies under the auspices of the American Board of the Presbyterian Church, with a view to subsequent missionary activity. Men were

needed for the field, and after some correspondence, occasioned partly by a question concerning Whitman's physical fitness, he was accepted, and the pioneer career began. (Whitman had abandoned his hope of study for the ministry because of an intermittant abdominal pain, and chose to follow medical training because the latter was less strenuous!) The Rev. David Greene, who succeeded Dr. Wisner on the American Board and figures prominently and not altogether favorably in Dr. Drury's narrative, forwarded Whitman's commission as "assistant missionary" to him in St. Louis.

After starting Marcus on his first westward journey in company with Parker, the author recounts, from 1808 to 1835, the life of Narcissa Prentiss, to whom Whitman had become engaged shortly before leaving for Missouri, and whom he married early in 1836 after his return from the first exploration. The detailed study of the Prentiss family appears at first as a check in the history, but the reader may find it justified in view of the important role which Narcissa Whitman played in the founding of the American Northwest. Narcissa is really the tragic heroine of the book, outshining Marcus, and much of the material on which the author draws for his picture of Old Oregon came from her pen. While no authentic photograph of either Narcissa or Marcus is known, all contemporaries agreed as to the physical charm, and attractive and courageous character of the pioneer's wife. The author's discussion of the various modern reconstructed likenessess of the Whitmans is interesting. The story of Narcissa's education introduces the famous Emma Willard School at Troy, New York, and Franklin Academy, both of which she attended. Her lovely voice was a subject for much enthusiasm, and Dr. Drury skillfully weaves this vocal ability into the picture of Narcissa's teaching among the Cayuse Indians in the following years. Narcissa had applied to the American Board in 1835 for a missionary appointment in order that she might accompany Marcus, although she had made tentative inquiries the previous year through Samual Parker. The sending of "females" to the Indian field in Old Oregon was then considered fantastic, and only after much difficulty was her appointment sanctioned in order that she might accompany her husband.

The history now reverts to the long journey of Parker and Whitman through Ohio and Illinois to St. Louis. Interesting mention is

made in passing of the Mormon town of Kirtland, Ohio. Here, as elsewhere throughout the book, this reviewer feels that a work of this type might well have included more specific references to the westward movement of forms of faith other than the Presbyterianism of Whitman. This is especially desirable in the cases of Methodism and Roman Catholicism as they enter into the Oregon colonization. Whitman later regretted bitterly the advance of Catholics into Oregon, and Jason Lee, the Methodist colonizer of the Willamette Valley, wrote quite strongly of Whitman's harsh punishment of Indians. We would like more information regarding this. Was it sectarian jealousy?

Judging by the standards demanded in pioneer journeys in those days, Parker was a poor traveller. His exaggerated sense of economy greatly annoyed Whitman, who was somewhat more adaptable to new situations. Because of Parker's protest against the buying of a second mule for the trip westward from St. Louis the expedition was close to disaster. Ignorance of western conditions on the part of missionaries, both in Boston and in the field, is striking throughout the book. The two men travelled by boat to Liberty, Missouri, the "jumping-off place," and then were fortunate in joining a caravan of the American Fur Company. The leader, Lucien Fontanelle, resented the presence of the missionaries, and not until cholera visited the caravan, and Whitman's previous acquaintance with the dread disease was called into play, did the attitude of the old frontiersman become softened. At the Rendevous on the Green River, far beyond Fort Laramie, Parker and Whitman gained valuable information about the Oregon country, and were favorably impressed by the attitude of the Indians whom they met. It was decided that Whitman should return to St. Louis with the caravan, and thence to New York. He was anxious to marry Narcissa and to push on to Oregon, for he had become convinced that wagons could cross the Blue Mountains from Fort Hall, Idaho. Parker was to continue westward.

Greene was satisfied with the report of Whitman and Parker, but neither then nor later did he give unstinted co-operation. After a hurried marriage ceremony Marcus and Narcissa were ready for their adventure. Because of Whitman's determined and unwise plans for an immediate departure, satisfactory missionary companions could not be found. Finally, the Rev. Henry Spalding and his wife, Eliza, who were even then on their way to an Osage Indian mission in Mis-

souri, were appointed, and the Whitmans overtook them before reaching St. Louis. This choice was an error in judgment; Spalding was a rejected suitor to Narcissa's hand. The history of the Whitman mission at Waiilatpu was marred from the start by ill-feeling growing largely from this root.

Of the journey to Oregon, and of the establishment of the mission at Waiilatpu on the Walla Walla, twenty-five miles above the Fort, little can be said in a brief review. Dr. Drury handles his material with the skill and enthusiasm of a dramatist. The letters of Marcus and Narcissa to the East, together with other large quantities of correspondence, are made to tell their own story. The sensitive reader lives again the hardships endured by the first white women to cross the Rockies over what was to become, ten years later, the Oregon Trail. Whitman's great ability along some lines, and his lamentable lack of judgment along others, become more and more apparent as the narrative unfolds. Once arrived at their destination, the establishment of a separate station for the Spaldings at Lapwai, across the line in what is now Idaho, 120 miles from Waiilatpu, occasioned by the lack of harmony between the families, was a blunder. Dr. Drury here gives us a realistic picture of the problems relating to the inside of primitive missionary life. The fact that the Whitmans settled among the small tribe of the Cayuse Indians, who were hostile to the whites, in preference to the large and friendly Nez Perces tribe chosen by Spalding, was a mistake which was to end in the massacre eleven years later. Other contributing factors, of course, played their parts.

The following chapters show Whitman emerging as farmer, carpenter, miller, physician, teacher and man of religion. For two years —until August, 1838—the Whitmans labored to build and develop their mission practically singlehanded. The Indians held manual labor in disdain, and this prevented Whitman from obtaining badly needed help in farming, and also made it difficult to carry on his plan for "settling" the Indians in agriculture,—a plan not favored by the Board. The nomadic habits of the Cayuses also proved a severe handicap. The author's treatment of Whitman's relation to the Indian medicine-men, and of the Cayuse custom of frequently killing the unsuccessful "te-wat" is instructive, especially as this has direct bearing on the causes lying back of the final tragedy.

The summer of 1838 saw the arrival of the first re-enforcements sent by the Board for the Waiilatpu mission in the persons of the Rev. and Mrs. Elkanah Walker, the Rev. and Mrs. Cushing Eells, the Rev. and Mrs. A. B. Smith, William Gray, mechanic, and Mrs. Gray, and Cornelius Rogers. Instead of providing welcome support and co-operaton, this addition to the Waiilatpu family increased the dissension which already existed between the Whitmans and the Spaldings. Immediately, and somewhat shockingly to the reader, bitter disagreements broke out among the members, which continued even after Walker and Eells (who alone lived on friendly terms) departed to establish a station among the Spokane Indians. Mr. Smith proved an especially bad choice. Add to this the death of two-year old Alice Whitman in the Walla Walla River, and the growing hostility of the Cayuse Indians, who had become increasingly suspicious of the missionaries' motives, and you have a gloomy picture of the years 1838-1842. Letters were sent from mission members to the Board,—to arrive in Boston a year later,—condemning first one and then another of the mission companions. Spalding was singled out for special criticism, and the reader may find justification for certain accusations; for others he is left to conjecture. The author gives us a somewhat confused picture of this acrimonius period, but the fault does not lie so much with him as with the confused and frequently childish reactions of the mission members themselves. A new world demanded adjustments which some of them could not make. These chapters show truly heroic and self-sacrificing endeavor, side by side with quite un-Christian intolerance, and even vindictiveness. But in spite of all, the work of the mission progressed, and Whitman's devotion through his medical service to those in need, both Indian and white, became more and more apparent. The author has held himself to the praiseworthy attitude of impartial chronicler through this central portion of the book, and has allowed the letters of the various individuals to speak for themselves. The reader gains the feeling that Whitman was becoming more and more a figure moved by events which had grown beyond his control. Co-operation was not his strong point. The dissension reached its climax when a letter finally arrived from Greene on February 25, 1842. The Board had evidently become discouraged by the flood of criticisms from

Oregon. The Spaldings were dismissed, and orders were given to close the stations at Waiilatpu and Lapwai! The Whitmans were to move to the smaller and much less important station at Tshimekain, where the cabins of Walker and Eells stood.

Greene's letter set the stage for Whitman's much discussed "ride of 1842-43." The Doctor again asserts himself. Dr. Drury here handles the rather meager material at his disposal with skill and effectiveness. Whitman's journey was for the purpose of righting matters with the Board in Boston. Only a personal interview could save the situation. The Waiilatpu mission *must* go on! In spite of troubles, the agreement between the British and American governments regarding the Oregon boundary was on the horizon. The trail through the Blue Mountains might soon be thronged with colonists for Oregon, and the strategic position of the mission on the Walla Walla would make it a center for the coming migration. How far Whitman visioned the settlement of the Northwest by Americans, and how much he was actuated in making his ride by an interest in American colonization of the territory, and consequent absorption into the United States, is a knotty problem carefully dealt with in the Appendix. But rightly or wrongly, much of the fame which attaches to Whitman's almost legendary figure is due to this ride to the East, and to the fact that, after making a hazardous journey to the South through Utah, and what is now New Mexico, because of Indian wars, he visited Washington en route to Boston, and is reported to have conferred there with President Tyler, Secretary of War Porter and others. Horace Greeley entertained him in New York, and articles began to appear in the Press concerning his work and the probable future of the American Northwest. These chapters are valuable for the material they present on the routes and personalities concerned with early exploration and migration, and on the history of the Linn Bill and the Webster-Ashburton Treaty. The "Fifty-four forty or fight" slogan of Polk in 1844 was even then in the air. Contrary to many sweeping assertions regarding Whitman's political motives, Dr. Drury maintains the position which appears justified by Whitman's own correspondence,—that the Doctor rode East with the missionary work on the Walla Walla foremost in mind, and that whatever he may have done,—and it was probably considerable,—to encour-

age the important migration of 1843, his general efforts were subordinated to the welfare of the specific project to which he gave his life. Whether Whitman "saved" the Oregon territory for the United States by encouraging the expedition of '43 to take wagons beyond Fort Hall remains an open question. In any event, Whitman was successful in persuading the Board to continue and to enlarge Waiilatpu, and on the return trip westward he was, perhaps accidentally, a leader in the migration of at least three hundred men with three thousand cattle which left St. Louis in May, 1843. Apparently, however, he had little to do with the organization.

After his arrival at Waiilatpu Whitman joyfully watched with Narcissa the following migrations of 1844 and 1845. The mission now housed many families. Buildings and workers were added. But the cloud of disaster still hung heavy over Waiilatpu. A severe epidemic of measles swept the Northwest in November, 1847, and, while many whites died, the toll among the Indians was extremely heavy. Whitman's Cayuses suffered greatly, and finally when three children of the hostile Chief Tiloukaikt died, Whitman was accused of poisoning them. He had lost what little influence he had held with the Cayuses when he openly favored white colonization. The massacre, in which Whitman, Narcissa and twelve others died, is graphically reconstructed by Dr. Drury, and this forms one of the literary high-points of the book. The tragedy was the more pathetic because of its uselessness. Whitman never learned Indian psychology. He had received ample warning of an attack from Hudson's Bay officials and friendly Indians alike, but he disregarded them. However, there was a nobility in the way he performed his duty as he saw it. He stands, an heroic Samson, pointing to the Oregon Trail.

Great as the religious influence of Marcus and Narcissa may have been in certain individual cases,—and there is no reason to doubt the worth of their Christian accomplishment,—the author seems to feel that the Whitmans' deeper significance lies in the impetus they consciously and unconsciously gave to the colonization of the Northwest. This sealed the fate of the Indian. In conclusion, one may say that Dr. Drury has given us a sincere, realistic, and consistent portrayal of an equally sincere, but essentially unrealistic and inconsistent hero.

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Immortality: A critique of the relations between the process of nature and the world of man's ideas. By COUNT HERMANN KEYSERLING. Translated by JANE MARSHALL. London: Oxford University Press, 1938. xvi + 232 pp. $4.50.

This is a more substantial work than readers of Keyserling's more recent works might suspect, and though the author is amazed that a work of his youth should call for an English translation at this late date, the book is certainly worthy, if not of immortality, at least of a more enduring career than those works have which live and die with the personality of their authors. For anyone interested in the idea of immortality, whether he happens to be interested in Keyserling or not, will find in the book an exceptionally penetrating analysis of human attitudes toward death, of the various conceptions of temporal and eternal being, and of the frame of life in general. The author calls it a "critical phenomenology." Philosophers may see in the argument little more than a fairly ingenious blend of Kant, Nietzsche, and Bergson, a mixture not so impossible as one might suppose. But the book is more than an argument; it suggests many fruitful fields of inquiry and raises more problems than it solves.

In 1907 the author was still thinking in Kantian terms. His aim was to present the content of the idea of immortality critically, that is, to determine the meaning of this idea for "possible experience" rather than to determine its truth. For several chapters he adheres fairly closely to this aim and really gives us a critical phenomenology. But before long the temptation to expound his own little doctrine becomes too strong, and the last half of the book is concerned less with a phenomenology of the idea of immortality than with an exposition of the author's theory of Life. Since it is to the critical phenomenology that I wish to call the reader's particular attention, I shall dispose of Keyserling's "metaphysic of Life" first, by quoting his own summary:

> The "Being" of life expresses itself in change, in motion, in perishing. As music *is* only as it dies away, so Life blossoms only as it fades. In it every pause, every enduring sameness, is equivalent to Not-being. We feel ourselves eternal *because* we are mortal. . . . Do I will to live forever? that means: my will points on beyond myself. Do I will to be Eternal? I disown my limitations. And if I feel and experience that I am eternal, I confess thereby that the boundaries of individuality are not the bounds of

'my Being. So, then, the will to eternal life, at its deepest, is identical with the will to death in Time. The Self to which the impulse of self-preservation and the longing for Immortality relate, is supra-personal. The ultimate significance, the supreme value of the person lies in its being mortal. . . . As the limits of thought make it actual, so it is Death that finally makes Life real. Non-being gives Being its eternity. Let us therefore be proud enough to will the end. This resolve lifts us above our limitations. We have overcome Death (pp. 228-230 *passim*).

These passages, and many others, suggest that Keyserling is trying to expound Goethe's *Faust*. Though the exposition is fresh and passionate, the doctrine is the familiar dialectic of romantic idealism. Man is more than a person or individual; by refusing to accept his personal limitations, by being a will instead of a mere consciousness, he exhibits the traits of Life. Life is a universal force, more or less individuated, but essentially a supra-personal reality, which unites the organisms in which it is manifested. The forms of this union are many, and hence the arguments for it, given in various chapters, are diverse. In this way Keyserling's exposition assembles various classic expositions of his theme from Goethe to Bergson. The reader who desires a school of wisdom will therefore find abundant edification here, and will easily be carried away (in spite of a pedestrian translation) with that elevated enthusiasm which has fed idealists for at least a century.

But to return from metaphysics to the subject of immortality from which the book digresses, the author's problem is not to explain psychologically why men believe in immortality, nor to speculate concerning the origin of the belief, nor to defend it, but to comprehend it.

Psychology . . . can only account *a posteriori* for beliefs actually extant, . . . but our object is to grasp belief critically. . . . We do not regard it as our business to give grounds for this belief abstracted from experience; our one and only concern is to comprehend it. . . . Man as a natural being cannot, even when his striving is directed to the supernatural, escape from the sphere of Nature. Therefore, even his belief in the transcendent must have its grounds in his natural being. In this innermost content of the thought of Immortality, not in the ideas which form its phenomenal, temporary expression, do we behold the core of our problem. The specific form of the problem entails, as a matter of course, that we cannot aim at judgments of value in the ethico-teleological sense. We are dealing with belief as a natural phenomenon (p. 10).

To study this belief critically as a natural phenomenon, that is, as a revelation of human nature, means to study its object in terms of "the conditions of possible experience of it" (p. 10). This pragmatistic interpretation of Kantian method seems to imply that we can proceed at once to the content of the belief. We soon discover, on the contrary, that before we can examine *what* we believe, we must explore the implications of *that* we believe. Belief itself becomes the crux of the argument, and after a chapter devoted to it, we become more and more deeply involved in metaphysics and can dispense with the phenomenology of the particular belief in immortality. For it turns out that believing is the basis of all action, the innermost activity of a person. "Man cannot do more than believe" (p. 95). "It is belief that creates Being for the mind" (p. 94). "*That* I believe is *a priori*, the ground of the possibility of all motives; *what* I believe may, on the other hand, be dependent on a hundred causes" (p. 95). To believe means to assume; to assume means to assume existence; to assume existence means to "relate directly to Being" (p. 93); to relate directly to Being means to have immediate experience; to have immediate experience is to experience the Self; Self-experience is vital power; "belief in myself as a continuously operative principle is the fundamental assumption of my personal existence. Self-consciousness coincides at bottom with the instinct of Immortality" (p. 104) Q.E.D. From this point on, immortality is swallowed up in "belief." "The essence of all beliefs (as opposed to what is known by reason) from our critical standpoint lies in the negative characteristic of not being subject to discussion" (p. 91 note). Having thus entered by the purely "negative" door, belief soon becomes so positive that "man cannot do more than believe." This old trick of idealistic logicians is now too hackneyed to be very deceptive, and I imagine even William James would repudiate the will to believe, if he saw it thus exploited. Keyserling might have profited by the "self-restraint" which he praises:

> The self-restraint (σωφροσύνη) required to transform the question: How does experience arise? into the more modest one: What does it contain? has everywhere been the maturest product of a mature culture (p. 72).

So, again, turning our backs on the dialectic, let us return to the beginning and examine the *content* of the particular belief in immortality. At the end of a chapter on "immortality in general," in

which there is a survey of the many different meanings men have given this term, we discover that since there are so many different ideas of immortality, and since we have no way of deciding scientifically which are true, we must disregard them all and get at the "innermost meaning," independent of all "phenomenal and temporary" meanings:

> Our incursion into the world of Myth has taught us one thing only, that this meaning, *so far as there is one*, is at all events not to be deduced from the ideas as such. Is this much or little? It is an extremely important result. *For from it there follows directly the possibility of a Critique of Immortality.* It is indeed irrational to assume that the current ideas of the Hereafter should have no deeper foundation than man's faculty of imagination. They are far too generally prevalent for that. Rather they must have a ground *beyond* and *outside* the actual empirical motive forces, that is to say, in the innermost living nature of man. . . . There is, in spite of all the disparity and incompatibility of the different ideas of Immortality, a belief in Immortality "in general." Just for this reason a critique of it is possible, . . . independent of any illusions held by consciousness (pp. 64-65).

Once again we are thrown back; our "critical phenomenology" turns out to be a critique independent of appearances. The "illusions" of sense are not instructive, and all mythologies can be discarded in favor of a belief in immortality "in general."

In spite of all this methodological disdain for empirical contents, Keyserling comes back to experience continually, and his book is full of critical *observations*. To some of these we can now, at last, turn.

The so-called "belief" in immortality is not so much an assumption, certainly not an assumption "beyond discussion," as it is a desire, hope, or "instinct." Keyserling goes so far as to say that to believe consistently in continuance after death is a sign of immaturity, ingenuousness, and inability to distinguish between reality and imagination (p. 20); for the myths of the after-life involve glaring inconsistencies and unintelligibilities, and must therefore be regarded as products of imagination rather than of reflection. On this ground he makes a sharp distinction between such doctrines as re-incarnation, whose aim it is to make moral causation intelligible, and doctrines of immortality which explain nothing, but offer hope of a new, discontinuous existence, where the natural consequences of this life can be forgotten. The commonplace is not immortal, and when it is so conceived, as by modern spiritualists, the idea is easily satirized. There

are, to be sure, "commercial treaties with the Hereafter" (p. 54), such as the Christian doctrine of retribution, in which the after-life merely continues and completes a system of rewards and punishments, but these are the exception rather than the rule. Belief in a continuously existing soul is also neither as prevalent nor as important as is often supposed. Primitive animism usually distinguishes sharply between the living beings and their ghosts or spirits; among the Egyptians and Greeks the souls of the living and of the dead were quite different. Even where the belief in an immortal soul prevails, its life is radically changed by death. In short, the basic theme of the idea of immortality is not the continuity of life, but the transformation of life.

In view of this fact, it is not surprising to note that few doctrines deny death or minimize it. Immortality is not literally doing away with death, but regarding it as a crisis instead of an end. Death and its consequences are the very heart of the idea of immortality. Keyserling generalizes and concludes that, among both primitive and civilized beings, the dead are more important than the living—more important, that is, to the living. To live in the past, and to try to keep present what has passed, is the normal pre-occupation of the human mind. "Only the past is wholly ours" (p. 81). The so-called future life is really peopled less with hopes of our own future than with memories of the departed. It is society with the dead. Death is important, therefore, because it gives life a frame, whereby others can appropriate it; death does not literally put an end to a life. "A life," as the biographer writes it, is bounded by birth and death, but the career of this framed life endures after death in some form or other, even without benefit of biographer.

Obviously there must be a basic duality wherever myths of immortality flourish; a monistic conception of life (such as Keyserling's, for that matter) gives scant foothold for the contrast between two worlds implied in all religious traditions. The basic dualism, according to Keyserling, is not that between body and soul, but between matter and energy. "The basis of every belief in Immortality is the disparateness of Matter and Energy" (p. 22). Given the distinction between a lifeless mass (corpse, for example) and a life-giving energy (breath, for example), the plot is laid for mythology. The doctrine of the immortal soul is but one variation, and a minor one, on this theme.

Philosophically the most penetrating and fertile analysis in this book is the way in which the author develops the contrast between eternal being and duration. He is obviously indebted to Bergson here, as well as to phenomenology, but his application of this distinction to the idea of immortality is enlightening. He does not push the distinction far enough to make it clear, but he, at least, suggests its significance. There are two types of immortality, based on different schemes of value. Those who pursue eternal life, timelessness, are striving like Faust's tempter to prolong the present. They sacrifice life to eternity; their emphasis is on conscious existence and a continuous presentation of the good. Sensual mysticism is the outcome of this approach. Its basic hope is to take the present out of its temporal context. The present, when thus abstracted, is the eternal. Such existence is lifeless, changeless, complete actuality, an endless presentation of the end of desire. Those, on the other hand, who cling to life, have a radically different ideal; they seek expansion in time, living with the past and future. Union with other lives in time, participating in all events of the temporal order, perpetual motion,—this is the substance of things hoped for by them.

It seems to me that Keyserling and many others only confuse this important distinction when they begin to talk of "the eternal process," of Life as a synthesis of time and eternity, and of the individual as in essence "boundless." The assumption that every force must be infinite and every will limitless, that a man's life is integrated with the whole of life, and similar expressions of idealistic faith, is neither necessary nor wise. The "critical phenomenology" which we have sketched above, culminating in the distinction between temporal and eternal existence, makes the ideas, hopes, and confusions of immortality much more intelligible. A genuine critique of immortality, emancipated from the particular mythology of romantic idealism, ought to be more than "possible" on the basis of the excellent beginning made in this work.

HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER

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Psychology and Religion. By CARL GUSTAV JUNG. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1938, 131 pp. $2.00.

It is a curious commentary on the validity of psychological theories

that they often seem to be accepted or rejected only in degree as they contain elements which are congenial or foreign to the temperaments of those in whom they kindle any intellectual fire. The Jungian systematization, probably more than the Freudian or Adlerian, practically demands that there be in the apperceptive mass of the inquirer some common bond of intuitive understanding, which, even though it cannot be clearly verbalized, can, none the less, be sensed. The greatest mistake one can make is to approach Jung purely intellectually. This fact is well illustrated in the present book. The "objective" psychologist will find it very disappointing, if not downright fantastic. The less "objective" individual though, who is willing to grant Jung a great deal of imaginative latitude, will find in it much that is stimulating and refreshing.

The conception of the "collective unconscious" continues for Jung to be the cornerstone of his psychology. The individual consciousness is based upon and surrounded by an indefinitely extended unconscious psyche. In some sense this collective unconscious is hereditarily transmitted, and with it the archetypal patterns which Jung discovers in dreams, folk-lore and mythology. Prominent among these patterns, he finds an archetypal image of the Deity, as well as the recurrence of a "quaternity symbol" associated with the numinous experience of Godhood. In several places the author emphasizes that in his observations he writes to prove, not the existence of God, but the existence of an archetypal image of the Diety. This phenomenological standpoint is predominant throughout and illuminates Jung's statement that "religious experience is absolute and indispensable."

Freud has said that "dream interpretation is the *via regia* to the unconscious," and Jung follows him in this. He does not look upon dreams, however, as merely façades to conceal something (as Freud seems to have it), adding that dreams are too universal and world-wide for that. Rather, he takes dreams more at their face value, not looking for a latent, behind a manifest, content. Jung does not deny the role that psychoanalysis ascribes to the repression of complexes and their symbolic interplay in the consciousness of the dreamer, but assigns them a secondary significance. Consequently, he does not believe that the meaning of a neurosis is exhausted by referring it to repressed infantile sexuality (Freud), or a frustrated will-to-power (Adler). In his estimation these involve probably only the very superficial

needs of the personality. He attempts to illustrate this in a case he presents of an agnostic scientist of Catholic upbringing who could not reconcile his agnosticism with certain experiences which Jung terms "religious." His cure followed the acknowledgment that his experiences were numinous in character, and that he was struggling with an innate religiousness which found no expression in his scientific life.

Jung, very interestingly, approximates here the theory of Boisen[1] in the latter's conception of religion and neurosis. Where Boisen, however, states that certain types of religious experience, like certain types of functional mental disorder, are attempts of nature to heal internal disorganization of the personality, Jung states that the neurosis is there because the acknowledgment of the numinous character of a religious experience is absent. Superficially, this difference may seem very fundamental, actually one needs only to transpose "internal disorganization of the personality" to "refusal to acknowledge the numinous character of a religious experience" to discover oneself in the same world of discourse.

Jung's disagreement with Freud as to the role of religious experience is, of course, very definite in nature, though in some of Freud's articles on the "Ozeansgefühl" one will find that the experiences which Jung terms numinous are not foreign to the founder of psychoanalysis. Their approach to this experience is, however, rooted in fundamentally different insights, hence their disagreement. Perhaps the clearest example of the impenetrability of Jung's theory by objective criteria is his revealing statement, when he writes of the numinous experience: "You can only say that you haven't had such an experience and your opponent will say, 'Sorry, I have,' and there your discussion will come to an end,"—as it inevitably must.

Henry J. Wegrocki

University of Minnesota

[1] *The Exploration of the Inner World.* (New York and Chicago, 1936).

BOOK NOTES

Hermetica. The Ancient Greek and Latin Writings which contain religious or philosophic teachings ascribed to Hermes Trismegistus. Edited with English translation and notes by WALTER SCOTT. Volume IV. Testimonia with introduction, addenda and indices by A. S. FERGUSON. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936. Pp. xlix + 576. 30*s*.

This is the concluding volume of a work the first volume of which appeared in 1925. It gives the remains of a curious literature which came into being in Roman Egypt, and which professes to be the record of revelations from Thoth, the Egyptian god of wisdom. Scott's edition of the texts was a monument of application and learning, produced by a man who had a determination to make sense of very difficult writings. It is generally agreed that he made more sense than the writers possessed, and that his drastic reconstructions have, for the most part, but small claim to be regarded as probable. Nevertheless, his work is of the utmost value to other students, not only of this literature but also of Christian beginnings, for, although Hermetism was itself in all probability untouched by Christian influences, it represents a phenomenon parallel to some Christian developments. This volume is of even greater value than its three predecessors, for it contains a very copious collection of quotations, not only from our Hermetica, but also from other sayings current under the name of Hermes and mentioned as such by writers in Greek, Latin, and Arabic. Scott's death "left the world an orphan," and the appearance of this fourth volume is due to the rare generosity of Professor A. S. Ferguson. Professor Ferguson has done more than preserve Scott's work. He has added an introduction, which makes a most valuable contribution to our understanding of one of the treatises, the *Asclepius*, notes which contain a wealth of valuable suggestions on the documents in general, and select word indexes for the Greek and Latin texts. The result is extremely welcome.

ARTHUR DARBY NOCK

Indian Temples: 136 Photographs chosen and annotated. By ODETTE BRUHL with a Preface by SYLVAIN LÉVI. London: Humphrey Milford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1937. viii + 140 pp. $3.00.

These photographs are so well chosen and reproduced as to make this book a delight. For the characteristics of Indian architecture, sculpture, and landscape are here communicated in what are often movingly beautiful illustrations, hitherto scattered in many more costly volumes. Moreover, the subjects presented permit a more inclusive visualization of Indian life and culture than the title "Indian Temples" might suggest. The authors profess "no didactic purpose in offering this album to the public," and have

certainly produced a result pleasantly free from all pedantry. Yet they have also succeeded in making intensive scholarship serve universal interests. The pictures follow in a chronological and topographical order that readily tells its story of Indian history from prehistoric times through the phases of Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam. The Preface by Sylvain Lévi gives a simple, intelligible clue to this arrangement. The brief notes on each picture by Odette Bruhl, on eight pages at the end of the book, give essential details regarding the history, iconography, and customary uses of the shrines in Indian life. The inclusion of a map of India would have been advantageous.

The volume includes eight views of sites in Ceylon, but none of Indonesian monuments. Of very special value are the eleven relatively unfamiliar views presented of temples in Nepal, a region to which Sylvain Lévi has devoted so much of his scholarship. On this group of pictures he makes the following comment: "The photographs of Nepal have been reserved till the end, and placed almost independently, not from personal predilection (which would be excusable), but because Nepal in its Himalayan isolation presents a synthetic view of India as she was before the Mohammedan invasion. There the Buddhist buildings are not archaeological curiosities, but centres of a living faith like the Hindu temples. Moreover in Nepal are to be found, still standing, examples of the wooden architecture which preceded and explain stone architecture, but which have totally disappeared from India. The photographs reproduced in this section are due to the ever-generous kindness of the late Maharaja Chandra Sham Shere, who died in 1929."

H. L. F.

The Quest of the Overself. By Paul Brunton. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1938. 304 pp. $3.00.

Mr. Brunton's fifth attempt to present to the West some of the spiritual treasures which he has found in India. In Part I, "The Analyses," he expounds the "mystery of man,"—his physical, emotional, and intellectual selves,—seeking the permanent self underlying the transient manifestations. Chapter VI, "Beyond Time to Eternity," contains an interesting analysis of the relation of time to the psyche. He finds that genius consists in a superior faculty of concentration which results in contact with the creative Oversoul within. In Part II, "The Practices," he offers a simplified yoga technique by means of which the westerner can derive the benefits of contact with the inner self, without resorting to the abnormal and dangerous types of yoga. The path to the Oversoul includes the spiritual culture of finer feelings, the practice of mental mastery and self-enquiry, and the mysteries of the breath, the eye, and the heart. The chapter on the breath is especially provocative of further thought and experimentation, which, however, is dangerous except under expert supervision.

M. B.

The Holy Scriptures. Deuteronomy, with Commentary. By JOSEPH REIDER. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1937. xliv + 355 pp. 3 maps. $2.50.

Dr. Reider's commentary is the work of a philologist of note, who has carefully studied the results of recent archeology in order to justify the traditional interpretation of Deuteronomy. In some places he seems to clutch at the merest straws to defend the authorship of Moses against the theories of the higher critics. In particular, he resents the documentary hypothesis of the Graf-Wellhausen school.

Unfortunately for the traditional point of view, the archeological findings, though pointing to an earlier date than criticism had allowed for many biblical events, lead to no such definite conclusions as in Dr. Reider's interpretation. The evidence he presents does not dispose of the basic factor in the critical theories, that Deuteronomy cannot be a product of the Mosaic period, because it represents a time in which the settled, agricultural life of the Israelites in Palestine and Transjordania is assumed as a fact.

Dr. Reider brushes aside as of little moment the matter of differing styles of composition, yet a survey of his philological notes shows some parts of the book, notably the Blessing of Moses, to contain a higher proportion of rare and archaic words than other parts of the book, an excellent argument for its composite character. The commentator's introduction to this section states the critical position with no attempt at refutation. But in the introduction to the Song of Moses (Chapter 32), the commentator admits the presence of later linguistic and stylistic elements "superimposed on the original song of Moses by a later editor or annotator" (p. 297), while verses 7-12, which look back to a distant past, presumed by the critics to be the Mosaic age, "might just as well be construed as an allusion to the patriarchal age, in accordance with Jewish tradition" (p. 297).

The highly developed monotheism of Deuteronomy is explained as Mosaic by analogy with religious movements akin to monotheism current in the time of Moses. The obviously reformist character of Deuteronomic law, and its insistence, nowhere duplicated in the Pentateuch, on a single center for the cult of Israel is dismissed on the ground that Jerusalem is not necessarily implied, and that other cult centers had preceded Jerusalem, as is suggested in the amphictyonic theory of Alt and Noth. In this instance, as in many others, Dr. Reider is playing one critical theory against another in the attempt to explain away the essential point, that, in some parts of the book, a fixed existence, rather than the nomadic state of desert wanderers, is implied.

The commentator's careful study of the work of the archeologists, and of the text, has borne fruit in a number of excellent topographical and philological notes, which constitute the chief value of the work. As a defense of the traditional view of Mosaic authorship, however, it is unsatisfying.

JOSEPH L. BLAU

The Validity of the Gospel Record. By Ernest Findlay Scott. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938. vi + 213 pages. $2.00.

The first three Gospels are largely composed of independent sections, often cast in conventional forms; forms which can be best explained as due to the use made of the material by the earliest Christian community. This relation between community use and form constitutes a special branch of Gospel research known as "form criticism," which has yielded illuminating results. Certain of its advocates, however, have treated it as an end in itself, arguing that "community use" implies "community formation"; that, consequently, we are to look to the community rather than to Jesus as the author of the greatest part of the Gospel material.

Dr. Scott's volume contains an analysis and critique of this contention. "A Community, as such, never produces anything. For whatever it decides or does some one man is ultimately responsible" (page 57). And this principle is particularly applicable to sayings of such unique content as those ascribed to Jesus in the Synoptists; the Christian community may well have given them specific forms in transmission, but to say that it "created" them is meaningless. This theory really implies that Jesus—who himself gave no teaching distinctive enough to be preserved—inspired anonymous disciples to produce the Sermon on the Mount. Such a theory is incredible.

It was the teaching of Jesus that created the community, not *vice versa.* And it was from his teachings that the community derived beliefs and practices "which could not be apprehended or explained except through the constant repetition of those deeds and words of Jesus in which the will of God had been revealed" (page 75). Recitation of those deeds and words accordingly went on constantly in Christian worship; in Acts the only address delivered to a Christian gathering (chapter 20) reaches its climax in "Remember the words of the Lord Jesus, how he said. . . ." This "cult use" inevitably involved a set form of these "words" for public recitation, and deviation from such a form would be instantly detected and resented. So to think of the pre-literary tradition as amorphous and fluid is palpably erroneous; "no definite line can be drawn between the Gospels as we have them and the tradition out of which they grew" (page 7).

This fixity of the early tradition is shown further by the difficulty the Evangelists manifest in discussing problems that arose after Jesus' lifetime. To justify preaching to the Gentiles, for instance, they can cite from the central tradition only the stories of the Centurion of Capernaum and the Syro-Phoenician woman—both of which are really inadequate for the purpose. There is no attempt to fill the gap by a "community creation," anxious though the community was to find justification for the new step; it is only in the very latest stratum of the Gospel material—Matthew 24:14—that an explicit commendation of the Gentile mission is put into Jesus' mouth. (The resurrection stories, naturally, belong to a separate class.) In other words, "a record had come down in the church which was known to contain the authentic memories of Jesus' life. With this record

no liberties could be taken beyond a certain point" (page 98). And it was not until the time of the Fourth Gospel that any "orthodox" attempt was made to rewrite the tradition to accord with later needs.

BURTON SCOTT EASTON

New Chapters in New Testament Study. By EDGAR J. GOODSPEED. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937. vii + 219 pp. $2.00.

In delivering the Ayer Lectures at the Colgate-Rochester Divinity School for 1937, contained in this book, the author states that his object was "to discuss some matters closely related to New Testament study which are not precisely within the scope of introductions, commentaries, or similar standard types of writing but are nevertheless of much importance to it." The book has thus a unique and useful place. There are chapters dealing with "publication and Early Christian Literature," "The Original Language of the New Testament," "New Testament Translation and Manuscript Discovery." A section answers questions about "The Lost Books of the Bible," and one chapter has the alluring title, "Modern Apocrypha." A graphically written work for scholarly reference, it is also valuable for class-room study and for popular information.

R. C. K.

Seven Centuries of the Problem of Church and State. By FRANK GAVIN. Princeton University Press, 1938. 132 pp. $2.00.

The four chapters which comprise this thin volume are replete with learning. They represent the Spencer Trask Lectures at Princeton University in 1937 and well reveal the rich mind of a scholar whose recent death we have so lamented. The author has attempted to outline the main developments in Christian thought on the problem of church and state, and his book is peculiarly timely for the present day. The new nationalism and the ecumenical movement have driven the issues of church and state again to the forefront of the Christian conscience.

The first and introductory chapter deals mainly with Justinian and his attempt to build a single society "which was both church and state at the same time." The importance of Justinian for the English Reformation is especially stressed, and several of the basic documents of English and Byzantine legislation are compared in the notes (pp. 24-25).

The second chapter treats of the delimitation of the two powers in the Middle Ages—the works of Gregory VII and the "York Anonymous" being taken as typical poles of thought. The third chapter deals with John of Salisbury and Bernard of Clairvaux under the heading, "The Full Development of Imperialistic, Curialist and Radical Thinking." The final chapter takes up some of the antecedents of the present day situation. Thomas Aquinas, Dante, Wycliff, and some others are discussed.

The chief value of Dr. Gavin's work is that he has made available in four short chapters a great deal of material which hitherto has not been

easily accessible. The book suffers, however, from its very short compass, and from frequent digressions of the author, whereby the general outline of the argument is often obscured. Furthermore, many important developments of the Reformation—Luther, Calvin, and Anabaptists—are not touched upon. The significance of the Conciliarists, and the influence of democracy, are also much neglected.

Nevertheless, the book remains a most valuable introduction to the subject, and is graced with the care and precision of one who was a very great scholar.

C. C. R.

The Mind of Latin Christendom. By Edward Motley Pickman. New York: Oxford University Press, 1937 vii + 738 pp. $5.00.

It is wholly refreshing to read a book written by a non-professional student of history who writes because the subject genuinely interests him. To be sure, he is acutely aware that other historians have somewhat neglected the aspects that are his peculiar interest. Yet his apology for the work is not an attempt to fill a need, but the compelling appeal of the subject to him. Here in the fourth and fifth centuries he finds the beginnings of our present world. He views the fundamental changes in spiritual terms. He is interested primarily in the ideas and intellectual issues that created a new mentality. Mr. Pickman is perhaps over modest in advising a reading of some of the principal sources of the period in preference to his own work. The present book is worth reading, and what is more, it is enjoyable reading. The author does not treat his theme systematically but roams leisurely through a series of topics chosen because they illustrate what he regards as essential movements of the age. After a general introduction he discusses St. Augustine at good length, and follows with chapters on Miracles, Bishops, Justice, Free Will, and Monasticism. He ends with the Papacy. To vivify his own narrative he quotes in translation extended passages from the leading contemporary authors, and by numerous specific examples he builds up the broad picture of the times. The final result is more an impressionistic than a logical demonstration. You feel the tendencies, movements and controversies of the age. Yet there are several points in which perspectives seem to the reviewer to need readjustment. Mr. Pickman, in his enthusiasm for the centuries of his choice, forgets that many of the problems of the fourth and fifth centuries were burning issues of the two previous centuries, and that they were still far from settled in the sixth century. Indeed the opening decades of the seventh century are, perhaps, better and truer lines of division between the old mentality of the Hellenistic-Roman Empire and the new mentality of the Middle Ages. Mr. Pickman agrees with those who emphasize the importance of the mystery religions in the development of Christianity. In so doing he underestimates, as it seems to the reviewer, the role of Judaism. Had he fully grasped the significance of this heritage he would see

that relation of God to man, which he stresses as the only original element taught in the Hebrew-Christian books known as the Bible, really gives new meaning to the rites and beliefs which he finds also common to most of the mystery cults. As a matter of fact the final enemy which Christianity had to overcome was not these mystery cults but the paganism which was the faith of the vast majority of the population who lived in the country-side. Even with imperial favor and the support of the army Mithraism failed to conquer the Roman world. It is therefore strange that Mr. Pickman sees in it so serious a rival of Christianity in the fourth century. However the relative importance of the influences borrowed from parallel institutions and those generated primarily from the institution itself provides occasion for endless debate. The reviewer feels that in the development of Christianity the latter are the more powerful, and therefore differs from the author on numerous interpretations. It is the willingness of the writer to argue in good spirit his own views that helps to make this a book which the reviewer can heartily recommend to the reading public.

IRVING W. RAYMOND

The Story of Instruction: The Church, the Renaissances, and the Reformations. By ERNEST CARROLL MOORE. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938. ix + 575 pp. $4.00.

Though this second volume of a history of instruction surveys the familiar subject-matter of the history of Christian dogma (especially Harnack's), and of the history of education, it is a decidedly fresh account. Its central theme is stated on page 382:

> In the renaissance which is commonly called the lesser, but which may in fact have been the greater, the Christian Church appropriated what it found of Greek learning among the Arabs and Jews and then what it could come upon in purer form among the Greeks themselves.

In Dr. Moore's story the conventional accounts of the Church as Europe's schoolmaster are supplemented by two admirable chapters on Islam and on the Jesuits, in which the author seeks to do justice to two frequently neglected but very important strains in Europe's heritage. Had he gone even further in describing the various elements foreign to the Greco-Roman culture which entered the intellectual life of the Church, and the profound transformations effected by them in the very substance and form of education, his volume would have more adequately fulfilled its purpose. As it is, Dr. Moore's account achieves freshness and richness chiefly by his ability, being himself a genuine teacher, to let the "instructors" stand out above the "instruction"; the individual qualities of men like Augustine, Alcuin, Johannes Erigena, and Loyola, to mention only a few of the dramatic characters he portrays, add much to what might easily be an academic history. The book reads like a story, and it instructs like Dr. Moore himself.

H. W. S.

Some Political and Social Ideas of English Dissent, 1763-1800. By Anthony Lincoln. Cambridge: at The University Press; New York, The Macmillan Company, 1938. 292 pp. $2.50.

This work, which had the merit of winning the Prince Consort Prize in 1934, is a careful and interesting account of dissenting opinion on social and political themes in the latter half of the eighteenth century. By and large it unfolds the story of the gradual change from an interest in Christian freedom to one of natural rights—the transformation, that is, of religious into secular idealism. Particular attention is paid to the thought of Richard Price and Joseph Priestly. A valuable bibliography is appended.

C. C. R.

Manductio ad Ministerium: Directions for a Candidate of the Ministry. By Cotton Mather. Reproduced from the Original Edition, Boston, 1726. With a bibliographical note by Thomas J. Holmes and Kenneth B. Murcock. (Pub. No. 42, Fascimile Text Society). New York: Columbia University Press, 1938, 12 + xx +151 pp. $2.00.

This fascimile re-edition makes available an important source of information concerning the education, literature, and general culture of early New England. The long list of authors which Cotton Mather recommends to his son is almost a complete curriculum and catalogue of readings for a young divinity student. I would call attention to two neglected aspects of this manual. First, as the subtitle, *The Angels Preparing to Sound the Trumpets*, suggests, the aim is apocalyptic: the churches are to be "gathered," preparatory to the imminent Day of Judgment. Secondly, there is clearly an emphasis on learned piety, and a number of references to the direct influence of the University of Halle, and of continental pietism in general.

H. W. S.

Young Emerson Speaks: Unpublished Discourses on Many Subjects by Ralph Waldo Emerson. Edited by Arthur Cushman McGiffert, Jr. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1938. viii + 228 pp. $2.00.

Emerson's early career was in the Unitarian ministry, and during the course of that career he prepared more than one hundred and seventy sermons. Until the publication of this work almost none of them had appeared in print. Professor McGiffert's excellent edition now makes available to the public twenty-five more. This is presumably a representative collection. It is certainly a varied one, and a remarkable exhibition of the mind and style of the youthful Emerson, one that no student of the mature essayist can afford to neglect.

Emersonian idealism did not come full-blown to its great exponent during his early years. As a student at Harvard College, and at the Harvard Divinity School, he was taught, and accepted that earlier form of religious liberalism known as "Channing Unitarianism." In fact, the great Chan-

ning himself was his pastor and chief spiritual guide during his formative years. The young preacher, as McGiffert states, "belongs to the first stage of the liberal reform of traditional Christian orthodoxy. Emerson, the lecturer and essayist, belongs to the second stage of that movement. His three years as a minister enabled him to come to grips with the new religious mind of his century."

This process took place very slowly indeed. The sermons throughout are those of a supernatural rationalist. (The sermon on Miracles most clearly shows this tendency, but there are clear enough indications elsewhere.) The youthful preacher believed strongly in personal immortality—a belief which he was to abandon in middle years, but returned to in later life. He then believed, also in a personal Deity.

In these early utterances the student of Emerson will observe not only doctrines quite at variance with those of the later writings, but also foreshadowings of Transcendentalism. The subjects of certain sermons have a familiar sound and the editor's notes remind us of many other themes in the sermons which the mature essayist was to improvise upon most arrestingly. The preacher's style is interesting as a contrast to the essayist's, but is hardly interesting in itself. The most loyal Emersonian would call it a flat, prosy style, and could note only occasional traces of that genius for epigrammatic statement which Emerson was to develop later. There are other defects, among them an occasional purple passage. As a rule, too much is condensed into a sentence, and some of the early sermons cover a vast amount of ground! It must have been difficult for the congregation to follow him, particularly as there were almost none of the homely illustrations with which, in the public lectures of his later years, he was wont to make his meaning clearer and relieve the strain upon his more attentive hearers.

To those who are familiar with Emerson's later works, these sermons seem models of coherence and orderliness. One wonders what led him to abandon these graces of style almost completely. The sermons show that he was well able to express himself in a clear and orderly manner. Why, then, did he not continue so to express himself? One reason probably is that he cannily realized that his style would gain in charm, and power to arrest attention if his thoughts were not expressed in too lucid and logical a fashion. Another reason is most certainly to be found in his later habits of composition, which involved building up his lectures and essays by pillaging percilessly from his journal, his "blotting books," his library, and his sermons.

Professor McGiffert has done his task well. His book begins with a long introduction outlining the story of Emerson's career as minister of the Second Church in Boston and supply preacher, and summarizing his early theological views. The text of the sermons themselves is followed by elaborate notes describing changes in the manuscripts, and quoting parallel passages from the journal and other writings. The book concludes with a list of the sermons, based on Emerson's own "Preaching Record," and a

thorough Index. Throughout the work, Professor McGiffert displays his wonted competence and ability to clarify, without oversimplifying, the difficult problems of theology and philosophy.

JOHN GARDNER GREENE

The Small Sects in America. By ELMER T. CLARK. Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1937. 311 pp. $2.00.

This is a very useful reference work, an informative description of the origins and traits of the many small Protestant bodies in the United States, supplementing the statements given by the sects in the 1926 volume of the U. S. Census by more objective and critical accounts. The number and variety of these sects is bewildering enough, even though the author has confined himself to the offshoots of Protestantism, and has omitted the national churches of Europe, Christian Science, New Thought, Theosophy, and all non-Christian groups. He has classified them as Pessimistic, Perfectionist, Charismatic, Communistic, and Legalistic. Though one must agree with the author that such a classification is confusing and yields much overlapping, it is difficult to suggest a good one. Possibly some scheme emphasizing the origins and historical affiliations would have been better. In fact, the author follows roughly a denominational order, grouping the sects by their parent churches. He would have been more objective, and his description more orderly, had he begun with some of the older sects (most of which are in the last group), and had he not used the term "legalistic." The Baptist sects, especially, are misrepresented by this term and should have been brought into closer relation to their Methodist neighbors. As it is, for example, one reads about several Mennonite subsects before one comes finally to the Mennonites themselves.

The last chapter is a descriptive summary of these sects, rather than a critical analysis. However, Dr. Clark makes at least the beginning of an analysis which deserves a more extended discussion. He repeats what has often been said, that these sects are refuges of "the disinherited" (p. 269), and of "the emotionally starved" (p. 273). In a sense this is true enough, for the majority of these groups are poor and sentimental, but it is difficult to prove that their poverty and monotony are primary causes of their sectarianism. A much more obvious factor, one which Dr. Clark seems to think not worth emphasis, though his book is full of it, is the influence of personal differences, personal loyalties, and individual convictions. The great majority of these sects are the work of strong personalities, whose followers dwindled when the personal influence of the founder ceased. Had they been caused by more general social conditions, they would have become more stable churches. These sects, in other words, are eloquent testimony to the fact that, though Protestant churches produce individual thought, they are not hospitable to it. That such local prophets are produced by poverty and supported by it is not the usual story in this volume;

and it is certainly true that the "communistic" sects were, as a rule, not stimulated by poverty, but by the patriarchal qualities of an enterprizing agriculturalist. It is likewise difficult to prove that pre-millenarianism, at least in America, is "pessimistic" rather than romantic.

But these are questions too large to discuss adequately here. Suffice it to say that the material so painstakingly gathered by Dr. Clark in this volume should stimulate a more critical sociology of sectarianism, and of religion in general, than we possess to date.

H. W. S.

On Journey. By VIDA DUTTON SCUDDER. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1937. 445 pp. $4.00.

This autobiography of a brilliant woman whose life, begun at the time of our Civil War, has spanned a momentous epoch in the world's history, is significant chiefly for the affect upon her of the major streams of life characteristic of that epoch. Her very birth as the child of a missionary in India is linked with one of the most important religious developments of the nineteenth century, and her own activity in the beginning of the College Settlement movement is in the same spiritual line of descent. Her work with the underprivileged inevitably led her into Socialism, and into a distaste for "tainted money" which almost cost her position on the faculty of Wellesley College. But intertwined with all this modernism and radicalism there is another strand no less interesting in its involvements, a strand of medievalism, which led her, not only into romantic by-paths of scholarship among the saints, but also into practical applications in the form of Anglo-Catholicism. Under the inspiration of Francis of Assisi these two strands were intertwined at last into one glowing purpose,—"to work within the Church for the Christian Revolution." Nor has her religious convervatism in the Catholic tradition dulled in the least her social radicalism; at seventy she can say: "My delight in the vast Russian experiment never wavers, for I do think the seeds of economic life are in its keeping. Nor am I unduly troubled by the atheism over there. I suspect the fresh start they have made is a relief to the Living God." Truly a paradox both delightful and enheartening!

M. B.

The Beloved Community. By ROGER LLOYD. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937. 183 pp. $2.25.

Canon Lloyd has addressed his thought to the solution of one of the most perplexing problems in human life, namely, achieving a proper balance between the rights of the individual and the rights of the community to which that individual belongs. From the *Republic* of Plato, and even before that, in Old Testament ideals of the theocratic state, down to the present welter of conflicting political philosophies, that problem has come

to the fore again and again. Anarchist and Fascist and every intermediate type, all have struggled to reach some satisfying answer to the question which threatens to undo them all unless it can be solved. And all have failed, because all have attempted to solve the problem by allowing to one side, the individual or the community, an authority which can be maintained only at the cost of sacrificing rights which belong to the other.

The only abiding resolution of the difficulty is to be found at neither one extreme nor the other. It is a matter of common observation that there exists a tension between the community and the individual. That tension cannot be broken without endangering both of the parties by which it is formed. The solution, therefore, is not to release the tension but to find its creative level, the point at which the individual is both allowed and constrained to make his maximum contribution to the life of all, the point at which the community is in a position both to confer benefits upon its members and derive benefits from them.

The willingness, however, to search for the creative level of tension between man's freedom for self expression and the community's claim upon his allegiance must be based upon a recognition of equality in status for both the community and its member. And this equality can exist only when they are both interpreted in accordance with the Christian doctrine of immortality. Here is the place at which many readers will question the author, for at this point he lapses, or rises, into an other-worldly pattern of thought. This reviewer can only suggest that one follow the argument of Canon Lloyd for oneself. Certainly, it is apparent from history, and from the happenings of our own time, that the conviction of an immortality, either of the individual or of the corporate state, underlies an argument for the supremacy of one over the other more often than may be recognized even by the exponents themselves. To attach significance either to one party or the other as an agent for the accomplishment of a divine or cosmic Purpose is to borrow from the doctrine of immortality.

Even readers who will not agree with Canon Lloyd's religious presuppositions will derive profit from his analysis of contemporary political trends in the chapter entitled "Short Cuts to Blessedness." And many will be interested in his criticism of John Macmurray's *Creative Society*, to which he devotes a long section in his chapter which traces the rise and development of "The Biblical Community." And no churchman, be he a member of the Church of England or not, can afford to miss Canon Lloyd's conception of the Beloved Community in which freedom and discipline achieve their proper relationship, for this is the Christian Church.

GEORGE E. RATH

Christianity and the Individual in a World of Crowds. By HALFORD E. LUCCOCK. Nashville, Tenn.: Cokesbury Press, 1937. 165 pp. $1.50.

The title of this book suggests the pertinence of its content to the major issue of today: how may the individual attain freedom and full develop-

ment of capacity in a world of mass-movements and increasing social control? Certain basic affirmations of the Christian faith are presented as bearing on that end: (1) "The true and final test of any system, social, economic or political, is its effect on individuals, the scope which it gives for the fulfillment of personality" (p. 31-32). (2) "Any Christian transformation of society will be carried forward through personalities as the agency" (p. 35). (3) "In our re-thinking of the individual we must . . . face one great paradox of our time, the paradox of social control, the seeming inconsistency in the fact that only through an extension of social control will he be able to realize the fulfilment of individual life" (pp. 44-45).

The implications of these affirmations are vividly discussed. It is recognized throughout that "the primary service of the Christian Church to life and to society is the awakening of the consciousness of God and bringing it into close relevance to the social environment and framework of life" (p. 50).

R. C. K.

Christian Faith and the Science of Today. By J. H. Morrison. Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1937. viii + 228 pp. $2.00.

Morrison's book comes as a surprise, and is more like a last clap of thunder after the storm has passed than like lightning illuminating the present scene. In the last century it would have created a stir and a welcome defence of Christian doctrine against the attack of an arrogant science. Today it is a belated exercise remote from the interests and problems of an intelligent religion. What we have come to regard as old mistakes are repeated, and the solution offered is a return to the answer formulated under somewhat simpler conditions of life, when the main outlines of Christian theology were generally accepted.

The author has taken two separate historical developments—science and religion—and represented them as complementing each other in the search for truth. Religion begins at the point where the scientist states that knowledge and investigation have reached a limit along certain lines, and where one can only proceed with speculation. Unmindful of the tentative nature of the proceeding, the author fills in this "beyond" with the religious language of the Sunday School. While it is conceivable that a mechanical explanation may not give an exhaustive account of nature, it is surprising that the mystical explanation should include every major dogma of Christianity stated with a finality that a scientist would hesitate to make about demonstrable aspects of nature.

The author's attitude toward science is especially revealing. While there is some interest in science as such, there is less in its secure achievements, and very little in how an intelligent religion could draw upon science to assure a factual basis for its ideal ventures. He goes snooping around seeking little matters to haggle about, and delights in discovering any uncertainty

in science. When scientists candidly acknowledge a limitation to their investigations it is triumphantly seized upon as an admission of failure. Thereupon, the old dogmas are brought out and offered as a full and sufficient solution of the problem. No attempt is made to prove these proffered dogmas. That there may be other answers, or no need for an answer, is not considered. It suffices if it can be shown that science does not disallow the inherited doctrines of the Christian religion.

The most serious fault of this book is in the *non sequitur* of the argument from scientific discourse to religious quotation. For instance, in discussing the uniformity of nature as a necessary scientific postulate, he concludes: "Faith in the uniformity of nature rests ultimately on this, that there is one God and Nature is His handiwork." This method of dealing with the relation of science to religion is so unsatisfactory as not to be taken seriously. He climaxes his book with the assertation that it is not enough to conceive of the world as simply a realm of reason (reasonableness), but it must be thought of ultimately as a realm of love as well. It comes as a surprise to be told that the evidence for intelligent purpose at the heart of the evolutionary process is simply "overwhelming," and that a study of our planetary system leads to a belief in a guiding hand. There are also some novel historical discoveries. The Greek concept of evolution was futile and unprogressive, because it lacked the Christian idea of evolution as "upward and onward."

The chief fault of this book lies in the author's inadequate conception of both science and religion.

FREDERICK REUSTLE

The Freedom of Man. By ARTHUR H. COMPTON. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936. xi + 153 pp. $2.00.

The most important part of this book is that contained in the first two chapters, "Freedom Versus Law" and "What Determines Our Actions?" in which the author speaks with the authority of one of the world's foremost physical scientists, who won the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1927, at the age of thirty-four. "Natural phenomena," the author writes, "do not obey exact laws. This statement marks perhaps the most significant revolution in the history of scientific thought" (p. 7). Professor Compton speaks "as one whose experiments have been partly responsible for this dramatic reversal of the physicist's point of view." These experiments concern the new quantum mechanics. The author notes that Einstein and Planck would not agree that the change which has taken place is fundamental, but he says that those most concerned with quantum mechanics are almost unanimous in sharing his own view. This change in the physicist's point of view abolishes the veto upon human freedom which has often been issued in the name of physics. The laws of Newtonian physics hold, of course, as accurately as ever for large scale events, but for electrons and protons they have only the value of giving "statistical averages." The variability of the behavior of

these particles within the limits of these averages makes room for the influences of thought and decisions upon human conduct, and for the freedom which common sense has always believed in, and which moral and religious philosophy require.

These Terry Lectures, given at Yale in 1931, which are also the Loud Lectures, given at the University of Michigan in 1935, owe their existence to the author's conviction that the scientist has a clear duty to make the general purport of his findings intelligible to the layman. The last three chapters, on "Intelligence in the World of Nature," "Man's Place in God's World," and "Death, or Life Eternal?" are the result of the author's desire to formulate a philosophy for the guiding of his own life.

Two corrections should be made. *Third Critique of Pure Reason* is not a correct title for any work by Kant. Two Scripture passages are referred to the Old Testament which actually must be found in the New (p. 113). (Is it possible that where "MacMillan" is printed, "Millikan" is meant? [pp. 86, 87].)

E. W. L.

The Christian View of Man. By GRESHAM MACHEN. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937. vi + 302 pp. $2.50.

The Machean viewpoint is well known among the readers of this journal. This book adds nothing to it except the freshness of the simple radio style. The Shorter Catechism is the normative Allah, and Charles Hodge of Princeton fame is its chief prophet. The theological doctrines of yesteryear are defended in a fresh manner: man is a sinner and saved by grace; God is Sovereign and asserts His prerogative of election; the Bible is as true now as it ever was; and so on.

VERGILIUS FERM

Five Minutes to Twelve. By ADOLF KELLER. Nashville, Tenn.: Cokesbury Press, 1938. 127 pp. $1.00.

A small book, but rich in content. "A Spiritual Interpretation of the Oxford and Edinburgh Conferences," it is also a diagnosis of the modern world and a testimony of personal experience. The arresting title is, as the author states, not a "scarehead" phrase, but "a challenge to the Church of Christ to use what may be its last opportunity" (p. 118).

This challenge is for the Church to recover the secret of spiritual power, and to make it available for the needs of men. That civilization is widely threatened with collapse is an evident fact. There is abundant knowledge, with ample material resources, to make possible unlimited progress, yet freedom is suppressed, inventions intended for human benefit are used as instruments of destruction, force is resorted to instead of peaceable solutions, excessive nationalism and claimed social superiority disrupt the unity of mankind. A fresh infusion of spiritual energy to overcome these assaults is a plain necessity. It is this power which the Church of Christ is called

upon to supply. For the Gospel which it is commissioned to proclaim is essentially the power—the δύναμις—of God. An inner receptivity, a willingness to accept this gift and to act in response to its direction, is the secret of recovery and of higher achievement. Schemes of social re-organization and "doing more things" cannot take the place of a vital knowledge of this spiritual source.

The setting of the author's treatment is the Barthian theology with its extreme insistance upon the transcendence of God. It is difficult to hold in a unified conception a belief in both the transcendence and the immanence of God, and one feels that here this unity is not made sufficiently the underlying conception. An occasional reference suggests that there is not an adequate appreciation of the Greek contribution to Christian theology. In Biblical interpretation the emphasis is laid, following Schweitzer, upon late Jewish eschatology as giving the character of the Gospel, a position which, though important, does not represent the essential nature of Jesus' teaching.

Of slighter significance—there does not seem to be any valid reason why the American members of the Conferences at Oxford and Edinburgh should have kept, as is said, their "democratic optimism in regard to the Social Gospel" in the background (p. 71). For a genuine realization of the Source of spiritual power is certainly the basis for hope and confidence, the "good news" for men; and the one Gospel of the Kingdom of God to be established on earth is the great aim for which men are bidden to pray and to seek.

But these comments are no detraction from the worth of the book. The author has something to say that is real and of great consequence, and he says it effectively. It is a book for which to be grateful.

An excellent bibliography, mainly on the two conferences, adds to its value.

R. C. K.

Religion and Public Affairs. Edited by Harris Franklin Rall. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937. xii + 240 pp. $2.00.

This is a collection of essays in honor of the Methodist bishop, Francis J. McConnell, written by his associates and representing his various interests and activities: labor relations, civil liberties, social security, cooperation with Latin America and with Oriental religions, and in general, the social application of personalistic idealism. The attention of the reader is called especially to the essay by Professor Edgar S. Brightman, who not only sketches the growth of Bishop McConnell's social philosophy, but attempts to formulate the more general social implications of personalism. The interest of religious leaders and institutions in public affairs is well illustrated by this volume, but not much clarified in theory.

H. W. S.

The Minister: His World and His Work. By WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN. Nashville, Tenn.: Cokesbury Press, 1937. 248 pp. $2.00.

There is no one whom we can name who is better qualified to discuss the work of the minister, his tasks and his problems, particularly as the representative and interpreter of the function of the Church in the modern world, than the author of this book. While Dr. Brown has had a long career as a professor of theology, making many scholarly contributions, he has never failed to realize the necessity of bringing a sound theology into relation with the daily duties and the large issues that are the concern of the minister, wherever he may be placed. The "care of all the churches" at home and abroad has been on his mind, as he has sought to promote their common welfare.

The contents of this book gives the substance of his intimate addresses to two groups of ministers in Texas, to which similar material from lectures delivered elsewhere, and from printed articles, have appropriately been added. The book has thus the appeal and directness of a personal conference in which the speaker draws upon his wide experience, as well as shares in considering the practical difficulties which his hearers have to meet.

It is fortunate that these addresses and discussions have been preserved in printed form. They are thus made available for profitable reading by ministers everywhere. But the book is valuable for laymen as well. Its clarifying interpretations of the distinct work of the Church in the modern world should do much to increase understanding, and to strengthen an intelligent support. It candidly examines outstanding questions of popular interest, such as the distinction between Protestantism and Roman Catholicism, the relation of science to religion, the nature of the present crisis in civilization. And throughout there is an apprehension of the unique contribution of religion, and of the forces which make for a more effective Christian unity.

R. C. K.

Heritage of Beauty. By DANIEL JOHNSON FLEMING. New York: Friendship Press. 1937. 99 pp. 45 photographs. $1.50.

The sub-title, *Pictorial Studies of Modern Christian Architecture in Asia and Africa Illustrating the Influence of Indigenous Cultures,* explains the contents of Professor Fleming's book exactly. But it would take a great many more words than that to do justice to the interest and importance of these contents, for they prove to us that the Christian missionary movement is at last emerging from its original, crude, Western provincialism into a real consciousness of the cultural values of other civilizations. The problem of naturalizing Christianity in the East has many angles, and one of the most important is that of church architecture. Climatic considerations are of primary importance, and the indigenous styles are naturally the best adapted to these requirements. Aesthetic considerations, also, seem to demand that a Christian church conform to its

architectural *milieu*. Most of the excellent photographs here reproduced show us such attempts at adaptation to native architecture. Among the most interesting of these experiments are: The Church of Jesus the Light of the World, in Old Cairo, an Anglican church built in Egyptian style, of Egyptian materials; The First Church of Christ (Chinese Congregational) in Honolulu, in the style of which the congregation paid tribute to its mother culture; the magnificent Catholic Cathedral at Phat-Diem, Indo-China, begun in 1888 by Father Six, an Annamite priest, which competes in splendor with the Buddhist temples; the Christukula Asram at Tirupatur, South India, in the traditional Dravidian style with great entrance towers in the wall enclosing the open porch, or *mandapam;* and the beautiful churches at Peshawar and Hyderabad, built in the Moslem style evolved centuries ago in Northern India. These are the impressive, full-blown flowers of this attempt to make Christianity at home in all the world. But even more appealing are the humbler forms illustrated: the chapel of the Papauta Girls' School in Samoa, a true native structure of breadfruit tree-trunks, tree ferns, wild bamboo, and cocoanut—almost a natural growth from the very soil of the jungle; the primitive mud platforms built for worship in Hindu villages, with only a rug to sit on, and an improvised awning for shelter from the burning sun; and the little garden shrine of the House of the Merciful Savior, in Wuchang, concerning which the author says: "The plain cross makes it unmistakably Christian; and the little tiled, curved roof just as unmistakably identifies it as Chinese. The crippled, blind or orphaned children in this home must feel that this shrine belongs to them."

But there is also a negative aspect to this process of adaptation. In some countries the national styles are too closely associated with the old religion, and a clean break from tradition is actually desired by the natives themselves. The author states: "Japanese Christians do not wish to be reminded of their religious past. A Western building helps to symbolize the fact that Christianity is different. At this stage they would rather run the risk of becoming too Western in their church architecture than to incur the danger of continued and possible dangerous entanglement with Shinto through the use of symbols, ritual, and architecture adapted from these religions." And in Medak, India, it was thought advisable to erect a great Gothic edifice to give prestige to a religious body composed of former outcastes—the poor and the despised of the community—and to be an outward and visible sign that Christianity has come to stay for all time.

M.B.

Transcendental Magic; Its Doctrine and Ritual. By ELIPHAS LÉVI. Translated, Annotated and Introduced by ARTHUR EDWARD WAITE. New and Revised Edition. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, Inc., 1938. xxxviii + 522 pp. $3.75.

In these days, when Magic is a way of earning a living, it is pleasant to

pass some time in the company of one to whom Magic was a way of life. Alphonse Louis Constant, like Robinson's Miniver Cheevy, was born too late; his nineteenth century environment prevents him from looming in intellectual history like Agrippa or Paracelsus in the fifteenth century. Magic, by the time of Constant, had long lost its claim to respectability.

That this work has remained alive is a tribute to the energy of a comparatively small clique of occultists whose interests go beyond orthodox Theosophy. Arthur Edward Waite is an outstanding scholar in this group. His original works are thorough, but the conclusions are limited by his preconceptions, and by the taste of the audience for whom he writes. It is significant, therefore, that, throughout the notes to this new edition of Constant's book, Waite presents a somewhat critical view of the French occultist's work. This attitude is especially valuable here, because it takes the form of translating passages from other books in which Constant has differed, often radically, from his expression in *Transcendental Magic.*

The first part of the book, treating of the doctrines of transcendental magic, is somewhat clearer and more self-consistent than is the second part, which deals with the ritual of magic. Constant apparently recognized this, for he suggests to the would-be magician "Believe and act; you will understand later" (p. 254). It must, however, be pointed out that belief is made difficult by the use of words in meanings other than those usually attached to them; this is particularly true of other philosophies which are frequently mentioned, such as the Kabbalah and the Christian religion.

JOSEPH L. BLAU

H. P. Blavatsky and the Theosophical Movement. By C. J. RYAN. Point Loma, Cal.: Theosophical University Press, 1937. xxi + 369 pp. $2.50.

To readers unfamiliar with the history of the Theosophical Movement this survey is welcome and useful. It brings together for the first time a balanced and connected account of H. P. Blavatsky's whole career. To have from the pen of an informed theosophist a description of the founder and the founding, as theosophists understand them, is the first step toward the more comprehensive and critical history which still remains to be written. The account in this volume of the later history of the movement and of its dissensions is less satisfactory; the informed will see in it much special pleading, and the uninformed will wish for more detailed knowledge on crucial points. The aim of the book, however, is praiseworthy, for it passes over most of the rivalries, chicaneries, and polemics which, in the longer perspectives of history, will presumably seem of passing significance, and it brings to the fore those central themes of theosophic teaching which constitute the nerve and life of the movement. One of the most interesting, if not crucial, of these themes is the influence of Brahman teachers and Oriental personalities on the movement; the contrast between Western

and Eastern approaches to "the Masters" is evident throughout this history and may some day receive more attention from the theosophists than they are at present disposed to grant it.

H. W. S.

Recoveries in Religion. By RALPH W. SOCKMAN. Nashville: Cokesbury Press. 1938. 284 pp. $2.00.

An expansion of the Quillian Lectures delivered at Emory University. "It is the effort of a minister working amid contemporary currents to point the directions which give most promise of advance."

In the City of Confusion. By BERNARD IDDINGS BELL. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1938. 151 pp. $1.25.

A series of Lenten meditations based on the theme of the value of adoration for man's salvation.

The Religion of Non-Religion. By FRIEDRICH SPIEGELBERG. London: The Buddhist Lodge, 1938. 19 pp.

A brilliant little essay on the monistic, pantheistic mysticism which has arisen in various forms, and at different epochs, as a reaction against dualistic, or polytheistic religions. The outstanding examples of this type of religious thinking are Neo-Platonism and Zen Buddhism.

Co-operation or Coercion? By L. P. JACKS. New York: E .P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1938. xvii + 153 pp. $2.00.

The Right to Believe. By J. S. WHALE. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938. 132 pp. $1.25.

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